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Preface 
In 1996-97, the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) received a 
grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, allowing two persons to 
undertake a study of Nato's out-of-area problems from a historical 
perspective. IFS also received a joint grant from the Norwegian Research 
Council and the British Council. Cand. Po lit. Torunn Laugen was engaged 
to study the post-Cold War period, and I was engaged to investigate the 
Cold War period. Laugen's study is published as Defence Studies no. 5/ 
1999. 
Given the scope of the topic, the study had to be strictly defined. A 
study based solely on secondary sources would be unsatisfactory, as 
several such studies are available already. On the other hand, a classic 
monograph - a survey of the topic based on virtually all primary sources 
available - would not have been feasible. Instead I decided to conduct a 
study based on a few, but hopefully key, representative and illustrative 
primary sources, supplemented by a selection of secondary sources. For 
the period up to the end of the 1960s, I could use Norwegian, British and 
American primary sources. For the 1970s and 1980s, only Norwegian 
sources were available. 
I am thankful to the Director of IFS, Professor Rolf Tamnes, for his 
guidance, advice, comments and suggestions. Others who have read 
drafts and made useful comments are Professor Olav Riste, Professor 
Geir Lundestad, and Ambassador Bj"rn Kristvik. A special thanks to Kari 
Dickson, who has put considerable effort into correcting and improving 
my English and writing style. 
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Introduction 
On the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1989-91, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)'s declared enemies 
disappeared. The Cold War came to an end and Nato was forced to think 
about its raison d'etre. One possible task for Nato that quickly appeared, 
was engagement in out-of-area issues. Many saw this not only as a new 
useful mission for Nato, but indeed as a rescue for an organization without 
a cause. The term (<out-of-area or out of business» was frequently heard 
in Nato circles. From 1992 to 1995, in the shadow of the civil war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nato slowly but surely prepared itselffor taking on 
out-of-area responsibilities. From 1995, Nato forces were dispatched to 
Bosnia with a United Nations mandate to implement and monitor the 
Dayton Peace Accord. This became Nato's first ground operation out-of-
area. Four years later, and this time without a United Nations mandate, 
Nato instigated air-strikes against a sovereign state, Yugoslavia, in an 
attempt to break the impasse regarding the rapidly deteriorating 
humanitarian situation in one of its provinces, Kosovo. 
This was a dramatic change from the Cold War era. From 1949 to 
1989, Nato was quite firmly committed to a non-policy regarding out-of-
area issues. Out-of-area issues were no fewer, nor less serious, than in the 
post Cold War era, but throughout the Cold War Nato remained very 
faithful to its policy of non-involvement in such issues. The most 
fundamental reason was differences in interests regarding areas outside 
Europe, and consequently a lack of will and ability to agree on a common 
policy. The United States had global interests; some Nato members, 
including major ones such as France and the United Kingdom, had 
substantial colonial interests; and some Nato members only had marginal 
interests outside of Europe. Another important reason was differences in 
ideology regarding international politics and how this should be conducted. 
Many non-colonial powers were anti-colonial and many of the smaller 
Nato members resented the «power politics» conducted by the major Nato 
nations outside the Nato area. A third reason was differences in the 
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perception of threat, especially those coming from the Soviet Union and 
global communism. While everybody recognized the constant, albeit 
varying, Soviet threat to the North Atlantic area, there was no such 
consensus on the Soviet threat to other parts of the world or the 
forcefulness of global communism. At first, the United States focused on 
the Soviet threat to the North Atlantic area. But during the course of the 
Cold War, the United States became more and more concerned about the 
global communist threat. The colonial powers, on the other hand, at first 
portrayed the Soviet threat as greatest to the North Atlantic area, and 
global communism as most dangerous in regions where they had colonies. 
After the dismantling of the colonial empires, however, they tended to 
downplay the communist threat to areas outside the North Atlantic area. 
The smaller non-colonial powers tended all along to downplay the Soviet 
and communist threat in far away areas, and instead focused on the Soviet 
threat in their local neighborhoods. 
In this situation~ with no convergence on interests, ideology, or 
perceptions of threat, Nato as a collective organization realized that to 
force the various members to reach a common policy on issues of 
particular interest to only some members, would lead to resentment and 
mischief, and could possibly undermine Nato's prime objective, the 
defense ofthe North Atlantic area from Soviet aggression. All Nato 
members instead found themselves either pursuing or accepting a policy 
with the inherent logic that the task of defending the North Atlantic area 
was so important that nothing should be allowed to obstruct it. Staying out 
of trouble outside the Nato area would also increase the possibilities of 
avoiding problems in connection with the formidable task of defending the 
North Atlantic area. However, there was a price to be paid for this: internal 
trouble regarding out-of-area issues occurred frequently, as some 
members at various times found this non-policy unsatisfactory and 
inadequate, and ventured to challenge it. 
The challenges fall into two main groups: first, in Nato's first two 
decades of existence, the colonial powers attempted to solicit Nato 
support for their actions and policy in their colonies. Second, from the 
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early I 960s, the United States wanted Nato to engage itself in containing 
communism in the Third World. Neither of these challenges succeeded. 
The colonial powers drummed up some support from individual Nato 
members, but not Nato as such. There were some exceptions, however, 
and in these cases, support was granted as it was believed to be for the 
sake of effectively defending the North Atlantic area. Similarly, until the 
early 1980s, Washington managed to receive some support from some 
Nato countries in some cases, but usually met solid opposition in its 
attempts to involve Nato in various Third World conflicts. 
In discussions regarding out-of-area issues in Nato, the members fell 
into four main groups. First, the United States, which was a non-colonial 
power with an increasingly global outlook. Second, the colonial powers 
(the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and Belgium) which originally had 
a global/regional outlook, but which, after losing most of their colonial 
influence, in many ways became like the third group. (The United 
Kingdom and France, did, however, maintain a broad outlook even after 
losing most of their colonial possessions.) The third group was the non-
colonial powers, which maintained a local outlook throughout the Cold 
War. This was either self-imposed as a result of World War II (Italy, tlhe 
Federal Republic of Germany), or simply because they were small 
(Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Canada). The fourth group (Greece and 
Turkey) was similar to the third in that they were non-colonial, less 
powerful and had a local outlook, but were different in that their local 
outlook extended to areas that were defined as out-of-area for Nato. The 
Netherlands is difficult to place, as it was a major colonial power until 
1949 - and a minor one until 1963 - but was also an «Atlantic animal»1 
with a close affinity to the United States, and was <dike-minded» with the 
Scandinavian powers in its Third World policy. Spain did not join Nato 
until 1982. 
Having a non-policy on out-of-area issues did not, of course, shield 
Nato from having to deal with them. During the Cold War, Nato was 
affected by the many crises, incidents and developments that occurred 
outside Nato territory, and had to address these issues in some way. Nato, 
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therefore, considered a handful of devices, of which consultations became 
the most widely used. 
These, however, were not sufficient for the larger Nato members, 
which despite acknowledging Nato's non-policy, - or because they 
acknowledged it from time to time, felt the need to engage in more 
substantial coordination regarding issues outside the Nato area. They 
therefore established an ad hoc, informal, bilateral cooperation, often of a 
low-scale military nature, on out-of-area issues. The groupings varied 
according to a «coalition of the willing» formula, whereby nations with 
particular interest in a specific case cooperated on that issue, but not 
necessarily on others. Coalitions between the United States and the United 
Kingdom were quite common, as were coalitions between groups of 
colonial powers, but others also occurred. This kind of cooperation was 
forced to take place outside Nato, due to what may be termed «coalitions 
of the unwilling» which prevailed within Nato. These also varied from 
case to case, but the nucleus often comprised the smaller non-colonial 
Atlantic nations, Denmark and Norway in particular. 
It may seem strange that the only nations which nearly always seemed 
to succeed in having their policy on out-of-area issues passed by Nato, 
were these small nations. The explanation, however, is quite simple. Nato 
was not a supranational organization, but an international organization 
based on unanimity. Formally, this meant that each nation had a veto in 
Nato's supreme forum, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This formality, 
however, was not sufficient if all the major powers were in agreement 
about one particular issue. If that was the case, their combined weight 
usually put the smaller powers in place. But this was rarely the case. On 
the contrary, the major powers were only seldom in agreement on out-of-
area issues. Thus, the smaller powers could generally rely on having one 
or more major power on their side, opposing Nato engagement. 
Out-of-area issues, as noted, gave rise to substantial noise, quarrels 
and disagreement within Nato during the Cold War era. Solidarity within 
the alliance was tested again and again, and political and military efficiency 
suffered due to all these «crises». Still, it is fair to say that out-of-area 
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issues were never decisive for Nato cohesion, nor seriously damaging for 
Nato.' After a seemingly serious out-of-area crisis, for example after the 
Suez crisis in 1956, Nato closed ranks remarkably quickly. It is natural to 
attribute much of Nato's ability to remain focused on its paramount task, 
the containment of the Soviet threat in the Nato area, to Nato's 
unwillingness to attempt to stretch the Nato solidarity to cover secondary 
concerns, namely out-of-area issues. 
In this study, the concept of «out-of-area issues» is used to denote 
issues relating to areas outside I) Nato territory, as defined in Article 6 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty (originally the European territory of the United 
Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, 
Iceland, Denmark and Norway, and from 1952, Greece and Turkey, and 
from 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany and from 1982, Spain; the 
North American territory of the United States and Canada; until 1962 
France's Algerian departments; islands under the jurisdiction of any of the 
above-mentioned in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; 
the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the above-mentioned, when in or 
over the above-mentioned territories, any other area in Europe in which 
occupying forces of any of the original parties were stationed on the date 
when the Treaty entered into force, the Mediterranean Sea, or the North 
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer),' and 2) Nato's declared 
enemy, the Soviet Union and its European satellites (members of the 
Warsaw Pact). 
Moreover, this study only deals with out-of-area incidents that had a 
bearing on Nato, i.e. those which forced members to raise the issue of 
Nato involvement. The question of enlargement is also discussed.' The 
study will not, however, deal with the various out-of-area issues as such, 
individual Nato members' out-of-area policy, or bilateral cooperation 
between member states. Such topics are only included if they provide a 
context, understanding, and explanation of this study's major focus: how 
Nato as an organization dealt with out-of-area issues, and why it did so in 
the way it did. 
In Chapter 1, after tracing the origins of the formal Nato area, and by 
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implication, what was considered to be out-of-area and why, I will look at 
the origins of the non-policy on out-of-area issues and the development of 
a number of devices created to deal with out-of-area issues. In Chapter 2, 
the first wave of challenges to the non-policy from the colonial powers 
will be discussed. Chapter 3 deals with the next serious challenge, posed 
by the United States from the early 1960s. In the concluding chapter, an 
attempt is made to gather the main threads and substantiate the general 
propositions made in this introduction. 
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Chapter 1: Defining the Nato area and 
establishing a non-policy on o[Dt-of-
areaiss[Des, 1948-1952 
The topic of this chapter is the creation of Nato and its fonnative years. 
The underlying reasons for the geographical definition of Nato and why 
some areas became «out-of-area», are to be found in this period. Above 
all, Nato was created to defend the North Atlantic area from Soviet 
aggression. Areas which were not deemed to be of the utmost importance 
in this regard, were, with a few exceptions, not included. This focus on 
the North Atlantic area, in addition to diverging interests, ideology and 
perceptions of threat to areas outside the North Atlantic area, is the main 
reason why Nato, from the start, chose a non-policy towards areas 
outside the alliance. But as everyone realized that events and developments 
in areas outside Nato would invariably affect the alliance, Nato policy-
makers had to establish how they would handle relations between Nato 
and areas outside the Treaty area. Thus, prior to signing the Treaty, and 
after much brainstorming, they drew up some basic principles and devices 
for handling Nato's relations with the outside world. Both the non-policy 
and these devices were soon to be brutally tested in the first major out-of 
area challenge for Nato, the Korean War. This war not only had great 
repercussions for Nato in general, but also influenced Nato's out-of-area 
thinking in the years that followed. 
The geographical definition of Nato, 1948-1949 
The definition of the geographical scope of Nato was primarily determined 
by the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and was carried out in three 
stages. The first was to link the principal area under Soviet threat, Western 
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Europe, with the principal provider of its security, the only nation with the 
resources to withstand the Soviet Union, the United States. The second 
was the inclusion of the countries which were strategically necessary to 
conclude the first stage: Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal. The 
third was to give special attention to political circumstances in France -
resulting in the inclusion of Italy and Algeria - because that country was 
deemed crucial in the defense of the North Atlantic area. During this three-
stage process a lot of sound and sensible arguments for the inclusion of 
other countries and areas were made, but they did not ultimately convince 
the decision-makers, primarily because the various candidates simply were 
not considered to be vital in the defense of the North Atlantic area. In 
addition, they would drain limited resources and stretch the proposed 
alliance to meaningless proportions, if they were included. All those 
involved realized that a (dine must be drawn somewhere.»' 
Linking Western \Europe with the United States 
As mentioned, the fundamental reasoning behind the formation of Nato 
was the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. Uneasiness about the 
intentions and behavior of the great communist power had increased in the 
final stages of World War 11, and peaked following the breakdown of the 
London Foreign Ministers' conference on Germany in December 1947, 
which for many was a litmus-test of the possibility to cooperate with 
Moscow. When the test failed, and the result was confirmed by the coup 
d'etat in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact 
with Finland and the rumors of a similar pact with Norway in February 
1948, it became top priority for leading Western European leaders to 
ensure the involvement of the United States, with its enormous resources, 
in countering this threat. First, they formed the Brussels Pact in March 
1948, consisting of the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Luxembourg. Its primary objective was, as noted by a prominent Nato 
historian, to entangle the United States in the defense of Western Europe.' 
Chronologically, as the initiative to form a Western alliance came from 
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Europe, the United States - and Canada, its junior partner - were the 
second group of countries to join the discussions on Western security in 
J 948- J 949. 
Despite the United States' geographic location far from potential rivals 
and enemies, a sense of vulnerability had traditionally led American 
officials «to regard preservation of a global balance of power as a vital 
interest)). After World War 11, policy-makers in Washington were forced to 
reconsider and adjust their strategies. As the Soviet Union emerged as a 
clear and direct threat from 1947-48 onward, Washington was more 
prepared than previously to deploy forces and establish bases overseas. 
Now, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the «entire area of 
Western Europe [ ... was] an area of strategic importance to the United 
States)). Therefore the military establishment and key officials in the 
administration succeeded in reversing the skepticism of the Congress and 
secured a positive American reply to the European request for help.7 
Including the .. link» countries 
One of the first questions asked by the delegates from the United States, 
Canada and the United Kingdom who met at the Pentagon in March-April 
1948 to take part in secret talks, was which nations should take part in a 
security arrangement for the North Atlantic area. At this point, the 
geographical scope was still quite fluid. Very broad concepts, based on 
culture and values, were brought to the table. The British Foreign Minister, 
Ernest Bevin, who had initiated the talks, had ideas for a security pact 
encompassing the whole free European civilization.' However, such lofty 
ideas were soon abandoned. During the «Washington Exploratory Talks)) 
in summer of 1948, the Brussels Pact members, which were all present, 
made it clear that they were interested in a limited alliance, rather than a 
broad one. They were first and foremost concerned about their own 
security and had no wish. as one historian puts it, to «share American 
largesse with outlying nations.))' 
Following an initial tug-of-war in Washington, this restrictive view was 
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firnlly rejected by the United States. lo Under Secretary of State, Robert 
Lovett, was of the opinion that the «Ultimate criterion» for any additional 
members, was whether inclusion enhanced American security, and, given 
the perceived Soviet threat to Western Europe, eased the burden of 
defending this area. In addition, the alliance had to be based on 
«reasonable geographic proximity and community of interest». Thus, as 
«Greenland and Iceland were more important than some nations in 
Western Europe to the security of the United States and Canada», and 
because the Americans thought it impossible to defend Western Europe 
without controlling such strategically important islands and a few key 
countries linking Europe with North America, such as Norway, Denmark 
(which governed Greenland) and Portugal (including the Azores), 
Washington insisted that these countries should be included. Given their 
primary goal of securing American involvement in the defense of Western 
Europe, the European delegates could not object to this.11 
The possibility of being covered by an American security commitment 
was the main reason why the «link» countries chose to accept the 
invitation to become members of the North Atlantic Treaty. But they had 
reservations, and the alliance was adjusted to meet their special national 
security needs. Iceland, which had no military forces and was situated in a 
strategically significant area for the superpowers, was reluctant to enter 
into an alliance with the Western powers, for fear of being dragged into a 
superpower conflict and, in addition, was unwilling to yield national 
sovereignty. A precondition for Icelandic membership was that «there 
would be no military presence [in Iceland] in peacetime». 12 The 
Norwegian government was hesitant about breaking away from its policy 
of non-alignment, and had to win over considerable left-wing opposition to 
entering an alliance with the capitalist United States. In the spirit of Nordic 
cooperation, Norway and Denmark also made a futile attempt to create a 
Scandinavian alliance. In addition, both countries insisted that there should 
be no allied bases in these countries (except on Greenland) in peacetime, in 
order to satisfY critical domestic opinion and to avoid provoking the 
neighboring Soviet Union too much. I' All in all, there was a strong 
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determination in the Nordic countries involved to limit the allied defense 
cooperation as much as possible. They agreed to measures that were 
deemed absolutely necessary to contain the Soviet Union, but would go no 
further. This kind of thinking was also to be crucial regarding out-of-area 
issues. Portugal had to square possible new Atlantic commitments with its 
defense pact with Spain, and found out that they were compatible. 
However, the exclusion of Spain, a close political ally, from the Atlantic 
alliance caused deep dissatisfaction." 
The problem cases: Italy and Algeria 
In many ways, the above-mentioned eleven Atlantic countries, together 
with the occupied West Germany, formed a «naturab, strategic and 
geographic entity to counter a possible Soviet attack on the North Atlantic 
area. There were, however, many additional candidates for membership, 
and in order to evaluate inclusion systematically, certain criteria were set 
forth in the discussions. These were generally applicable, but were 
particularly pertinent in the case of Italy, which, despite not being an 
Atlantic state, was the most frequently mentioned possible member of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. 
The first criterion was whether new members would be an economic 
or military burden or asset to the alliance. In the case of Italy, it was 
argued that its location as a non-Atlantic state, would made it difficult to 
defend, and that this could drain resources and divert them from 
strategically more important areas. Nor would the burden be sufficiently 
offset by Italy's assets, given the restrictive clauses imposed on the Italian 
military after World War n which considerably reduced the potential 
military contribution to the common cause." A second criterion was 
whether the candidates were politically acceptable. After all, the North 
Atlantic Treaty was also intended to defend democratic free nations 
against the dictatorial rule of the communist Soviet Union. In the case of 
Italy, many felt uneasy about the historical legacy of World War I, the 
fascist regime ofBenito Mussolini and its behavior during World War n. 
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Some feared that Italy would be an «ineffectual and undependable ally»." 
A third criterion which was particularly relevant to Italy was whether 
inclusion would strengthen the candidate's Western orientation. Though 
the military containment of the Soviet Union was the primary reason for 
the North Atlantic Treaty, another motivating factor was the wish to spark 
a cooperative mood in Western Europe, to boost a region struggling with 
economic problems and a lack of confidence, and to integrate the losers of 
World War 11 back into the fold, particularlY West Germany and ltaly.l7 In 
this context, the selection process was vital. Failure to include a nation 
that wanted to join could set in motion a process whereby that country 
developed a closer relationship with the enemy. 
The inclusion of Italy in the Western security discussions was briefly 
considered prior to the Italian general election in April 1948, in order to 
weaken the communist party.'" But after the election, in which the non-
communist parties won an overwhelming majority, the fact that Italy was 
not an Atlantic power again rose to prominence. The Americans now «felt 
that the inclusion of Italy, unless it had theretofore become a member of 
the Brussels Pact, would be a mistake since it would destroy the 
geographic basis of the North Atlantic area.»" Canada and the Brussels 
Pact members agreed. Even the French, who later became Italy's primary 
supporters, questioned the desirability of including Italy in the proposed 
alliance, as at this stage, France's aim was to limit the alliance to the 
Brussels Pact members, the United States and Canada." 
Later, the question of Italy's political orientation again became the 
focus. The then American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, wrote in his 
memoirs: «from a political point of view an unattached Italy was a source 
of dangen). He continued: «Italy might suffer from an isolation complex 
and, with its large Communist party, fall victim to seduction from the 
Easu)2I Italy should therefore not be left in the cold. But as Italy primarily 
was of strategic importance in terms of the defense of continental Europe, 
and not from an Atlantic point of view, the United States favored the 
inclusion of Italy in the Brussels Pact, or alternatively, membership in a 
future Mediterranean pact." The Brussels Pact countries, not wanting to 
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impair the American security commitment, dragged their feet and came up 
with all sort of proposals, short of inviting Italy to join the Brussels Pact. 
The Dutch even proposed adding annexes to the Treaty, stating the 
alliance's relevance to certain external areas, which would then enhance 
Italy's security." 
But when France realized that the inclusion of the «link» countries 
would tilt the balance within the alliance to the North, and that Italian 
membership would enable them «to make a more forceful case for the 
inclusion of North Africa», Paris became the primary mover in the 
campaign for the inclusion of Italy." At the start of 1949, no participants 
in the talks had any strong feelings about extending membership to Italy. 
However, in February 1949, France set the surprising ultimatum, that if 
Italy did not become a member, France would oppose Norway's 
membership. This provoked the other participants to the extent that it 
nearly proved counter-productive for France. The other delegates 
maintained that Norway was a totally different issue from Italy. Norway's 
case rested on geographical and strategic imperatives in the task of 
defending the North Atlantic area from Soviet aggression, whereas this 
was not the case with Italy. Despite the anger caused by France's 
behavior, Italy was the last country to become a signatory to the original 
Treaty when the American President, Harry S. Truman, on Acheson's 
insistence with reference to France's strong opinion, grudgingly accepted 
Italy's inclusion.2s 
Towards the end of the squabble regarding Italy, France also demanded 
that Algeria should be included in the alliance, as «Algeria was a part of 
France and in the same relation to France as Alaska and Florida to the 
United States». The American Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, 
was very much opposed to trying <<to expand the area beyond the basic 
limits of the homelands.» The alliance had the North Atlantic area as its 
core area. To include North Africa would make it <<impossible to draw a 
logical line anywhere» and would «open up a limitless field». In reply to a 
charge from the French Ambassador to Washington that the core area had 
«been greatly expanded by the inclusion of the northern territories of 
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Canada, Alaska and possibly Norway and Denmark», Lovel! said that there 
was a marked difference between these areas and North Africa, which 
«had been considered and found to be not of cardinal importance.»" 
However, the United States accepted the inclusion of Algeria, primarily 
because France was important to the alliance and because it helped to 
solve the impasse regarding Italy and Norway." It was emphasized, 
though, that Algeria was an exception. Washington feared that if other 
colonies were included, the United States would be sucked into colonial 
wars all over the world." 
With the exception of France, potential members possessing colonies 
quite easily accepted that the colonies would not be included in the 
alliance. After all, colonies were of secondary concern in relation to the 
hope that the United States would provide security against the Soviet 
Union. In addition, the colonial powers were not interested in the 
possibility of others meddling in their colonial affairs. 
The "remainder .. category 
During the deliberations leading up to the signing ofthe Treaty, there was 
a «remainder» category of nations, which for various reasons were briefly 
considered for membership. Four subgroups can be identified in this 
category. 
The first subgroup included the three neutral states, Sweden, Ireland 
and Switzerland. The two former were considered as (<link» countries. To 
include Sweden, however, was unrealistic, as participation in a security 
alliance was not compatible with Sweden's long-standing policy of 
neutrality. Ireland was effectively ruled out by insisting linking the question 
of the secession of North em Ireland from the United Kingdom with the 
question of participation in the security alliance. None of the delegates in 
the preparatory talks found this acceptable. Switzerland was never 
formally invited to join the alliance, as it was assumed that the answer 
would be no. However, had the Swiss wished to join, they would have 
been welcomed.29 
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The second subgroup comprised the occupied West Germany and 
Austria. As it would have been politically futile to suggest that they should 
be included, these countries were not under consideration for immediate 
membership, but it was agreed that they would possibly join at a later 
stage. In the meantime, their territories were to be covered by the Treaty, 
by way of reference in Article 6 to {<occupying forces of any of the 
Parties».JO 
The third was the exposed borderline countries, Greece, Turkey and 
Iran. The concern that selecting countries to participate in a Western 
security arrangement would invariably leave someone out in the cold, 
combined with an alleged expansionist Soviet Union, was especially 
pertinent in the case of these countries.]! They were under considerable 
communist pressure: Greece from within, and Turkey and Iran from the 
Soviet Union. But the desire to avoid affronting the Soviet Union too close 
to its territory, was sincere. This aspect of reassurance, combined with 
the fact that Greece, Turkey and Iran were relatively far removed from 
the core area of Nato, and that the United States had bilateral security 
arrangements with them, are the main reasons why these countries did not 
become full members in 1949.32 
The fourth group comprised the long-shot, Brazil, which briefly was 
considered in the preliminary talks for Nato, but was too far away and too 
culturally different from the group of seven to really be seriously 
considered.]] (The same applies to Egypt, which requested Nato 
membership in 1950.34) 
Even if the countries in this diverse «remainder» category did satisfY 
some of the criteria for inclusion, they did not satisfy all, and certainly not 
the crucial ones: that they were geographically and strategically important 
in the defense of the North Atlantic area. As a result, none of them was 
eligible for membership in the alliance. 
All in all, there was a relatively restrictive attitude towards which countries 
should be included in the alliance. But this, however, did have a downside: 
how to provide for the security of the world's free countries which were not 
included in this paramount security alliance of the free world? 
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Considering out-of-area devices, 1948-1949 
The criteria for membership developed during the process leading up to 
Nato left many non-communist countries out-of-area. Their security 
problems in relation to a perceived threat from the Soviet-led communist 
bloc remained unresolved and had to be addressed. In was a common 
belief that every communist advance in the global struggle would 
dangerously affect the existing balance of powers and would have a 
negative long-tenn impact on Western security. Furthennore, all out-of-
area conflicts, whether or not these stemmed from communism, could 
eventually involve the great powers, spill over into the Nato area and 
trigger a large-scale war. Moreover, some of the nations in the Western 
security talks had national interests outside the North Atlantic area, and 
wanted to use their Nato membership to protect them. 
During the security talks, six devices were considered to help cope 
with the security needs of countries not included in the alliance: I) limited 
membership in the alliance; 2) the establishment of a series of alliances 
across the globe (in which the North Atlantic Treaty would be first among 
equals); 3) an implicit understanding between Nato countries, the Soviet 
Union and the countries in need of protection, that Nato cared for the 
security of these countries; 4) explicit declarations that left no doubt that 
the North Atlantic Treaty indeed cared for the security of certain non-
member countries; 5) consultations among Nato countries on out-of-area 
security questions on a case-by-case basis; 6) as a last resort: an 
expansion of the Nato area. 
The purpose of the first device, limited membership, was to establish 
links with countries which did not want to become full members such as 
Sweden, did not geographically or strategically belong in the North Atlantic 
area such as Italy, or, for various reasons, would be useful associates for 
Nato. The negotiators basically envisaged two categories in addition to full 
membership: I) associated members with limited commitments and 
responsibilities; 2) nations which, if threatened, would be consulted and 
possibly receive help from full members. In addition, the Dutch Foreign 
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Minister, Eelco van Kleffens, suggested that some countries should be 
associated to the alliance through amendments to the Treaty, All these 
proposals were quickly rejected, however, as it was felt that they would 
weaken the alliance and confuse the original purpose of defending the 
North Atlantic area from the Soviet Union," 
As regards the next possible device, the idea of a series of alliances 
stretching across the world was tabled at various times during the talks, 
The most ambitious suggestion was that the United States - which would 
be a member in all alliances - would specifically design its commitments 
according to local circumstances, Such grand designs, though, did not 
generate much support, First of all, American skepticism to commiting 
American resources anywhere, initially even in Western Europe, based on 
the perception that these resources were limited, did not allow for this 
kind of thinking. Second, such alliances would, to an unacceptable extent, 
undermine the United Nations and the idea of collective security. 
Provisions in the United Nations' Charter made allowances for regional 
security arrangements - such as Nato -, but if the United States was a 
member of all of them, then their regional character would undoubtedly be 
questioned. Third, and most importantly, it was argued that such alliances 
would probably not provide the necessary security. There was no point in, 
as one American official put it, «spreading the butter so thin that it would 
not feed anyone.»" 
More limited alliance arrangements were investigated thoroughly. The 
most pressing concerns out-of-area were at Nato's Southeast frontier. The 
creation of alliances covering the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
would have many advantages. This would allow membership for those 
Western powers with interests in the region, and relinquish responsibility 
for those without. It would also make it possible for Washington to 
commit itself less than to the North Atlantic area, which was more 
important. And, perhaps the most tempting aspect of such alliances was 
that they would take care of the security needs of Greece, Turkey, Iran 
(and for a while, also Italy) without having to include these countries in 
Nato. But the American arguments against such ambitious alliance ideas 
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were applied here, too. Washington was of the view that it was already 
doing a lot for security in this region by providing assistance to Greece 
and Turkey, and was skeptical of greater commitment. In addition, it 
would be wrong to give more promises than one could keep. Thus, 
Mediterranean and Middle East alliances were not established in 1949. But 
some countries, especially the United Kingdom, which traditionally had the 
largest interests in the region, continued to push the idea into the 1950s.37 
The third device which was considered to bring areas outside the 
alliance within its security scope, was to reach an implicit understanding 
with certain countries that even though they were not offered membership 
in Nato, they were included in the general picture and would be given due 
assistance in the event of an attack from the Soviet Union. Such an 
understanding would, by nature, be vague and non-committal. It would 
primarily rest on the premise that the countries in question - and the Soviet 
Union - understood that it would be in Nato's own interest to come to 
their aid in the event of Soviet aggression. The countries most often 
mentioned in this context were West Germany, Austria, and Spain. 
Geographically, historically and culturally, they belonged in the western 
camp, but due to their former or present fascist regimes, it was politically 
impossible to include them in the alliance itself. At the same time, it was 
taken for granted that these countries, at least West Germany and Spain, 
would become members at some future date, once their fascist legacy had 
faded. The great powers agreed that (<no western security system would 
be complete unless Spain and Germany played their proper roles.» Their 
strategic importance was too great. An implicit understanding that Nato 
would provide for the security of these areas outside the alliance was 
therefore in reality only a temporary device. J8 
The fourth device designed to provide security for areas outside Nato 
was to issue explicit statements (or alternatively - «some sort of protocob> 
attached to the Treaty) to the effect that member states would take the 
necessary steps if certain countries were threatened by hostile powers. 
The use of an implicit understanding was considered suitable for countries 
such as West Germany. Spain and Austria, as the objective was to 
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circumvent the political sensitivity related to tllese countries within the 
nations of the future North Atlantic Treaty; but if the purpose was to send 
out a signal to certain countries, the Soviet Union in particular, that Nato 
had strategic concerns in areas not covered by the alliance, then explicit 
statements seemed better suited. The device was at one time proposed as 
a possible solution to the problem of Italy, but was rejected by the French. 
It was more applicable to the problems of Greece, Turkey, and Iran." 
These countries, Turkey in particular, were extremely disappointed that 
they were not being invited to join the alliance, especially after it became 
clear that Italy would join. The promises of the Western powers that they 
probably would become members of a Mediterranean or a Middle East 
alliance at some future date, did not mollify them. They continued their 
campaign for inclusion in the Atlantic alliance. The Americans and the 
British admitted «that the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact might have 
undesirable repercussions on certain nations which would not be included 
in its scope.» In order to rectifY this and demonstrate support to Greece, 
Turkey and Iran immediately, an official statement seemed a good 
alternative. The British, who had major interests in the region, considered 
this «virtually as important as the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact 
itself.»" 
This was in fact to become the device used to deal with these 
countries' security needs at the time when the North Atlantic Treaty was 
concluded. However, it was not Nato, but the United States, which 
unilaterally issued the statement. On 18 March 1949, the same day that the 
proposed North Atlantic Treaty was announced, the American Secretary 
of State, Dean Acheson, delivered this statement on radio: 
In the compact world of today, the security of the United States cannot 
be defined in terms of boundaries and frontiers. A serious threat to 
international peace and security anywhere in the world is of direct 
concern 10 this country. Therefore, it is our polic..-y lu help free peoples to 
maintain their integrity and independence, not only in Western Europe 
or the Americas, but wherever the aid we are able 10 provide call be 
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effective. Our actions in supporting the integrity and independence of 
Greece, Turkey and Irall are expressions of that determination. Our 
interest in the security of these countries has been made deal; and we 
shall continue to pursue that policy. 'I 
The fifth possible out-of-area device was consultations. The original idea 
was to give countries under communist threat the opportunity to consult 
with Nato or Nato members, «with the object of [the Nato powers] taking 
any measures which may be necessary.» It would be up to Nato or its 
individual members to decide on the scope and content of any eventual 
measure following such consultations, but it was still believed that the 
right to consult with Nato countries would give some reassurance to non-
Nato, non-communist countries. At the same time, it was hoped that the 
existence of such a consultation mechanism would serve as a warning and 
reminder to the Soviet Union. The device was originally considered to be 
particularly relevant regarding Italy, North Africa and indeed any country 
and/or area belonging to the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC). In fact, the head of the Policy Planning Staff in the 
American Department of State, George Kennan, thought that the security 
of all non-Atlantic free countries should be covered by this device." 
In the course of the security talks, the idea of fonnalized consultations 
with countries outside Nato was replaced by the idea of consultations on 
out-of-area issues within Nato. All parties agreed that this kind of 
consultation clause would be appropriate, but opinions differed as to its 
fonn and content. The United Kingdom, with substantial interests outside 
the Nato area, wanted any consultation clause to be as committed as 
possible. The British wanted to obligate members to consult each other if 
any member country's national integrity - including its colonies - was 
threatened. Washington, especially the Pentagon, disliked such a 
mandatory element and the inclusion of the colonial possessions on the 
grounds that this would result in loo many commitments and excessive 
Nato responsibility for areas outside the Treaty. The outcome - Article 4 in 
the Treaty- was a compromise, but would in the future serve as an 
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important device for dealing with out-of-area issues: «The parties will 
consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is 
threatened.»" 
The sixth device was never really discussed, but was a logical 
possibility that could not be dismissed, namely to expand the alliance to 
include other areas. This was how many thought the security problems of 
West Germany, Spain and possibly Austria would be solved in the future. 
Although no other countries were under serious consideration for 
membership at the time the Treaty was concluded, there was a realization 
that in the future, situations may arise in which Nato would have to 
reconsider its geographical scope. 
All these various devices, with the exception of limited membership, 
which was rejected, were very quickly and seriously tested, when North 
Korean forces attacked South Korea on 25 June 1950 and generated one 
of the most serious crises in the Cold War. 
The first major out-of-area challenge: The Korean War, 
1950-1953 
Few in the Western camp doubted that the Soviet Union had instigated the 
North Korean attack on South Korea. The attack was seen as the latest, 
albeit most flagrant, expression of an expansionist communist bloc aimed 
at taking a substantial lead over the free world in the Far East. The Soviet 
atomic explosion in 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong's victory in the Chinese 
civil war the same year, the subsequent alliance between China and the 
Soviet Union, communist threats against Indochina, Malaya and the 
Philippines - all pointed in the same direction. Moreover, most believed 
there was, at least in the longer term, a real danger that the Soviet Union 
could mount similar attacks on the North Atlantic area. We now know that 
these beliefs were, if not altogether wrong, inaccurate and greatly 
exaggerated. But the sentiments nevertheless explain the strong reaction in 
Western capitals to the attack. The West believed it had to counter the 
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onslaught in order to maintain its credibility within its own camp, with the 
Soviet Union and with the neutrals." 
As Nato's first serious out-of-area issue, the war can be viewed from 
several angles. As a local war, it was not of great significance. The Korean 
peninsula was far away and of little strategic importance to Western 
Europe and the United States. Nor did Korea possess natural reSOurces 
worthy of Nato's attention. For Nato, the most significant aspect of the 
Korean War as a local war, was that it threatened a globally important 
center of industrial and military power: Japan." But this was not sufficient 
to warrant any substantial consideration in Nato fora of the Korean War as 
a local conflict. 
If the Korean War is viewed as an omen for what might conceivably 
also have happened in the Nato area, however, it is a wholly different 
matter. As such, the war represented a turning point for Nato. The 
communist bloc, and by implication the Soviet Union, had shown that it 
could aggressively use arms to achieve political and territorial objectives.46 
As it was believed that a similar act of Soviet aggression could take place 
in Europe, Nato had to take precautions. Nato members dramatically 
increased their military spending. The alliance itself established an 
integrated command structure and collective defense framework; it began 
the process of rearming and integrating the Federal Republic of Germany 
into the North Atlantic Treaty, and Greece and Turkey were invited to join 
the alliance. These events are viewed by many scholars as the most 
important aspects of the Korean War for Nato, and were indeed prime 
illustrations of how an out-of-area issue could affect Nato in the Cold 
War.47 
The third angle from which to view the Korean War as an out-of-area 
issue for Nato, and the one to which most attention is devoted, is the 
Korean War as the first case where Nato and Nato members actually had 
to deal with an out-of-area conflict. Basically, the West interpreted the 
outbreak and initial development of the war in the same way. Western 
powers were able to respond collectively and militarily to a clear act of 
aggression. And as long as the American-led United Nations intervention 
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maintained a clear objective and good chances of succeeding, the West 
demonstrated unity and forcefulness. But as these criteria were eroded, so 
was Western unity. Diverging interests, different perceptions of threat, 
and, most of all, different conceptions of what constituted the best means 
to meet the communist challenge, surfaced among the allies. In the 
context of this study, the most serious consequence of these 
disagreements was that the Western powers allocated a very small role to 
Nato in the handling of the conflict, because they feared it would 
undennine Nato cohesion regarding the North Atlantic area. Despite the 
American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles' statement that "if 
hostilities can be tenninated in Far East, NATO will be the first 
beneficiary», and his assurances that "US [United States] efforts in Far 
East areas are aimed directly at increased strength and security for 
NATO», all the important aspects of the Korean War were tackled without 
Nato participation." Issues related to Korea were dealt with at length in 
Nato, but they were almost exclusively focused on the defense build-up in 
the North Atlantic area, and not Korea as an out-of-area conflict. 
Slrains on Weslern unily 
The West quickly succeeded in getting the United Nations to authorize a 
multilateral American-led intervention force. In the first few weeks after 
the attack, Western unity was strong. Interests, perceptions of threat and 
practical response seemed to converge. But soon after, Western unity 
became strained. Whereas Washington was more inclined to rely on 
military strength and tough action, Western Europe - led by the British -
was more inclined to make concessions and work in cooperation with 
neutral and Third World countries. The British "proposed compromises 
often resembled surrenders», the American Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, wrote in his memoirs. He also reacted sharply to the British 
Foreign Secretary, Emest Bevin's suggestion in July 1950 to link a 
settlement along the 38th parallel (the border between North and South 
Korea established after World War 1I) with American withdrawal from the 
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Taiwan Strait and mainland China representation in the United Nations." 
The most important explanation for these differences on the Western 
side was diverging views and perceptions due to different interests. 
Whereas Washington refused to have anything to do with communist 
China, London had considerable economic interests there, in addition to 
interests in Hongkong, Malaya and Singapore. The United Kingdom was 
afraid that the conflict in Korea could jeopardize its interests and its 
empire. Washington did not pay much heed to British national interests in 
its formulation of the Korean War policy. On the contral)', American 
officials became quite upset when the British referred to regional and 
national interests, as opposed to common Western interests, in their 
arguments against American policy in Korea. 50 Only in rare instances did 
the British and allies' attitude have an impact on American policy, such as 
when the American Commander in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur's 
proposal to use large Nationalist Chinese forces in the war, was rejected.5I 
Other regional and national interests connected to, but with no direct 
bearing on, the war in Korea also influenced how the allies handled the 
war. The British, for instance, were interested in having a good 
relationship with the United States regarding Korea in order to secure 
Washington's support in the Middle East. 52 One of the main reasons why 
London, despite initial opposition, tried to accommodate Washington on 
the issue of economic sanctions against communist China in 1951, was 
that the British needed American support in their conflict with Iran. Other 
countries, such as Australia, the Philippines, Turkey and Greece, were 
eager to obtain an American security commitment, and contributed forces 
in Korea in order to achieve this objective. The latter two also hoped to be 
rewarded with Nato membership." 
For Nato's smaller nations, policy formulation regarding the conflict 
reflected a lack of interests in the Far East. They were more than pleased 
with the forceful American response to the attack, but primarily because, 
as the Norwegian Ambassador to Washington, William Morgenstierne, told 
Acheson in June 1950, «the small nations of Europe no longer doubted 
American determination to defend them under NATO»." In the same vein, 
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they were also of the opinion that any response to communist aggression 
in Asia had to be controlled. From their perspective, it was important that 
the commitments in the Far East did not interfere with the much more 
important economic and military build-up in the North Atlantic area, and, 
not the least, did not increase the possibilities oftriggering a major war 
involving China or the Soviet Union." 
This concern was acknowledged by all the European allies, great and 
small. They were pleased that the United States took on the challenge 
posed by the communists in the Far East, but were afraid that in doing so, 
Washington would overreact and endanger the defense of the West. 56 An 
escalation and/or hostilities outside Korea, especially in the Middle East or 
the North Atlantic area, would in their view mean that the military 
response to the North Korean attack had been a terrible mistake. The 
United States, on the other hand, pursued its policy in the conviction that it 
was in the best interests of Europe. Washington acted tough as this was 
widely believed to be the best way of deterring the Soviet Union, also in 
Europe. 
ManifestatiDns Df disunity 
Different interests, perceptions of threat, and application of means 
continued to haunt the allies throughout the war. In fact, they surfaced at 
almost every juncture in the course of the war. For example, the European 
contribution to the military effort in Korea was, to a large extent, 
motivated by the need to show the kind of solidarity which they expected 
the United States to demonstrate in a future crisis in Europe: military 
intervention. On the other hand, given the fear of an attack in Europe, 
Washington should not pay too much attention to Korea, either. That some 
allies were opposed to committing forces in Korea, should be interpreted 
in this light; they believed that these forces were more needed in the 
defensc of the North Atlantic area. For instance, Norway argued that 
diverting excessive manpower to Korea could weaken the overall goal of 
defending the North Atlantic area and that priorities were being rearranged 
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without knowing the consequences. Most importantly, it could also 
undenmine economic well-being in the North Atlantic area and thus 
Western military capabilities in the long run. The Pentagon basically agreed 
with this, but had to argue with the State Department and the White 
House, which, for propaganda purposes, wanted to assemble as broad a 
coalition as possible. As a result, non-American participation was limited to 
token contributions, leaving the Americans to take the brunt of the 
fighting. " 
Similarly, the primary reason why the European allies in the end 
supported the controversial American decision to cross the 38th parallel in 
autumn of 1950, was because they feared that by not doing so, they 
would endanger American engagement in Western Europe. European 
support was conditional in that the advance should not trigger a Chinese or 
Soviet response, which in turn could lead to a globalization of the conflict. 
Any sign of this, and the advance should halt. When China indeed entered 
the war in November, the European allies blamed the Americans, and 
changed their overall soft opposition to a more forceful one." 
The Europeans received another blow when, at a press conference 
later the same month, President Truman hinted at the possible use of 
atomic weapons in Korea. The British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, 
rushed to Washington to discuss, in the words of a leading historian on the 
Korean War, "an Asia conflict that threatened to tear apart the Western 
alliance.» Attlee's criticism of the United States' attitude to Korea was, 
however, largely ignored. True, a deeper understanding that a wider 
conflict was not in the interests of the West had evolved in Washington, 
but Attlee's proposals - echoing those of Bevin five months earlier - to link 
the re-establishment of the 38th parallel with an American withdrawal 
from the Taiwan Strait and communist China's membership in the United 
Nations, were resolutely rejected by Acheson. Nor did Attlee succeed in 
getting the United States to agree that the United Kingdom should be 
informed in advance of any eventual use of atomic weapons." 
Allied criticism, from the British in particular, of American conduct in 
the war on the ground and American handling of the conflict in the United 
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Nations persisted throughout the first half of 1951. In January 1951, the 
British Minister of War, John Strachey, warned Bevin that a world war 
could start within two years if the United States got its way in the Korean 
War. Bevin thought this was an exaggeration, but tried as hard as possible 
to hold the United States back, but to no avail. The American proposal to 
brand China as aggressor in the l1nited Nations followed a similar pattern. 
Acheson, irritated by allied feet-dragging, resorted to indirect threats by 
saying that a failure of the United Nations to recognize this aggression 
«would create a wave of isolationism in this country which would 
jeopardize all that we are trying to do with and for the Atlantic Pact 
countries.» This intimidation worked; despite changes in the wording, the 
main content of the resolution remained unchanged and was passed by all 
the Western powers. Later that spring, the British protested against 
American plans to attack Manchuria if the Chinese carried out substantial 
air attacks in Korea, but once again had to back down. 60 
The differences between the United States and its allies did not 
evaporate when the discussions on a ceasefire started in the summer of 
1951. The allies found Washington too stubborn and too reliant on military, 
rather than diplomatic, solutions. Crises occurred within the alliance 
frequently. In 1952, Acheson was so angry about the British and Canadian 
support for an earlier version of the Indian United Nation proposal for the 
repatriation of prisoners of war that he allegedly threatened the British 
Foreign Minister, Selwyn Lloyd, to dissolve Nato. He subsequently calmed 
down, and a compromise was worked out. Another serious crisis 
occurred in May 1953, when many allies blamed the military stalemate in 
Korea and the diplomatic impasse on the belligerent American stance and 
deficient American leadership. The fear of a major showdown in Europe 
was widespread at this time. Harsh words flew high across the Atlantic 
and the so-called «May crisis» seriously strained the Nato alliance." 
Transatlantic differences not only stemmed from diverging interests, 
perceptions of threat and the application of means, but also from a general 
apprehension regarding the wisdom that the American leadership had 
shown in the handling of the war. Some European policy-makers regarded 
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the United States as arrogant, immature and ignorant of foreign policy. 
The preference for military solutions in relation to diplomatic ones, the 
erratic leadership of General MacArthur in the field, the bellicose Congress 
stance and general American opinion all contributed to this." 
The emergence of a non-policy 
What is most striking, in the context of this study, is how peripheral Nato 
was in all this allied squabbling about the Korean War. Allied deliberations 
were largely bilateral, informal, ad hoc and for the most part between the 
major powers. When there were multilateral discussions, these took place 
in the United Nations. If the allies needed a forum outside the United 
Nations, they were created on an ad hoc basis, such as the forum for 
meetings between the force contributors in the latter stages of the war, or 
the intimate relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom 
regarding the armistice negotiations from 195 I onward.63 
It is difficult to ascertain why Nato ended up with a non-policy on 
such an important out-of-area issue as the Korean War. One reason was 
probably that the West, because of the Soviet absence in the United 
Nations Security Council, was able to utilize the United Nations to counter 
the attack, and did not need Nato for this purpose. Moreover, since no 
Nato member had direct interests in Korea, and those who had indirect 
interests, such as the United Kingdom, preferred to deal with the United 
States bilateraJly, there was reaJly no reason to involve Nato in the 
deliberations. Another contributing factor was that it soon became clear to 
the Western allies that they had diverging interests, different perceptions of 
threat, and different conceptions of what constituted the best means to 
meet the communist chaJlenge in Korea and were not willing to play out 
these differences in Nato. The overriding objective of Nato - to cope with 
the Soviet threat against the North Atlantic area - required such strong 
solidarity and amicable relations between the allies that it was best for 
Nato to stay out of the quarrels about how to deal with the Korean War. 
The organization was simply viewed as too precious to jeopardize through 
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differences in interests, perceptions of threat and the applications of 
means in an area so far removed as Korea. Thus, it makes perfect sense 
that the world's most powerful alliance became a quiet eye in the 
international storm revolving around the Korean War. 
Probing solutions to out-of-area concerns on the 
Southeastfrontier, 1950-1952 
One fundamental consequence of the Korean War was a growing fear of 
Soviet intrusion elsewhere in the world. In addition to the Middle East, the 
Nato countries were particularly concerned about the area closest to its 
Southeast frontier: the Mediterranean area, Greece, Turkey, and even Iran. 
It was not a direct attack that caused most concern, but a possible gradual 
increase in communist interference and influence. A growing nationalist 
mood in the region, accompanied by a leaning towards neutralism, which 
was seen as an invitation to Soviet intrusion, added to this concern. Nato 
believed it had to do something, but the question was what? 
Interpretation of the threat differed, along the same lines as those in 
connection with the Korean War. The United States deemed Nato's 
Southeast frontier to be within the perimeter of its global struggle with the 
Soviet Union. London wanted primarily to maintain its military, political 
and economic influence in the Middle East. The French, preoccupied with 
Indochina, were temporarily on the sidelines. The smaller Nato countries, 
which did not have direct interests in the Southeast frontier area, did not 
want to divert attention from the North Atlantic area. These diverse 
outlooks probably explain the lack of consensus on how Nato should deal 
with the region. Nato initially considered a pact solution, but ended up 
using the most decisive device to deal with out-of-area concerns - an 
expansion of the Nato area - despite the reluctance of the smaller Northern 
powers. Once the United States decided, in spring of 195 I, that Greece 
and Turkey were essential to the security of the North Atlantic area, and 
managed to convince the United Kingdom and France of this their 
combined weight was too much for the smaller powers to oppose. 
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A Mediterranean pact? 
Proposals for a Mediterranean pact were first tabled at the Washington 
Exploratory talks in 1948, as a possible long-term solution to the problems 
related to Italy, Greece and Turkey, Italy ceased to be relevant to the 
scheme when the country became a Nato member. Greece and Turkey at 
first regarded a possible Mediterranean pact as insufficient and favored full 
membership in Nato, but when it became clear that the latter was out of 
the question, Turkey reverted to the idea in April 1950, probably as the 
best way of getting into the Western security structure. When Washington 
stated it was not keen on the idea, and the Korean War subsequently 
reactivated hopes of achieving the primary objective, both Turkey and 
Greece pushed for full membership in Nato. By that time, however, the 
smaller countries and France had started to become interested in a 
Mediterranean pact, probably as an alternative to full membership in Nato 
for Greece and Turkey. But the pact alternative made «no sense» to 
Acheson: if some Nato allies were to become involved in a conflict in the 
Mediterranean Pact area, the rest were obliged to follow suit, but without 
having a say in the initial involvement. The United States instead chose 
wholeheartedly to pursue the other option: an expansion of Nato to include 
Greece and Turkey." 
Enlargement: Greece and Turkey 
Greece, Turkey (and Iran, which was a cause of concern due to explicit 
Soviet threats against the country after World War I1) had been excluded 
from the alliance in 1949 due to the priority of Western Europe, their 
distance from the Atlantic, the easing of communist pressures against 
them in the late forties, and a desire to avoid provoking the Soviet Union 
by meddling too close to its borders. But Greece, Turkey and to a lesser 
extent, Iran, constantly pressed for inclusion in the alliance, or if that was 
not feasible, for some form of security arrangement involving at least the 
United States, but preferably also other Western countries. But prior to the 
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Korean War, Washington was simply «not in a position to consider any 
security pacts with Greece, Turkey, Iran or other Near Eastern countries 
at the present time because we cannot tell whether our capabilities at this 
time are adequate to defend our vital interests in Europe.» Washington told 
the suitors to be patient until something could be worked out." 
Developments in Korea made Washington review its «wait and see» 
policy and re-evaluate an increased commitment, particularly with regard 
to Greece and Turkey. The hostilities in Korea had shown American 
officials that the communists were not hesitant to mount military attacks. 
More importantly, even before the Korean War, military strategists had 
recognized especially Turkey's vital strategic role for the North Atlantic 
area in an eventual war with the Soviet Union. If Greece and Turkey were 
to fall into enemy hands it would be a terrible blow for Nato and would 
undermine the security of the North Atlantic area. It was also of 
considerable value that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey would 
contribute 25 new divisions to Nato's common defense. Moreover, 
communist influence was allegedly on the rise again in the region, and it 
was possible that the Soviet Union could even exploit Greek and Turkish 
disillusionment at having been excluded from the alliance to lure the 
countries into a neutral, or even worse, submissive role in relation to 
Moscow. Congress and the Pentagon, however, were still hesitant about 
taking on more commitments.66 
So, too, was Nato. A formal application for membership from Greece 
and Turkey wa, rejected at the Nato meeting in the autumn of 1950. 
Instead, Nato offered associated status to Greece and Turkey by means of 
their participation in a defense planning agency. It was vainly hoped that 
this would satisfY Greek and Turkish demands for security and at the 
same time avoid committing Nato and American forces to a new theater. 
Greece and Turkey continued to press for full membership.61 
In February 1951, the United States State Department finally started 
seriously to consider the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in Nato. The 
Pentagon was still hesitant, but the reluctance to commit forces to regions 
other than Western Europe, occupied territories and Korea, waned slowly 
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but surely. In April-May, the military came around to the State 
Department's view, and the inclusion of Greece and Turkey became 
official American policy. Talks with the British and the French 
commenced." By the time of the Nato meeting in Ottawa in September 
1951, the Pentagon had become an ardent supporter of including Greece 
and Turkey in Nato. A JCS memo, agreed to by the Secretary of Defense, 
stated that: 
il is of ulmosl imparlance 10 Uniled Slales security inleresls Ihat Illrkey 
and Greece be admitted as full members of Ihe Norlh Allantic Treaty 
Organizalion (NATO). They [JCS} feellhal no issue should be injecled 
inlo Ihe discussions al Oumva which could resuit injeopardizing or 
even postponingfor any considerable period Ihe admission of Greece 
and Turkey 10 NATO, 69 
The United States was, accordingly, by now fully prepared to assume 
greater responsibilities in the struggle against the Soviet Union. 
Washington's reason for wanting to include Greece and Turkey in Nato 
is primarily mililary and is based on a conviction Ihallhis is Ihe only 
salisfactary means of assuring Ihaltheir military resources, especially 
Ihose of Turkey, will be fit/ly available 10 the Wesl in event of war. The 
associalion of Greece and Turkey is 10 (a) secure Ihe Soulhernjlank of 
Europe, and (b) 10 lend substance to a Middle Easl Command [MEC -
see belo""'170 
At the Nato meeting in Ottawa, Acheson took the lead in advocating the 
inclusion of Greece and Turkey. He was met, however, with what he 
described as «sulk), resistance from our smaller associates». The biggest 
problem for the smaller Atlantic powers, especially Denmark and Norway, 
those most opposed to enlargement, but also the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Canada, was that they would have great difficulty explaining to home 
audiences that an attack on, for instance, Turkey should be regarded as an 
38 DEfENCE STUDIES 4/1999 
attack on them. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, could 
not understand why the smaller nations should have to take responsibility 
for an area «which is outside their sphere of interest». Furthermore, small 
Northern countries like Norway feared that an extension of Nato could 
provoke the Soviet Union, diffuse Nato's resources, and undermine the 
culture, tradition, democratic nature and Atlantic character of the alliance. 
In addition, it would make it more difficult to expand Nato's mission into 
fields other than the purely military - something they desired - and would 
also shift the balance towards the South, and make an unwanted 
precedence for future enlargement. There was also some «soreness» 
which <<led to some pretty straight speaking at the Council» regarding the 
way the big powers had handled the whole affair. The smaller countries 
believed they had been presented with a fait accompli. The French 
seconded this complaint, as they felt left out by the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Denmark and Norway maintained their opposition 
throughout the meeting, but Acheson's strong appeal on behalf of Greece 
and Turkey, and his reassurance regarding the many objections to 
enlargement, won over their opposition and secured the inclusion of the 
two Southern countries. Greece and Turkey were formally included in 
1952." 
Conclusion 
The first and second stages of the formation of the defense cooperation 
were the linking of the Brussels Pact members and the United States! 
Canada, and the inclusion of the <<link» countries (Iceland, Denmark, 
Norway, Portugal). These states were explicitly related to the objective of 
defending the North Atlantic area from Soviet aggression. The third stage, 
the inclusion of Italy and Algeria was also, albeit in a more indirect way, 
due to the importance of defending the North Atlantic area. Given the 
importance of France and the fact that France placed considerable weight 
on including these areas, the other powers did not want to defy Paris. 
Because such high priority was given to the defense of the North Atlantic 
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area, Nato chose a relatively restrictive view of its membership from the 
start and preferred not to be engaged in areas outside the Treaty area. 
Concessions regarding Italy and Algeria, however, foreshadowed a 
perennial problem for Nato: how should Nato cope with national pressures 
regarding secondary concerns - issues that were neither directly related to 
the common defense of North Atlantic area nor to containing the Soviet 
Union? 
Nato members realized that the line between primary and secondary 
concerns was a thin one. Conflicts outside the Nato area could involve 
Nato members, spill over into the Nato area and the outcome could tilt the 
balance of power between the East and West. The Korean War was a case 
in point. Moreover, for Nato members involved in such conflicts, the line 
between primary and secondary concerns quite often seemed meaningless: 
the problems had to be addressed, regardless of whether they were future 
problems involving the Soviet Union, or present issues involving enemies 
in far away areas. Thus, the alliance partners were forced to think about 
how to deal with this. The result was a handful of devices, which, with 
the exception of the concept of I imited membership, all played some role 
in the decades to come. However, political consultations became the 
cornerstone of Nato's handling of out-of-area issues. 
But these devices were only potential instruments. A policy for out-of-
area issues was needed. And the preferred policy became that of not 
having one - a non-policy. This was not a meticulously considered policy, 
but one that manifested itself in the first couple of years of Nato's 
existence, and was especially influenced by how the Nato allies handled 
the Korean War. This war showed that Nato's member states had 
substantially diverging interests, perceptions of threat and views as to 
what were the best means to use in situations not directly related to the 
defense of the North Atlantic area. Consequently, a non-policy became the 
preferred solution instead of the potentially divisive process ofatternpting 
to hammer out a policy which cut across the varying national policies 
regarding areas far from the Nato area. Furthermore, the potential for 
succeeding in formulating a common Nato policy on out-of-area issues 
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was limited, as illustrated by Secretary of State, Dean Acheson's 
recollection of President Truman's remarks that «we would stay in Korea 
and fight. If we had the support from others, fine; if not, we would stay 
on anyway.»7Z 
A favored alternative to a common Nato policy on out-of-area issues 
for nations with interests in the case in question, was to develop an ad 
hoc, infonnal, bilateral cooperation, often of a low-scale military nature. 
This fonnula was similar to what later has been called «coalition of the 
willing». It both suited Nato members not interested in becoming involved 
in a particular case and minimized the risk of Nato running into trouble 
regarding the primary task: the defense of the Nato area from Soviet 
aggression. 
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Chapter 2: Cha~~enges to Nato's nOll1m 
policy on out-of-area issues, 1949m 1974: 
The co~onialpowers 
Nato's non-policy regarding out-of-area-issues, as it emerged in the 
organization's early years, was by no means without challenges. In Nato's 
first 25 years, these came first and foremost from the colonial powers 
which wanted Nato support for their colonial policies. These pressures, 
and increasing resistance from the non-colonial powers - the United 
States, and in particular the Scandinavian countries and Canada -
constituted the bulk of Nato's out-of-area problems in the first two to 
three decades of its existence. 
Nato's area was based on «location, rather that the legal status of a 
particular locality»; thus, it was the geographic area of Western Europe 
and the North Atlantic, not nation states, that constituted Nato. Hawaii, for 
example, was not included in the Treaty, despite being United States 
territory from 1959.73 Most colonial possessions were not included in the 
alliance, either. All the colonial powers, except France with regard to 
Algeria, initially accepted this, not only as a result of strong American 
insistence, but also because they feared intrusion in «internal affairs». 
Soon, however, the colonial powers began to modifY this acceptance. In 
face of great opposition from the colonies themselves and from the 
increasing number of new independent nations, the colonial powers 
wanted Nato 10 support their colonial policies. 
Basically, they tried to obtain two kinds of support: I) financial and 
military assistance and 2) moral backing. A broad range of arguments was 
put forward to solicit support. First, and most importantly, the colonial 
powers tried to define their colonial problems as common Nato problems. 
They highlighted the perceived global nature of the communist threat and 
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argued that their fight in the colonies was part of the great struggle against 
communism. The logic was simple: communism was intrusive in all parts 
of the world, thus, it should be fought in all parts of the world. Second, 
the colonial powers underlined that their efforts outside the Nato area put a 
serious strain on their economy and military capacity. Without allied aid, 
both their economic and military efforts in Europe would suffer. Thus, it 
was a classic case of the «tyranny of the weak». A third argument was 
simple, but powerful: the colonial powers expected their allies to show 
solidarity in times of trouble." 
The United States and the other non-colonial powers, most notably the 
Scandinavian countries and Canada, were basically skeptical to these 
requests for help. They declared themselves anti-colonial on moral 
grounds. They did not always accept the assertion that the colonial 
powers fought for a common cause. More often than not, they saw 
legitimate nationalistic claims where the colonial powers saw communist 
activity. They did realize that colonial struggles drained resources from the 
European scene, but believed that this could be resolved by granting the 
colonies independence, not by diverting even more resources to the 
colonies. As regards the requests for solidarity in times of trouble, the 
non-colonial powers argued that the colonial powers had got it up-side 
down. In many ways, it was the policies of the colonial powers that got 
Nato in trouble. They associated Nato with an outdated colonial policy, 
strained Nato's relations with non-aligned nations, undermined Nato's 
cohesion, and worse, threatened to jeopardize Nato's ability to do its job in 
the Nato area. It should be noted, however, that the United States tended 
to accept the colonial powers' arguments more easily than the smaller 
non-colonial countries. Washington was more ready, therefore, to 
bilaterally extend the support requested by the colonial powers. The 
clearest example of this was regarding Indochina from 1950 to spring 
1954. 
The requests for support were a kind of «damned if you do, damned if 
you don't» problem for the non-colonial powers, especially the United 
States. If the colonial powers were given material support, the total 
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allocation to Europe would diminish, and the resources would be diffused 
in an undesirable way. If, on the other hand, they were denied material 
help, the chances were that the colonial powers would prioritize their 
colonies over their European commitments. This is not to suggest that 
they regarded their colonies as more important than their homeland, but 
that the colonial problems were regarded as more pressing; while efforts 
in Europe were directed at a perceived future threat, efforts to maintain 
the colonies were directed at concrete problems demanding immediate 
action." Similarly, as regards moral backing, if the colonial powers were 
given moral support, the non-colonial powers would be associated with 
the colonial powers, suffer «guilt by associatiom),76 and lose legitimacy in 
the Third World. On the other hand, if they were not given moral support, 
it would lead to resentment among the colonial powers which could 
undermine the cohesion of the all iance. 
So, how did Nato deal with this problem? I will look at Nato's handling 
of a series of issues: the French struggle in lndochina, mainly British 
problems in the Middle East, the big debates about the consultation device 
as a means of dealing with out-of-area problems in the Third World, and 
finally the Nato colonial powers' loss of empires and the consequences 
thereof. 
Nato, France, and Indochina, 1950-1954 
Prior to 1949, the United States did not consider Southeast Asia to be of 
vital strategic importance. Washington had developed a strategic concept 
that gave priority to Europe, adjacent areas and Japan. For the remainder 
of Asia, Washington applied a «defensive perimeter» defense, i.e. 
maintaining island strongholds such as Okinawa and the Philippines.77 As a 
general principle, Washington viewed Southeast Asia through anti-colonial 
glasses, as did Nato's smaller non-colonial powers. On the other hand, 
some European powers, such as the United Kingdom, France and the 
Netherlands, had substantial colonial interests in the region, and viewed the 
region quite differently. 
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Even before the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded, the allies were at 
odds regarding colonial issues. Washington - pursuing an anti-colonial 
policy - imposed a weapons embargo on the Netllerlands and threatened 
to deny military assistance if the Hague did not change its policy on its 
colony, Indonesia. Having made some futile attempts to receive support 
from other Western nations, the Dutch desperately attempted to link the 
North Atlantic Treaty to colonial issues a few days prior to the signing 
ceremony, by saying that they would not participate in the alliance unless 
the United States eased the pressure on Indonesia. The threat was not 
credible and, as the American Secretary of State Acheson noted, «the 
Dutch capitulated under pressure.» Indonesia was granted independence in 
1949." 
Such heavy-handed anti-colonial policy was not pursued in relation to 
the much more important governments in London and Paris. The United 
Kingdom and France continued to maintain colonies in Southeast Asia, and 
at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty urged Washington to take 
greater interest in Southeast Asia. The British Foreign Minister, Ernest 
Bevin, feared the «sausage-effect» - that the creation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty and possible future security arrangements in the Middle East would 
increase pressure on other places, notably Southeast Asia." Paris 
seconded this view and insisted that maintaining Western colonies in the 
Southeast Asia region was vital for the West and the North Atlantic 
defense cooperation. An officer in the French General Staff told the 
Americans that should 
the Soviets be success fill in establishing Stalinite governments from 
Korea to Iran, they will hold the entire Pacific coastline of Asia and the 
Indian Ocean, and their modern submarines will prevent America and 
Britain from maintaining their vital communications on the Seven Seas. 
In this event, nothing would be capable of withholding the Soviet 
General S(ailfi"om launching an all-out offenSive against Europe and 
Africa. The abandonment of the American, British, French and Dutch 
positions in Asia would spell the certain doom of Europe.{. . .} Whatever 
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AmericanJeelings may be concerning colonialism in the Far East, both 
politically and morally, it is no longer permissible to undermine the 
influence oJ European nations still deJending important Jootholds in 
Asia or the Pacific while they are being called upon to organize Jar the 
deJence oJ (( Western)) Europe. so 
Washington became more receptive to such appeals after the (doss of 
China», the passing of the National Security Council 68 (NSC-68, which 
urged for a more active containment policy towards the Soviet Union), 
and most significantly, the outbreak of the Korean War. Washington was 
also aware that the region contained important natural resources, tin and 
rubber in particular, which were vital not only for the United States, but 
also for the reconstruction of Japan and Europe." Thus, at a Nato meeting 
in the autumn of 1951, after Acheson had reminded his audience that 
practically all the current fighting in the world was in the Far East - Korea, 
Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia - he emphasized that 
these hostilities had one thing in common: 
they were all Communist-directed and could be stopped at any lime if 
Moscow so desired. Moreover, they were all causing a diversion oJ 
effort which would otherwise be usedJor N.A.T.o. purposes; there was 
thus a connection between N.A.T.o. and the Far East." 
!France receives material aid from the United States 
In general, France was pressing hard for allied support in all colonial 
struggles, but most notably in lndochina. A prominent Nato historian, 
Lawrence S. Kaplan, has even suggested that «France's investment in 
Nato was based heavily on the utility that the alliance would have in 
gaining U.S. material support for the French Unionl) and that «France saw 
the Nato connection as a means of maintaining its place in lndochina.»" 
France had been fighting the Indochinese nationalists since 1946 and was 
increasingly on the defensive. In February 1950, France formally asked 
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for American economic and military aid to uphold its efforts in Indochina. 
Paris received a positive reply in the spring of 1950, prior to the outbreak 
of the Korean War.'" In the light of Washington's anti-colonial stance, this 
has to be explained, not least because the prevalent view in Washington at 
the time was to avoid commitment in far removed areas. In addition, the 
United States wanted to be on good terms with the various nationalist 
movements in Southeast Asia. Why, then, give support to the French 
struggle in Indochina? 
The two most important motives were probably I) to assist the French 
so that France could fulfill its economic and military commitments in 
Europe, and 2) to support France in a struggle that even Washington came 
to view more and more as a struggle against world-wide communism. A 
third motive connected to Cold War considerations was that Indochina, 
rich in natural resources, was important to the recovery of Japan, to 
maintaining the British presence in Malaya, and in general the Western 
supply of important raw materials. Fourth, there was also a certain degree 
of domestic pressure in the wake of the «who lost China?» debate from 
those wanting to devote more attention to Asia.85 The outbreak of the 
Korean War greatly reinforced the American determination to assist its 
Western ally in Indochina. These Cold War considerations explain the 
American motives for granting material aid, but also why so many 
differences and misunderstandings occurred between Washington and 
Paris later on; whereas Washington was primarily motivated by the desire 
to fight world-wide communism, Paris primarily pursued colonial and 
national interests." 
The Indochina issue was - as was the Korean War - primarily dealt 
with bilaterally outside Nato, on both a political and military level. But the 
French were eager to discuss Indochina in Nato and explain their policy to 
their Western allies. First of all, they underlined that they were not waging 
a colonial war in Indochina. Paris had granted independence to the three 
Indochinese states in 1949 and the French union, established in 1946, 
was, according to the French, of the same nature as the Commonwealth. 
The French also argued repeatedly that their struggle in Indochina was 
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necessary in the struggle against world communism, which was a more 
gratifying argument to maintain after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. 
Both wars, said the French, had to be fought by the free world: <<liberty in 
Asia cannot fly on one wing alone [ ... ] lndochina is not the only stake, 
South East Asia and even the Whole of Asia, is at stake»; then, the 
argument followed, the road would lay open to Europe. The French also 
exploited the fact that their struggle in Indochina reduced France's ability 
to maintain its defense commitments in Europe. The French Foreign 
Minister, Robert Schuman, maintained that 
France was still bearing a very heavy burden which. like British action 
in Egypt. was in the interest not of herself alone but of all the Western 
POH'ers. (oo.] France s Far Eastern commitments absorbed more than a 
third of her military budget and thus made it difficult for her to carry 
out the whole task she had undertaken for HA. T. 0. in Western Europe 
Another - but not so explicit - argument for fighting in lndochina was the 
need to preserve the supply of important raw materials for the West. 87 
The campaign for soliciting material support paid off. By 1954, the 
United States was funding approximately eighty per cent of France's war 
expenses in lndochina."' At Nato's Lisbon meeting in 1952, Nato accepted 
the transfer of French Nato-designated troops to Indochina. Some 
regarded this indirect Nato role as a step in fulfilling the French Prime 
Minister, Edgar Faure's «Grand Plam) - a Natofication of French policy in 
lndochina - and a step towards a coordinated western policy on world 
communism. Nato's indirect role in the lndochina war was also a victory 
for Nato's first Secretary General, the British Lord Ismay, who was a 
keen advocate of a more globalized Nato policy. B9 And it certainly seemed 
that Nato was heading in that direction when the so-called Indochina 
Resolution was passed in 1952. 
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/France gains moral support from lNIato • the Dndochina 
Resolution of 1952 
The Indochina Resolution of December 1952 was the first official Nato 
statement on an out-of-area issue and went to great lengths in its praise of 
the French effort in Indochina. The resolution stated that Nato 
EXPRESSES its wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long 
continued struggle by the Frenchforces and the armies of the 
Associated States against Communist aggression; and 
ACKNOWLEDGES that the resistance of the free nations in South-East 
Asia as in Korea is injitllest harmony with the aims and ideals of the 
Atlantic Community; AND THEREFORE AGREES that the campaign 
waged by the French Union forces in Indo-China deserves continuing 
support from the Nato governments. 90 
In their campaign to have the resolution passed, the French restated the 
familiar arguments that the struggle in Indochina was of direct relevance 
to the security of Europe and the Middle East, and that the French effort 
was harmful to France's military and economic contribution in Europe. 
Sensing the skepticism of the smaller Nato countries, the French 
reassured that the resolution would not entail extra commitments for 
them." France chose a different strategy with which to confront the 
larger Nato nations: to link the Indochina issue to European security 
efforts, to the European Defense Community CEDC) in particular, which 
especially the Americans were keen to establish. At a meeting with 
Americans and British delegates, the French Ambassador to Nato said that 
unless such a resolution were passed, it would be very difficult for the 
French to agree that the Council should adopt any resolution 
recommending the early ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty. [ ... ] In fact the 
two resolutions were linked together in the minds of the French and their 
acceptance of a resolution on the E.D.C. was conditional on the passage 
of a resolution about Indo-China." 
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For France, the passing of the resolution would have many benefits. It 
would «draw attention to the fact that certain countries had obligations 
outside the N.A.T.O. area which were bound to affect their contribution to 
N.A.T.O.» It would also «secure an affinnation of the connection between 
the defence of Indo-China and that of the N.A.T.O. area proper - i. e. 
presumably something similar to «the integration of Indo-China into the 
common strategy»».9] 
Skepticism among other Nato countries stemmed primarily from a 
reluctance to undermine Nato's established non-policy regarding out-of-
area issues. The Americans would have preferred to keep out of the 
lndochina issue, but decided that 
we need 110t, and should not, play the leading role in knocking down 
any such French suggestion. Indeed, we can rely on the Canadians and 
on the smaller European powers, which are intent all avoiding 
commitments outside the Nato area, effectively to block adoption (and 
probably even the introduction) oJ such a resolution in the NA c." 
The assumption that the smaller nations would do the job proved to be 
wrong. Despite opposition, neither the United Kingdom nor - surprisingly 
enough - the smaller nations wanted to create trouble by refusing to toe 
the French line. They realized that this issue was so important for France 
that not giving in could have serious repercussions for the defense of the 
Nato area.95 
The passing of the resolution represented a major departure from 
Nato's earlier policy of not addressing issues outside the Nato area, and 
was therefore met with considerable interest around the world. The 
influential observer, Waiter Lippman, wrote approvingly in The New York 
Times that the passing of the resolution indicated that Nato was changing 
from a regional to a global pact." The Washington Post, on the other hand, 
saw the resolution as a violation of the spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty 
because it went beyond Nato's traditional geographical scope." 
The association with the French war in Indochina caused Nato's 
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smaller Northern nations to suffer a serious headache on the domestic 
front. A heated public debate erupted in Denmark and Norway as to 
whether Nato should concern itself with areas outside the Treaty. Those 
on the far left generally disliked Nato and claimed that the alliance was 
noW supporting a colonial war. Others supported Nato, but were 
concerned that peripheral wars would drain valuable resources from the 
defense of Europe, undennine the legitimacy of Nato in the Third World 
(and domestically), and increase Nato's commitments. The two 
governments were hard pressed on this issue. It is not surprising, then, 
that in subsequent years the Norwegian and Danish representatives in Nato 
referred to the furore in the two Scandinavian countries in the wake of the 
resolution whenever they wanted to avoid discussion of the Indochina 
issue in Nato. The Danish representative insisted that if the issues needed 
to be raised, it should be dealt with in secret. The domestic havoc caused 
by the Indochina Resolution was an eye-opener for the Scandinavian 
countries. As a result, they believed that Nato should not be involved in 
out-of-area issues in the future, if it could be avoided." 
lI..imits of support - Dien Bien IPhu 1954 
Initially, France was successful in gaining allied and Nato support for its 
struggle in Indochina. But as the war dragged on, allied support waned. 
This was clearly illustrated in the crucial days in the spring of 1954, when 
French forces were surrounded by the enemy in the small town of Dien 
Bien Phu. France requested immediate American military assistance, but 
did not receive it. France lost the battle, and subsequently also the war in 
Indochina. At the international talks in Geneva later that year, the Vietnam 
part of Indochina was partitioned in two states, one of which became 
communist, and one of which became capitalist and dependent on the 
West. The principal reasons behind the American refusal to assist France 
in the last stages of the war, were primarily increasing differences in 
interests, aims, perceptions of threat and the application of force in 
Indochina. 
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The United States first and foremost viewed the conflict in terms of East-
West relations. Washington did not want to alienate nationalist forces in the 
Third World and had therefore, from the time of initial involvement in 
1950, urged the French to grant political concessions in Indochina. As the 
JCS saw it, «the military problems in Indochina are closely interrelated 
with the political problems of the area.» Thus, they wanted the French to 
«[eJliminate its policy of «colonialism»». This would also benefit France, 
the argument ran, as it would be easier to obtain local support for the fight 
against communism. The French, whose primary interest was in the 
preservation of their colonial empire, did not comply with these wishes." 
Another source of tension was that, throughout the war, the Americans 
and the French had different opinions of how to best conduct the war. 
Washington believed France was applying the wrong strategy - that they 
were far too cautious - and that they made a grave mistake in not 
sufficiently engaging the local population in the fight against the 
communists. The French, on the other hand, complained loudly about 
American interference in their handling of the war. One historian has 
suggested that these increasingly bitter quarrels «may have been the 
decisive factof» behind Washington's refusal to support France at Dien 
Bien Phu. IOO 
By 1954 it was clear to Washington that France's struggle in Indochina 
did not payoff sufficiently in the East-West balance to offset the 
enormous resources thrown into the war and the loss of Nato's legitimacy 
in the Third World. And the United States was not the only one to 
reconsider its support to France. In fact, London was crucial in the 
decision to refuse assistance at Dien Bien Phu. When the French asked for 
help, Eisenhower brought the matter to the Congress. Conditional support 
was granted if France made some major concessions in its colonial policy, 
and if the United Kingdom actively supported the Americans. The 
Americans had in mind some sort of «united actioO», in which the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth nations and several Asian 
nations in concert would assist France. But the British refused to help the 
French, and thus also doomed American support. London's <mo» was 
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based on fears ofa major war, Commonwealth considerations, the belief 
that outside support would not be sufficient, and unfavorable domestic 
opinion. 101 
Nato, the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, 1949-1956 
Indochina was only for a short while regarded by the major Western 
powers as vital to the global defense against communism and thus also 
important to the defense of the North Atlantic area. The Middle East and 
the Mediterranean were a different matter. The region was adjacent to 
Europe, strategically important, and its enormous oil resources were 
deemed to be vital for the North Atlantic area in terms of both the 
economy and the military. 
Traditionally, the United Kingdom had been the most powerful Western 
country in the region. The United Kingdom had colonies, protectorates, 
and substantial economic and military interests there. After World War ", 
however, the general deterioration of British global power had 
repercussions on London's policy in the region. The hand-over of 
responsibility for the security of Greece to Washington in 1947 further 
underpinned the United States' gradual assumption of Western 
responsibility in the region. Still, Washington wanted the United Kingdom 
to retain as much responsibility as possible. A policy paper from 1948 
illustrates American thinking on the matter: 
We have decided in this Government that the security of the Middle 
East is vital to our own security. We have also decided that it would not 
be desirable or advantageous for us to allempt to duplicate or to take 
over the strategic facilities now held by the British in that area. We 
have recognized that these facilities would be at our effective disposal 
anyway, in the event of war, and that to attempt to get them transferred, 
in the fonllal sense, from the British to ourselves would only raise a 
host of new and unnecessary problems, and would probably be generally 
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UllsuccessjiJI. This means that we Inust do what we can to support the 
maintenance of the British of their strategic position in that area. J02 
But this also had a downside: it entailed leaving the security of a vital area 
to a declining power; it meant associating with a colonial power and 
supporting policies with which Washington did not always agree. IOJ This 
dilemma was to haunt the United States in the years to come, and also to 
create difficulties for Nato, as the British sought to include Nato in their 
Middle East policy. The parallels to France and Indochina are clear. 
Furthermore, as the limits of allied support to the French in Indochina 
were reached in a climatic showdown over Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the 
limits of allied support to the United Kingdom in the Middle East were also 
demonstrated in another dramatic event - the Suez crisis in 1956. 
British attempts to link Nato, the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East 
As mentioned, after the outbreak of the Korean War Western policy-
makers feared Soviet intrusion via Nato's southeast border. Shortly after 
the outbreak of war in Korea, President Truman observed that if «we 
were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and no telling what 
would happen in Europe.» The West did not expect a direct Soviet assault, 
but rather a gradual increase in influence and less local resistance to 
communist pressure. 104 
This fear led to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in Nato in 1952, as 
these countries were closest to the Nato area and perceived as being under 
the greatest threat. Their inclusion, however, not only enhanced the 
security of the North Atlantic area, but could also be useful to Nato in 
dealing with out-of-area issues in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. 
This line of thinking did not appeal to most non-colonial powers in Nato, 
including the United States, and particularly not to the Scandinavian 
countries which were furthest from the region. They wanted to treat the 
Middle East and areas in the Mediterranean not included in Nato as 
54 DEFENCE STUDIES 4/t!l99 
separate from Nato issues. The British, however, clearly stated their 
objective to link Nato with the Eastern area of the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East. They pushed particularly hard for a Turkish role in the 
defense of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. In fact, according to 
the British Foreign Minister, Herbert Morrison, 
His Majesty s Governmellt had beell very reluctallt to accept Turkish 
membership oJ N.A. T. O. alld had only dOlle so because of the 
importance they attached to establishillg all allied commalld ill the 
Middle East oJ which TIII·key would Jorm a part. 
In the years that followed, London put great efforts into trying to gain 
allied and Nato support for an enhanced Western role in the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East - with mixed success. 105 
The security of the Mediterranean was one of the first questions Nato 
had to address following the inclusion of Greece and Turkey. The Western 
part of the Mediterranean was part of the original Nato area from 1949, 
but had not been regarded as strategically important. When Nato started to 
fear Soviet infiltration in the Mediterranean, the Eastern part was also 
included with the admission of Greece and Turkey, and this assessment 
began to change. Nato realized that a coherent strategy and policy for the 
whole of the Mediterranean would be expedient. This, however, proved 
difficult to achieve in the face of the prestigious national rivalry and 
different interests between the United States, the United Kingdom and 
France regarding command structures in the Mediterranean. The tug-of-
war regarding command structures caused problems for Nato for a long 
time. The British were concerned about the naval prestige in the 
Mediterranean, but equally, if not more importantly, they believed that their 
interests in the Middle East would be best served by a particular command 
structure. The French had direct strategic interests in the Mediterranean as 
well, and wanted the command structures to reflect this, but they were 
also concerned about their interests on the southern shores of the 
Mediterranean - in North Africa. The United States wanted to prevent the 
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discussion about command structures in the Mediterranean ending up as 
an out-of~area issue. I06 
In 1951, London suggested that the proposed British leader of the 
Mediterranean Command should also report to the head of the proposed 
Middle East Command (see below). This would not only secure a 
privileged position for the United Kingdom in the Mediterranean, but would 
also link Nato - and especially Turkey - to the defense of the Middle East. 
The Americans, sensing the British ploy to link Nato with the defense of 
the Middle East, were opposed to this and insisted that command 
structures in the Mediterranean be dealt with separately from the much 
more delicate question of Nato's role in the defense of the Middle East. In 
the end, they won. The long and heated struggle regarding the command 
structure in the Mediterranean culminated in a compromise in 1952. A 
Mediterranean Command was set up, but the intense national rivalry had 
left Nato with a strategically incoherent structure with an array of 
command lines and confused military responsibilities. I07 
Egypt was the most important country for the West in the Middle East. 
It was located at the center of the Arab world, was the most populous and 
resourceful state, and most importantly, it contained the Suez base, where 
the British had valuable assets such as troops, airfields, stocks of 
resources, harbors, etc. Furthermore, the principal waterway to the East 
was the Suez Canal. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Americans 
generally tried to perform the same delicate balancing act in the Middle 
East as they had in the Far East, by supporting a Western, predominantly 
British, presence and at the same time opposing imperialism and 
supporting nationalist movements. However, increasingly nationalist 
attitudes in Egypt and Iran combined with the growing American support 
of Israel made it harder to make friends in the region and also created 
opportunities for greater Soviet influence. The Americans found, as they 
had done regarding the French in Indochina, that they had to compromise 
their anti-colonial stand and assist an allied power out-of-area in order to 
contain the communist threat. But again, as in Indochina, the Americans 
would not go as far as to commit forces to the region. Instead, they 
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wanted to coordinate the British effort with bilateral American military aid 
to individual countries in the region. 10. 
It was in this context that the British, in May 1951, attempted to use an 
out-of-area device to connect various alliances. They came up with the 
idea of a Middle East Command (MEC), which, in addition to securing 
British interests in the command structures in the Mediterranean. also 
would commit the United States and Nato, the latter especially via Turkey, 
to the defense of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The British 
envisaged a British commander as head of a command with forces from 
the United Kingdom, the United States and possibly other Nato countries 
stationed in Egypt. A Middle East Defense board would include several 
Nato members, and the MEC would be linked to Nato through the 
Mediterranean command. Washington was initially hesitant, but gradually 
came around to the idea, on the condition that there should only be 
informal links with Nato, if any, and that the United States would not 
commit forces. London and Washington agreed on these terms and 
presented the idea to the other members in Nato.'oo 
They were not enthusiastic. The Netherlands and Denmark worried 
that Turkey - as a member of both Nato and the MEC - would obtain a 
privileged position and enjoy the advantages of being a Nato member 
without taking on all the responsibilities. In addition, the scenario of being 
involved in a conflict in the MEC area through being Nato members, but 
without having any influence, was not attractive. At a Nato meeting in 
Ottawa in September 1951, Acheson reassured them that Turkey would 
share all Nato's responsibilities. The Americans and the British also argued 
- not very convincingly, though - that the MEC would in effect commit 
some Middle East countries to the defense of the Nato area without Nato 
having to include them as members and thereby expand the area of 
commitment. Besides, the MEC would secure the supply of oil from the 
Middle East, which was unquestionably essential to the security and 
economic well-being of the North Atlantic area. In the end, Nato gave its 
support to the proposed MEC, but to no avail, as Egypt, whose 
participation was essential, but who deplored the British presence in 
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Egypt, rejected the plan in October 1951. '10 
The Americans and the British tried for a while to push through a 
modified MEC. The new MEC would be based on the British-controlled 
Cyprus and separate from Nato. The most important new aspect was that 
Washington now contemplated committing forces. This new concept 
gradually came to be known as the Middle East Defense Organization 
(MEDO). MEDO could be set up without Egyptian participation, but 
Washington favored Egyptian participation. After the coup against King 
Faruk in the summer of 1952, Washington tried to cooperate with the new 
regime, headed by General Mohammed Naguib. The United States also 
considered granting military assistance, but this was rejected by President 
Truman in January 1953, due to internal (JCS) and external (the United 
Kingdom and [srael) resistance. As cooperation with Egypt proved to be 
difficult, the United States decided to scrap the plans of a defense 
organization centered around Egypt in the summer of 1953. The country 
lost even more of its strategic importance for Nato in 1954, when Cairo 
and London agreed that British forces should leave Suez within 20 
months. III 
But MEDO was not dead yet. The «series of allianceS» idea became a 
key issue in the strategic thinking of the new Secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower also liked the idea. [n 
tenus of the Middle East, this manifested itself in a shift of focus from an 
«inner core» of defense centered around Egypt to an «outer ring « or a 
«Northern Tier» of defense, comprising Turkey, iran, Iraq and Pakistan. 
This had, according to Washington, several advantages. The Northern Tier 
was more important from the viewpoint of containing the Soviet Union. It 
would also represent a departure from relying on British influence in the 
region, which was stronger in the <dnner core», and thus make it easier 
for the United States to distance itself from British imperialism. Moreover, 
the shift would also direct attention eastward to the Persian Gulfwith all 
its oil resources. Besides, a Western-supported defense organization would 
help to keep the Northern Tier countries «Western oriented and politically 
stable.» The Turks were also very keen on setting up MEDO, and argued 
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that this would close the present gap in the defenses of the Western 
World. Washington, London and Ankara, therefore, conducted military 
discussions which ended in «general agreement [ ... ] as to the military 
objectives, strategy, concept of operations, and other factors relating to 
the defense of the Middle East.»i12 
But MEDO did not come about. Instead the Baghdad Pact was 
established in 1955 with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and 
Iraq as members. The United States had surprisingly decided that it would 
not become a member, even though Washington had initiated the Pact and 
furnished most of the anms to its members. The reason for this was that 
Washington realized that the United States would not gain anything by 
being a member of an alliance which would alienate important countries in 
the region - Egypt and Israel. Furthenmore, it decreased the possibility of 
peace between the two countries, a peace which the new American 
president was very keen to obtain. The British were extremely annoyed 
and felt betrayed. The British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, remarked 
that «[i]n recent years the United States has sometimes failed to put its 
weight behind its friends, in the hope of being popular with their foes». 
The Baghdad Pact did not become the strong bulwark against communism 
that the Western powers had hoped it would. The Pact was further 
weakened in 1959 when Iraq, following a left-wing coup in 1958, left the 
organization. The organization then changed its name to the Central Treaty 
Organization - CENTO .'13 
The West was partly to blame for the Baghdad Pact's weakness, as 
Nato refused to establish links with the Baghdad Pact, despite strong 
lobbying from the Pact, Turkey in particular. The United States, the United 
Kingdom and Italy had found the linkage idea interesting. Dulles said that 
linking security pacts together would combine something like 60 nations. 
However, he also realized that this would rival the United Nations, and that 
it was better to stick with separate regional groupings. But, it was still 
possible, Dulles said at the Nato summit in December 1957, to establish 
closer cooperation among the various pacts, particularly with regard to 
infonmation. When Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and this became 
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CENTO in 1959, the earlier advocates of tighter relations with the 
organization joined ranks with the smaller nations, like Canada, Norway 
and Denmark, which were reluctant to involve Nato, What concerned 
these countries most was that American - and British - action in the Middle 
East could not only harm Nato's image, but even endanger Nato and the 
security of the North Atlantic area. ll4 
A good example of this was the secret American operation to topple a 
pro-Nasser regime in Syria in August 1957. It failed, and the Syrian regime 
sought help from Cairo and Moscow. The United States responded by 
asking Turkey to mobilize along the Syrian border. and even considered 
dispatching troops to Syria. The Soviets, in turn, threatened Turkey. A 
possible Soviet move against Turkey would have triggered a Nato 
response and, viola, the incident would have escalated into a superpower 
conflict and highly dangerous affair. The crisis passed, however, after 
Syria and Egypt merged to become the United Arab Republic in 1958. 
What the smaller European members resented most about this incident, in 
addition to the danger in which they were placed, was that the Americans 
jeopardized Nato without informing, let alone consulting, their allies. liS 
Trouble, but not really· the Suez Crisis 
The failure of the MEC and MEDO, the weak Baghdad Pact and the 
withdrawal from the Suez base reflected a steady decline in British 
influence in the Middle East in the early 1950s. The British already had 
difficulties in Aden, Yemen, Lebanon and Cyprus when they faced their 
worst crisis in the region: the Suez crisis of 1956.116 A brief outline of the 
crisis is as follows: Israel raided Egyptian troops in Gaza in February 
1955. This led, or gave an excuse to, Egypt's new strong man, Gamal 
Abdul Nasser, to accept an offer of Soviet weapons (through 
Czechoslovakia) in September 1955. Panic ensued in Washington and 
London; as a result, the United States and the United Kingdom offered to 
finance Nasser's prestigious Aswan Dam project, but the offer was then 
somewhat clumsily withdrawn in July 1956. Shortly afterwards, Nasser 
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nationalized tile Suez Canal Company, which was predominantly British. 
This was unacceptable to London, and the crisis unfolded.'l7 
At the same time that the international community was engaged in 
hectic diplomatic activity to solve the crisis, the British, the French - who 
were convinced that the rebellion against France in Algeria was sponsored 
by Nasser - and the Israelis, in secrecy planned a military intervention 
from the end of July. The British Foreign Minister, Selwyn L1oyd, told the 
Americans that failure to take action would mean «the end of us, of 
Western Europe and Nato as decisive influences in world affairs». London 
regarded Nasser's behavior as dangerous to Western oil supplies and a 
threat to an important European sea route to Asia, and argued that the 
Soviet Union stood behind Nasser. Washington accepted all these 
arguments, but still would not resort to force. Force «would only facilitate 
Soviet infiltration of the region.» The Eisenhower administration therefore 
wanted to solve the crisis by peaceful means. The Americans were also 
anxious that the Suez crisis would harm the United Nations, Nato and 
relations with the Third World, especially the Muslim countries.'" 
Many other Nato members, particularly Germany, Italy and the 
Scandinavian countries, also distanced themselves from the British and 
French approach. But Nato, as such, did not do much. For a short while, 
the question was raised «whether attack on U.K. [United Kingdom] or 
French naval vessels in Mediterranean by Egyptians would come under 
terms of North Atlantic Treaty», but it was clear to both Washington and 
London that the North Atlantic Treaty was <(Oot intended to cover this 
particular case». The extraordinary NAC meetings that were called 
because of the Suez affair, did not lead to anything, as the major powers 
did not want Nato to meddle in their affairs and the rest did not want Nato 
to become involved in the Suez affair. The American Secretary of State, 
John Foster Dulles, said of Suez that «[t]his is not an area where we are 
bound together by treaty.» He went on to say that 
[cJertain areas we are by treaty bOllnd to protect, sllch as the North 
At/antic I)'eaty area, and there we stand together and I hope and believe 
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always will stand absalutely together. There are also other problems 
where our approach is not always identical. For example, there is in 
Asia and Africa the so-called problem of colonialism. Now there the 
United States plays a somewhat independent role. //9 
Realizing that they lacked allied support, London and Paris decided to 
bypass their Nato allies altogether. Not only did they disregard the 
consultative mechanism in Nato which they, and all other Nato nations, 
had praised so highly at a Nato meeting only a few months previously, the 
British also imposed an information blackout on their most important ally, 
the United States, in early October. Disregarding Nato allies, however, did 
not stop the French using planes which were normally committed to Nato, 
in the military operation a few weeks later. I " 
When the United Kingdom and France used the Israeli attack on Sinai 
as a pretext to attack Egypt in late October, President Eisenhower was 
furious. What angered him most was the double-crossing, the 
secretiveness and the deceit by the British. Washington was more or less 
unprepared for the attack, despite warnings from the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and other sources. The administration had not paid much 
heed to these warnings because, as an Eisenhower's aide put it: «we relied 
on them as allies to inform uS of what they were doing.» The Americans 
were so angry that shortly after the attack, they imposed a forceful 
combination of economic and diplomatic pressures, and were successful 
in getting the British and French to withdraw from Egypt in December. 121 
The United States was not alone among the Nato members in being 
upset and angry with the United Kingdom and France. The Norwegian 
Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, who, along with two others, had been 
given the assignment to improve the consultative process in Nato in the 
spring of 1956, was so depressed that he at one point wanted to drop the 
whole project. Many were concerned about Nato's distorted image in the 
Third World and about the devaluation of the propaganda value that the 
Soviet invasion of Hungary - which took place at the same time as the 
Suez war - gave Nato and the West. But most serious were the bellicose 
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threats, including the use of atomic weapons, that the Soviet Union issued to 
London and Paris as a result of the Suez affair. These showed tha~ in effect, 
the United Kingdom and France jeopardized the whole alliance through this 
domestically motivated out-of-area affair. '" 
However, following the harsh words and strong sentiments, conciliatory 
voices were heard remarkably soon among Nato allies - also from the United 
States. The Soviet invasion of Hungary had something to do with this; the 
event aroused the feeling that the Suez affair only made it more imperative for 
Nato to keep together. Perhaps the Norwegian Foreign Minster, Halvard 
Lange, encapsulated the atmosphere best when he described the dispute with 
London and Paris as «dispute between fiiends, a family dispute». According 
to Lange, the lesson to be drawn from the Suez affair was that ,<the lack of 
coordination in members states' perception of nations outside the Treaty area 
had had serious consequences for cooperation.» The only way to deal with 
this, Lange continued, was to improve consultation: «Even though 
consultation may not always result in consensus, it will enable all members to 
take a stance based on a comprehensive knowledge of their allies' views and 
interests.» Suez created serious trouble for Western cooperation, but this 
could be tolerated as it was only an out-of-area issue, and thus did not have 
the power to distract Nato allies from close cooperation on the most important 
issue: the defense of the North Atlantic area from Soviet aggression.123 
Creating out-of-area policy through the Consultation 
process? 1949-1960 
Since World War n, the Western allies had engaged in extensive talks and 
cooperation, both bilaterally and in various groupings. As Western leaders 
and their representatives participated in Nato meetings from 1949 
onwards, they invariably became forums for discussion on a wide range 
of subjects. Emphasis was squarely placed on European security issues; 
the tour d'horizon at the start of Nato meetings was from the outset of an 
informative and noncommittal nature, as were the out-of-area discussions 
at the meetings of the permanent representatives. In the years to come, 
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however, Nato repeatedly pondered the question of whether the alliance 
should have more, improved and extended consultations. 
In September 1952, the Americans took the initiative to investigate 
whether increased consultation would be of benefit to Nato. When the 
colonial powers quickly signaled that they would welcome the opportunity 
to solicit support for colonial and other out-of-area questions, they 
illustrated for the non-colonial powers the double-edged nature of 
consultation. This raised the question of the purpose of consultations. 
Should they only be an exchange of information, or serve as the basis for 
the formulation ofa Nato global policy? Nato's Secretary General, Lord 
Ismay, favored the latter. In 1952 he wanted to discuss «the question of 
global planning within Nato». He was also keen on «establishing some 
machinery between Nato and other countries which would be expected to 
align themselves with Nato in time of emergency.» High on the agenda in 
the early 1950s, then, was both the question of improved consultation 
between Nato members, and between Nato and other nations. While the 
latter soon disappeared as a topic, the former was a recurrent theme in 
Nato throughout the Cold War. 1" 
Many smaller, non-colonial Nato countries were generally positive to the 
prospect of improved consultation on all sorts of matters within Nato as they 
believed they would greatly benefit from the increased information, and in 
addition, would have the chance to influence the bigger powers on a wide 
range of issues. To this end, the Norwegians proposed the establishment of a 
political committee, but this was not passed at this point in time. On the other 
hand, the smaller nations were also apprehensive of assuming responsibility 
for areas outside Nato and being tied to the decisions of the bigger nations. 
This was demonstrated in 1953, when Lord Ismay participated in the tripartite 
meeting between the United States, the United Kingdom and France in 
Bermuda. The smaller nations immediately expressed concern that the big 
three were «ganging up» and that Lord Ismay's presence would commit Nato 
without all the Nato countries taking part in the discussions. When the issue 
was discussed in Nato, the British dryly reported that the Canadian 
representative «and his little friends are rather sore».I25 
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Addressing the Soviet challenge in the Third World - the 
Wise Men's Report 
There was much talk about improving consultations over the next couple 
of years. The discussions were stimulated by two important trends in 
international politics in the mid-1950s. One was the apparent thaw 
between the East and West after the death of the Soviet leader, Joseph 
Stalin, in 1953, the peace conferences on Korea and Indochina in 1954, 
the peace treaty regarding Austria and the summit in Geneva in 1955. This 
thaw triggered questions as to whether Nato should attempt to enter new 
civilian ventures, and not solely concentrate on military defense. The 
second was that it seemed that the Soviets slowly but surely were 
beginning to mount an offensive in the Third World. The arms deliveries to 
Egypt through Czechoslovakia in 1955 and the many visits to Third World 
countries by the new Soviet leadership after the death of Stalin in 1953 
were very alarming to many in the West. Already in December 1954, 
Dulles had warned Nato that the West should not be <<lulled into a false 
sense of security» by the thaw in East-West relations: 
Outside of the Soviet-Chinese Communist orbit, the Communists are 
everywhere stressing, pressing, subversion as an instrument of their 
policy. [. . .] It is particularly apparent in the so-called colonial and 
dependent areas. [. . .] We can see that policy being pursued particularly 
in Asia and in Africa. 116 
Similar warnings were issued time and again by several speakers in Nato 
in the years that followed, but there was no take-off in the question of 
what Nato should do about it until Dulles suggested at a Nato meeting in 
May 1956 that perhaps improved consultations could be a suitable device. 
His proposal to investigate this in more detail was accepted by the other 
Nato members, but only «after considerable battle». 127 
Out-of-area concerns, then, were a central issue when the organization 
started the process of examining and re-assessing «the purposes and the 
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needs of the Organization in the light of certain changes in Soviet tactics 
and policies which have taken place since the death of Stalim), with special 
emphasis on non-military means and consultation. The committee of 
Foreign Ministers, Gaetano Martino of Italy, Lester B. Pearson of Canada 
and Halvard Lange of Norway (the «Three Wise Mem»), appointed by 
Nato was in no doubt about the magnitude of the Soviet challenge in the 
Third World: 
The Soviet Union is now apparently veering towards policies designed 
10 ensnare these countries by economic means and by political 
subversion, and 10 jasten on them the same shackles of Communism 
from which certain members of the Soviet bloc are now striving 10 
release themselves. 
The focus was placed on non-military matters as they regarded the 
challenge in the Third World to be subtle subversion, not armed attack. 
Emphasis was given to consultations as the consultation process was 
considered the most suitable for handling these kinds of out-of-area issues 
in Nato. 
The report, presented to the Nato Council in December 1956, when 
Nato was trying to cope with the effects of the Suez crisis, emphasized 
that «Nato should not forget that the influence and interests of its 
members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that 
common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by 
developments outside the Treaty area.» With clear reference to the Suez 
crisis, the report stated that it was important for Nato, which had 
experienced that some members were «putting narrow national 
considerations above the collective interest», that the Atlantic Community 
developed greater unity «by working constantly to achieve common 
policies by full and timely consultation on issues of common concern.» 
The report even suggested that "any changes in nalional slrategy or policy 
which affect the coalition are made only after collective consideration.» 
How, then, could the consultation process be improved? The report stated 
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that «[ C lonsultation within an alliance means more than exchange of 
information, though that is necessary. [ ... llt means the discussion of 
problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before 
national positions become fixed.» The report underlined that the major 
powers had the main responsibility to consult, but there were, of course, 
qualifications: 1) «ultimate responsibility for decision and actiom) still 
rested on national governments, 2) situations may occur which demanded 
action from a member «before consultation is possible with the others.» 
According to the report, the most important devices needed to achieve a 
better consultation process were: 1) annual political appraisals, 2) a 
mediator role for Nato if members disagreed (in particular greater power 
for the Secretary General), 3) parliamentary associations and the 
Parliamentary Conference, 4) improvements in Nato's organization and 
meetings. 128 
The Report was favorably received, but important conditions were 
quickly raised, even by the United States, which had initiated the 
report. Dulles underlined that Nato should not expect to reach 
agreement in all aspects of foreign policy. The United States had to 
take into consideration its world-wide commitments and collective 
security associations: 
The United States has this kind of association with, 1 think, 44 
countries, all of which call for consultation. {. . .} Obviously, it 
would not be practical to submit to prior consultations here matters 
which under our other treaties are perhaps more peculiarly, more 
directly, a concern of these other countries. [. .. } We cannot have a 
sort of hierarchy of associations in which we try to rate them in 
importance and have consultations accordingly. '" 
Subsequently, Dulles went even further in pointing to the limitations of 
Nato's ability to deal with out-of-area issues: «There has been a feeling 
for some time that because the members were so affected by events 
which took place outside the treaty area that the jurisdiction so to 
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speak of the Council should be enlarged.» The United States was 
willing to go along with this to a certain degree, but was 
not willing to take the position that our association in Nalo is the most 
important association lhal we have, which has a kind of priority over 
everything else, so that all our policies all over the 'world have first to 
be brollghllo Nalo and discussed, and agreed upon, Gnd Ihen carried 
DuI in the rest of the world. JJ/J 
The attitude of the United States illustrates that despite the rhetorical 
consensus on the need to improve the consultation process, it was hard to 
do it and to accept the consequences. This was clearly shown in the years 
to come. 
How to meet the Soviet challenge in the Third World? 
At the time of the preparation of the Three Wise Men's report and in the 
following years, Nato considered three methods by which to maintain its 
unity and respond to the alleged new Soviet foreign policy in the Third 
World. First, investigating whether Nato's military strategy could be 
changed to fit the new Soviet challenge. Second - and connected to the 
first - establishing what united Nato members and what made Nato 
attractive for non-committed countries and, in line with that, developing 
Nato's non-military sides. Third, and most importantly, investigating 
whether the consultation process was suited to dealing with out-of-area 
challenges in the Third World. 
One of the countries most eager to change Nato's military strategy in 
autumn of 1956 was the United Kingdom. The British believed that the 
new strategy should «stress the new Soviet tactics of proceeding by out-
flanking and subversive moves outside the N.A.T.O. area.» Furthermore, 
it should emphasize the flexibiliry of the new Soviet threat, which was 
military, economic and psychological/ideological, and which could be 
directed at Nato, but was more likely to be directed at non-Nato areas. 
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However, this would still affect Nato: «the defence of the N.A.T.O area 
itself could be fiustrated if N.A.T.O. countries failed to maintain sufficient 
strength to resist military threats outside the N.A.T.O. area». The British 
maintained that «the second priority [after deterring Soviet in Europe 1 was 
not World War Ill, but limited aggression either in N.A.T.O. or 
elsewhere.» The increased British focus on areas outside Nato bothered 
the Americans, who believed that the British were giving Nato defense a 
lower priority by highlighting defense commitments in other areas. The 
British countered that 
we were compelled 10 give priority to hostilities in which we were 
actually engaged; the French had to do the same. Since nobody else 
would help us, the burden fell an the United Kingdom, but it had to be 
realised that the success or failure of our efforts was of vital interest to 
N.A. T. 0. as a whale. 
The French seconded this: <<It should be possible, given modern means of 
transport, to maintain the maximum defence effort in N.A.T.O., while at 
the same time being prepared to meet emergency calls elsewhere.» Despite 
some support, the overall reception to London's views was, according to 
the British, «rather discouraging.» Not receiving much support in Nato, 
however, did not discourage the British from giving a higher priority to 
areas East of Suez, as reflected in the British Defence White Paper from 
May 1957.[1I 
In this debate, two countries not known to be active in out-of-area 
issues maintained strongly that Nato had to meet the Soviet challenge in 
the Third World. Germany was concerned about Africa, whereas Italy 
was eager to discuss an enlarged Nato role in the Middle East. At the end 
of the day, however, the various attempts to change Nato's new strategy 
to reflect out-of area concerns came to little. Nato agreed on the need to 
counter new Soviet tactics by looking more closely at areas outside Nato, 
but did not want to commit itself in any way. The new Nato strategic 
concept from May 1957, Military Committee (MC) 14/2, concluded that 
DEFENCE STUOIES 4/1999 69 
Nato defense planning should take into consideration the efforts of some 
members to meet Soviet expansion outside the Nato area, but that the 
defense of the Nato area had to be the overriding task. For instance, if 
nations wanted to use Nato-designated forces for out-of-area purposes, it 
would have to be with due consideration to the primary task.'" 
Changing Nato's military strategy was only one way to meet the Soviet 
challenge in the Third World. Another alternative was to enhance those 
aspects that united Nato and possibly made Nato more attractive to Third 
World countries: democracy, economic progress and the quest for peace. 
One way to do this was to develop Nato's non-military tasks, perhaps 
even extend aid to the Third World. This idea had circulated in Nato for a 
while. At a Nato meeting in 1955, the French Foreign Minister, Antoine 
Pinay, proposed pooling economic resources for underdeveloped areas. 
This would associate Nato with aid to the Third World. At the next 
meeting, the Belgians circulated a document entitled Plan 10 Creole Nalo 
Special Fund 10 COllnler Soviel Economic Drive in Underdeveloped 
COllnlries. The Wise Men's report and many proposals in subsequent 
years also dealt with this theme. Generally, reactions to all aid proposals 
were that the West and Nato had to counter Soviet moves and that aid was 
a good device. However, Nato should consider and analyze the Soviet 
threat, particularly the political and military aspects and its consequences, 
but should nol itself grant aid. That could be done better by other 
agencies, most notably the United Nations or the OEEC. One reason why 
Nato was not encouraged to give aid was that Nato would be vulnerable to 
accusations that the organization had political, not altruistic motives for 
giving aid. The accusations would indeed have had merit: according to 
General Secretary Paul-Henri Spaak, Nato should not grant aid to Third 
World countries «regardless of their feelings toward Wes(}).1JJ 
Improving consultations was the third and most important method 
considered in the debate on how to counter the Soviet challenge in the 
Third World in the I 950s. And indeed, Nato did make a few adjustments 
to its consultation procedure in the wake of the Three Wise Men's report, 
but a wide range of ideas were dropped, either before or during 
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discussions in Nato. For example, President Eisenhower suggested 
departing from the rule of unanimity in the North Atlantic Council. His 
Foreign Minster, however, would not let go of the right to veto because of 
the <<importance of maintaining good relations with members of other 
parts of the world» and because the United States should not be «bound 
by views of Europeans which were often based on inadequate knowledge 
of conditions elsewhere.»I34 Ideas that were tabled in Nato, but which 
were not endorsed or at least considerably modified, included the German 
proposal of expanding the Secretary General's powers, an Italian proposal 
for a fund to promote economic development in the Mediterranean and 
Middle East, Secretary General Spaak's proposal that Nato's regional 
expert groups should prepare proposals for common policies regarding 
out-of-area issues, and his idea that Nato should strive to have a «global 
policy».'" 
These proposals were largely dropped as the smaller non-colonial Nato 
powers were unwilling to involve Nato in out-of-area issues. They feared 
that such an involvement would undermine Nato solidarity and Nato's 
image in the Third World. They were especially wary of appeals for 
support from the colonial powers, or powers with considerable interests in 
far away areas, in the name of improved consultations. For example, the 
Netherlands wanted support for its policy in Indonesia and even hoped for 
a common Nato policy. In the same vein, the French requested a common 
Nato policy in their areas of interests, North Africa and the Middle East. 
Paris went as far as to suggest that Nato should expand its formal 
geographical scope. In response to such appeals, powers such as Canada, 
Norway and Denmark made it crystal clear that they would not commit 
to, and certainly not assume responsibility for, areas in which they had no 
interests and of which they had little knowledge. lJ6 
The result of all these efforts to improve the consultation process in 
Nato in the late 1950s, was a vague agreement based on the reluctant 
views of the smaller non-colonial countries and the United States: in 
traditional Nato matters, Nato's policies should continue to be common 
and binding; in out-of-area issues, Nato should not commit itself, and that 
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the volume of infonnation should increase as should the regularity of the 
consultations. The establishment of the Committee of Political Advisors 
(later named the Political Committee) in 1957, the Regional Experts 
Groups set up in the following years and the Atlantic Policy Advisory 
Group for long-term studies and world problems (APAG) established in 
1961, were tools to this end. 'J7 Another major reason why Nato chose to 
settle with a <<lowest common denominatOr» policy on out-of-area 
consultations, was the French President Charles de Gaulle's wide-ranging 
proposals of «tripartitism», which were not favorably received by the 
other Nato countries. 
!French overplay: demands for tripartitism 
Following World War 11, the French had persistently worked for closer 
coordination on global policies between the United States, the United 
Kingdom and France, for example by extending the military cooperation in 
the Standing Group (the Military Committee's Executive Body, composed 
of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France) 
and by developing political cooperation through improved consultations. 
Paris did not receive the desired response and continued to push this issue 
in the 1950s, most forcefully in a letter from de Gaulle to President 
Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in September 1958. De 
Gaulle urged the three big powers to negotiate their policies on out-of-area 
issues, to reach a common understanding and then present the results to 
Nato as a sort of a fait accompli.'" 
De Gaulle's ideas were evaluated in a series of tripartite meetings in 
December 1958. «Nato no longer corresponds to the present day situation 
in the world», maintained the French Ambassador to Washington, Herve 
Alphand, when he opened the discussions. He continued that in the current 
situation, when the threat was global, Nato had become «too narrow». It 
did not, for example, cover North Africa and the Middle East, «yet these 
areas have become the southern flank for the defense of Europe» and 
there was a problem of «Communist infiltration there.» AI ph and compared 
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Nato defenses with the Maginot line. <<It is admirable in its way but 
doesn't cover the whole front.» The various remedies that had been tried, 
for example «expanded political consultatioll)l and «creation of new 
pacts», were not sufficient. «France does not oppose Nato consultatioll)l, 
Alphand assured them, Paris just «believes that it would be easier to get 
solutions if the three have an advance agreemenU> The objective, Alphand 
said, «is to achieve, at least, some degree of advance tripartite agreemenU> 
The French proposals would «secure world-wide co-ordination [ ... ] on all 
matters of importance in the world.» Alphand promised that «NATO, of 
course, would be kept informed [my emphasis] of matters which relate to 
iu> He also said that France did not propose to extend Nato's military 
guarantees to other countries, because it is <mot likely that the 
Scandinavians would agree to this.» Rather, Nato's military resources 
«should be re-organized to take into account other theaters of operation. 
As an example, thought has to be given to the co-ordination of African 
commands with European commands.» It was «ridiculous», Alphand 
contended, «that the Standing Group does not consider contiguous areas.» 
The American and British representatives were skeptical to all this. They 
argued that normal - albeit improved - consultations would serve the same 
purpose. The problem with the French ideas was, according to the British 
representative, that: 
The Italians and Germans believe they are of comparable stature. The 
smaller countries will think the three are trying to impose decisions on 
them. As for the u.K., it has its special relationship with the 
Commonwealth to consider, and there is indeed the problem of most of 
the free world, committed or uncommitted. 
Faced with this skepticism, Alphand resorted to outright pressure: <<if 
France can't get the tripartite consultation it seeks and Nato remains 
unchanged, then France has no interest in Nato in its present fonn. In 
short, France had to reserve its right to «denounce» Nato or seek a 
revision of the treaty.» Afterwards, however, Alphand backed down 
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slightly.ll9 Several other Nato members did not like the French ideas at all. 
They argued that they would sideline Nato. Furthermore, as Nato's most 
important task was to defend the North Atlantic area, this would be far too 
heavy a price to pay for the sake of the creation of a triumvirate to deal with 
out-of-area issues. As the United States and the United Kingdom were also 
skcptical, even though they paid lip service to the French for another couple 
of years, the idea of tripartitism never took off. The tripartite meetings that 
took place over the next couple of years were more like the ordinary talks that 
had been conducted in the past, but they still aroused suspicion among the 
other Nato members. The majority of the North Atlantic Council was, for 
example, «extremely upse!» about a tripartite meeting which took place in 
June 1960, at a time when France was proposing - albeit futilely - to use the 
Standing Group as the military realm oftripartitism. Aware of the opposition, 
France had began to implement some parts of its threats towards Nato, the 
most drastic measure being the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet 
from Nato command in March 1959.140 
The Congo crisis of 1960-61 presented de Gaulle with another opportunity 
to launch tripartitism. In a letter to the American president, he cited the Congo 
as an unfortunate case of Western disunity, and went on: 
The facr rhatthe Atlantic Alliance, such as it is, covers only the narrow 
sector of Westem Europe, whereas continental Asia, South-East Asia, Asia 
minor, North Africa, Black Africa, Central America, South America are 
full of problems and of seething dangers and would eventually become the 
theater of war operations, appears to France unrealistic and incompatible 
with her world-wide responsibilities. [. . .} I feel that you, Mr. Macmillan 
and I have the possibility, which is at one and the same time definite and 
transitory, to organize a real political and strategic co-operation of our 
West in the presence of the multiple and dangerous threats which beset us. 
The attempt was in vain, however, as Eisenhower answered that he did not 
understand what France wanted. The tripartite proposals were too vague, 
he contended, and were not well received by the other Nato members -
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and other friendly smaller nations, for that matter. Moreover, France's 
gardual withdrawal from the integrated military structure due to lack of 
support for tripartitism was deemed to be very unfortunate and in effect 
undermined solidarity among the Nato allies.14I 
Nato and the dwindling empires 
In the late 1940s and 1950s, Nato's colonial powers started to loose their 
colonial possessions, and the process accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s. 
It was a painful process for these nations, but also had repercussions for 
Nato. The colonial powers continued to solicit support from Nato and to 
attempt to extend Nato's geographical scope, in order to maintain their 
colonies, or at least ensure that dismantling their empires did not damage 
national interests too much. But in the final years of colonialism, with the 
Third World on the rise in international politics, the antipathy towards 
colonialism among the non-colonial powers in Nato was even greater than 
before. Thus, support was harder to obtain. The consequences for Nato 
were diverse: the lack of support for France's out-of-area problems 
generated bitterness and was one of the reasons why France left Nato's 
integrated military command structure in 1966; the United Kingdom 
managed to adjust to its lesser role, but Nato had to undergo major 
restructuring as the United Kingdom had lost important strategic 
possessions in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East; and finally, 
Nato's image and internal cohesion suffered due to Portugal's eagerness to 
hold on to its colonies long into the 1970s. 
iFrance and North Africa 
While the United States had supported France in Indochina, Washington 
did not support Paris with regard to Morocco and Tunisia, which were 
both struggling to achieve independence in the early I 950s. The French 
were bitter, especially as Paris had granted bases to the Americans in 
Morocco. Washington wanted to maintain French influence there, but 
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resented Paris' way of dealing with the situation. «The real difficulty with 
the French position was that France had no policy in North Africa except 
repression and hanging 00», Acheson complained. Other Nato allies also 
had difficulties with the French policy in North Africa. Norway's 
representative to Nato feared that it threatened to make Nato look like a 
«colonial power-bloc»,142 
This did not deter France from making great efforts to link Nato with 
North Africa in the early 1950s. As Algeria was a part of the Nato area, the 
French believed they had a good case for also including Morocco and 
Tunisia. Besides, the Mahgreb contained both French and American bases, 
and thus was different from other African colonies. The French did not 
achieve much. One reason, in addition to the fear of guilt by association, 
was that the inclusion of North Africa would «tend to divert effort to 
countries which are not going to play a part in the main theaters of 
operations.» Besides, Nato did not see any reason for formally including 
Morocco and Tunisia. In the view of some British officials: 
As arrangements for the facilities required by Nato in Tunisia and 
Morocco are already being made with the French under the procedure 
for military operating requirements as developed in NATO, we can see 
no military advantage to the inclusion of these territories in the Nato 
area. f.I3 
The Americans agreed: 
Attack on forces, vessels or aircraft {oj] any Nato member in or over 
{the} Mediterranean ojJTzmisia would be covered by subparagraph 
(ii) Article 6. Practically speaking, it is not possible {to} conceive {a} 
Soviet attack which would /lot involve {the} latter possibility if 
Tunisian facilities were {the} object {of the} attack. In 
When the two countries gained independence in 1956, the idea of 
Moroccan membership in Nato surfaced again, but sank quickly, whereas 
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Nato negotiated an arrangement which allowed for the use of installations 
in Tunisia. l4S 
By this time Algeria was far more important to France than other North 
African areas. Algerian armed resistance had started in 1954, inspired by 
the Vietnamese victory over French forces at Dien Bien Phu. In response, 
France transferred four divisions from Europe to Algeria, which was not a 
part of Nato's integrated military structure, but a French defense 
responsibility. Concerned Nato allies suggested that in the future, the 
transfer of Nato-designated forces to other areas should not occur without 
the North Atlantic Council's blessing. I " In the following years, France 
tried occasionally with mixed success to gain Nato support for its war in 
Algeria. In many instances, Nato allies had to yield as they realized how 
hard France suffered militarily and economically because of its Algerian 
problems. l47 
However, there was typically a lack of support from the allies, 
including the United States. What worried the allies was not only a 
weakened Nato defense because of French preoccupation with Algeria, 
but also that Nato's image towards the uncommitted Third World would 
suffer. In autumn of 1957, the French marched out of a Nato 
Parliamentarians meeting in protest because the United States (together 
with the United Kingdom) decided to sell arms to Tunisia, which, 
according to France, supplied arms to the Front .de Liberation Nationale 
(FLN) in Algeria. Paris did not accept the American argument that if the 
United States did not supply Tunisia with arms, the Soviet Union would. 
In February 1958, France's Nato allies protested fiercely and a nasty row 
erupted between Washington and Paris when France bombed a Tunisian 
village in order to quell Tunisian support of the guerrillas in Algeria. The 
French demanded that if France did not get allied support in the Tunisian 
affair, Nato would suffer a very serious crisis (<<une crise d'une extreme 
gravite»). This threat did not scare the allies, however, and they distanced 
themselves even more from Paris, as the French continued their brutal 
fight against FLN in Algeria. In the United States, Senator John F. 
Kennedy made the colonial issue, Africa and opposition to France's policy 
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in Algeria an important part of his presidential campaign. Massive Nato 
protests also occurred in 1962, when de Gaulle simply invaded Tunisia 
after its leader, Habib Bourguiba, demanded that France should withdraw 
from its bases in the countI)'. The same year, however, Algeria Won its 
independence and the issue came to a natural conclusion.'" 
!Britain and the South· lEast !Region 
The United Kingdom also gradually lost its empire after World War 11, but 
unlike France, allowed it to disintegrate with relatively little fuss. In Nato, 
France was veI)' apprehensive about its declining status as a world power 
and bitter about the lack of support. The United Kingdom, on the other 
hand, quickly overcame the disappointment after Suez and managed to 
adjust to its new role in Nato. Following the decline in influence in the 
Middle East, the British then had to face a similar situation in the 
Mediterranean, an area which was even more important for Nato, as it 
involved many Nato powers. The Cyprus issue was a case in point. 
In connection with Greek and Turkish membership in Nato, the 
Eastern part of the Mediterranean as well as the Western part was covered 
by the alliance. Thus, the whole Mediterranean became Nato territoI)'. But 
not all land areas in the eastern Mediterranean, such as Cyprus, were 
covered. Only those belonging to Greece and Turkey were included. The 
United Kingdom had wanted Cyprus to join Nato as early as 1951, but 
decided not to press the issue, as France would probably then propose the 
inclusion of its North African possessions, and Belgium and Portugal 
would probably ask for the inclusion of their African possessions. This 
would not only be too much for the United Kingdom, but would certainly 
not be accepted by the rest of Nato either.'" 
In April 1955, the Greek Cypriot guerrillas started a war of liberation, 
with union with Greece as their stated objective. The Turkish minority 
resented this. They wanted partition and were supported by Turkey and 
Britain. Although the British never explicitly acknowledged it as they 
entered into negotiations, they realized that independence was inevitable 
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and that partition would serve their interests - not least regarding their 
bases - best. This conflict was awkward for Nato, as three of its 
members were involved. Turkey and Greece hardly spoke to each other, 
nor did London and Athens. In spring of 1955, for instance, a scheduled 
Nato meeting in Greece was canceled because London refused to go to 
Athens as long as intense anti-British campaigns were being conducted 
there. The meeting was instead, for «practical reasons», held in Paris. A 
more serious aspect of the conflict was that Nato had installations on the 
island. The bases were operated by the United Kingdom, but Nato 
financed an important link in its Early Warning System on Cyprus and 
relied on «suitable provisions made by the member country most directly 
concerned [the United Kingdom))."o 
As the conflict dragged on, Nato, with the Secretary General at the 
forefront, entered into a new venture: conflict resolution within the alliance 
on an out-of-area issue. Initially, Nato was successful: the alliance played a 
significant role at the Zurich meeting in 1959 that paved the way for 
Cypriot independence in 1960. The United Kingdom retained two 
important bases on the island and Nato was satisfied with the outcome of 
the thorny conflict, not realizing that the conflict whould resurface only a 
few years later. The Secretary Generals, Ismay and Spaak, were believed 
to have done a good job, and this fueled Nato's mediating ambitions for 
the future." I 
As soon as the conflict regarding Cyprus was temporarily settled, 
Malta became the source of trouble. Malta gained independence in 1964, 
and Nato, which not only had bases but also a headquarters (the 
Mediterranean Command) on the island, had to renegotiate its relationship 
with the new authorities in Malta. The Maltese government wanted to get 
as much security and money as possible for the bases. In December 1964, 
the first President of Malta, Dr. Borg Oliver, told the American Secretary 
of State, Dean Rusk, that Malta wanted to become a member of Nato. He 
discretely threatened to throw out Nato staff if he did not receive a 
positive response. With the exception of a few countries, such as Turkey, 
Portugal and Belgium, Nato powers did not want Malta to become a 
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member. One reason was a general reluctance to admit more members 
into the alliance and raise the hopes of others wanting to join - such as 
Spain. Another reason was that Malta «would have interests and 
sympathies in common with the uncommitted countries of the south and 
eastern Mediterranean and her attitude is likely to be different from that of 
other members.» A third reason was that Malta was small and weak and 
would not contribute much in terms of military strength and would 
therefore be an economic burden. Lastly, Nato wanted to stay out of 
trouble regarding internal political problems in Malta.'" 
On the other hand, even though Malta was not very strategically 
important, and it was not essential to maintain Nato headquarters on the 
island, it would be disastrous for Nato if the Soviet Union gained influence 
on the island: «The objective which we were all seeking was to keep Malta 
aligned with the WeSD), said a British representative to Nato. To achieve 
this, Nato reluctantly considered the possibility of guaranteeing Malta's 
integrity in return for continued facilities for Nato headquarters. But the 
British did not see any reason why Nato should broker such a deal with 
Malta; they could take care ofthe West's interests in Malta, as they did in 
Cyprus. The Scandinavian countries did not like discussing the issue in 
Nato at all; they considered it too sensitive in light of the domestic attitude 
towards Nato and out-of-area issues. The outcome of the talks with Malta 
was that the functions of Nato's Mediterranean Command on the island 
were transferred to Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples. 
But Nato maintained some base rights - through the United Kingdom-
and, by maintaining and protecting the bases, the alliance would, in effect 
contribute to the economic well-being and security of the island. Malta 
was not entirely satisfied, but had to accept this solution."3 
In the 1960s, turmoil and civil wars raged in the Persian Gulf and the 
United Kingdom had to let go of its possessions. For a while London tried 
to retain its influence; for example, British forces invaded the former 
British protectorate Kuwait in 1961, just after it became independent, to 
protect it from Iraqi claims. It was a peaceful operation and !he troops 
withdrew a year later. But the British had used Nato-designated forces and 
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even hinted that they would use atomic weapons; this troubled 
Washington. These efforts to hold on to its possessions, however, were to 
no avail. In 1966, London announced that the United Kingdom would 
abandon its huge military base in its protectorate Aden. In 1968 it was 
decided that the United Kingdom would withdraw all its forces from «East 
of Suez» by 1971, thus reversing a fundamental aspect of its strategic 
thinking introduced in the Defence White Paper from May 1957, in which 
areas East of Suez were given priority. This created shock-waves among 
policy-makers in Washington, who tried in vain to make the British change 
their minds - as they had done in 1956-57, when they had opposed the 
British giving priority to areas East of Suez. There were reasons to believe 
that the Soviet Union was gaining increasing influence in the region, in 
particular through intervention in the Yemeni civil war. But as the British 
could not be persuaded, Washington tried to substitute British presence in 
the Persian Gulf by aiding, and relying more, on Israel and Iran.'54 
London also had to let go of its possessions in the Far East in the 
1960s. In the process, however, in an attempt to preserve London's 
interests, British Nato troops serving in Germany were sent to the Far 
East. London was fully entitled to do this, and Nato was duly informed, 
but it nevertheless caused concern in Washington and other Nato capitals. 
London's problems in the Far East and the draining of Nato resources 
were parallel to what the Netherlands had experienced in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, when Dutch interests in Indonesia and West New Guinea 
were jeopardized by Jakarta. The Dutch concentrated their campaign in 
Nato on coordinating Nato members' policy and in particular preventing 
Nato allies supplying arms to Indonesia. At first, the response was vague 
and uncommitted, but after the Dutch argued that they would have great 
problems in meeting their European commitments due to obligations in the 
Far East, the Nato members, excluding the United States, agreed not to 
deliver arms to Indonesia.'" Although colonial problems were not formally 
Nato's problems, a weakened Nato defense in Europe was. 
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lNIato's smaller powers and Africa 
It was not only the big Nato powers that had colonial problems which 
caused difficulties for the alliance; Belgium and Portugal's problems in 
Africa also caused trouble. In the early 1950s, Nato had not paid much 
attention to Africa. The situation in the Far and Middle East was seen as 
more important for Nato. At the end of the decade, however, Nato began 
to focus on Africa as it was believed that the Soviet Union was trying to 
gain influence on the continent. Several documents were circulated about 
the need and means to counter communist infiltration in Africa. The 
Federal Republic of Germany was, perhaps surprisingly, heavily involved 
in this process. In autumn of 1958, the Germans circulated a long report 
about the different forms of communist intrusion in Africa and possible 
Western means to counter this. Nato was aware that these discussions 
were sensitive, as sub-Saharan Africa was well beyond the Nato area, and 
it went to great lengths to keep these discussions secret. Especially the 
small, non-colonial powers felt uneasy. They maintained that is was 
crucial that Nato did not see African matters solely in an East-West 
context and risk gaining the reputation of acting as a block in African 
matters. This could alienate Third World countries, be exploited by the 
communists and thus be harmful to the alliance. On the other hand, Nato 
countries with interests in Africa, Portugal in particular, were eager to 
harmonize or at least coordinate Nato members' policies on Africa. Not 
much came out of these discussions in the late 1950s, except for an 
improved awareness and increased knowledge of African problems. 156 
The first major challenge to Nato on an African issue was in 
connection with the Congo crisis in 1960. Belgium, which had hastily left 
the Congo when the country became independent, intervened to protect 
Belgian nationals after the country erupted into violence and the province 
of Katanga seceded from the Congo. The Belgians did not receive the 
allied support they had expected, not even from the United States. Many 
Nato countries demanded that Belgium should withdraw from the Congo 
and let the United Nations take charge. For Nato, the overriding concern 
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was to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting the situation. Nato did not 
fear outright Soviet intervention, but rather communist infiltration. Nato 
members were aware of the link between colonial resentment, disorder 
and opportunities for communism. Moreover, if the Congo, a big country 
in the heart of Africa, were to become communist, it could spread to the 
rest of the continent. Nevertheless, they did not want to involve Nato in 
the matter. In 1961, Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Secretary General of 
Nato, left office disappointed at the lack of support in the Congo issue.'57 
But Belgium did get some sympathy. The other colonial powers in Nato 
saw the situation in the Congo as a precedent for what might happen to 
their remaining colonies, and regarded it as imperative to maintain law and 
order in Congo and not be too harsh on Belgium. Moreover, for some it 
did matter that the Belgians were «friends and allies». Excessive criticism 
could also undermine Nato solidarity. The Belgium bases in the Congo also 
mattered to Nato. They were used by Nato countries for training 
purposes. The British delegation to the United Nations, for instance, was 
instructed to avoid any mention ofthe bases in the resolution texts. It soon 
became unrealistic, though, to believe that the bases could be kept in 
Belgian hands and thereby remain useful to Nato.'" 
The other Nato country with African colonies, Portugal, had a long 
tradition of using Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, regarding 
consultations, to raise and solicit support for its colonial policy, not only 
for the African colonies, but also Goa, which was threatened by India. 
They also regularly maintained that it would be difficult to increase their 
defense expenditure in Europe as long as they had such heavy burdens in 
the colonies. On occasion, Lisbon also expressed its wish to expand the 
geographical scope of Nato to cover Africa, or at least parts of it. Portugal 
did muster some support, as expressed in the «Dulles-Cunha» 
communique of December 1955, which emphasized «[tlhe inter-
dependence of Africa and the western world», but for the most part the 
Nato majority did not support Portugal.'" 
In 1961-62 the guerrilla war in Portugal's African colonies intensified, 
especially in Angola. Portugal used Nato-designated equipment in its 
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response. In Washington, the newly elected President, John F. Kennedy, had 
made AfTica and anti-colonialism a key element of his foreign policy, and in 
March 196 I voted for a United Nations resolution which criticized Portugal's 
colonial policies. The United States repeated the criticism at a Nato meeting 
and reduced its milital}' aid and restricted commercial sales to Portugal. 
However, this American anti-colonial offensive under President Kennedy was 
not long-lived. Portugal launched a counter-attack in Nato, and argued that 
Washington was meddling in its affairs, and was supported by the other 
colonial powers in Nato on that principle. The major reason why Washington 
backed down, however, was fear of an unfavorable arrangement with 
Portugal regarding the vel}' important bases on the Azores, which was to be 
renegotiated in 1962. Washington backed down in the United Nations and 
lifted its economic sanctions. In fact, Lisbon applied so much pressure on 
Washington, that the American SecretaI}' of State, Dean Rusk, wl}'ly said that 
the Portuguese demands, if met, «would have the effect of making the United 
States the satellite of Portugal.»[60 
The smaller non-colonial powers in Nato did not have as many inhibitions 
and interests as the United States. Throughout the 1960s and early I 970s, 
they were increasingly vocal in their criticism of Portugal's handling of its 
colonies. A climax was reached in 197 I when the Norwegian Foreign Minister 
in vel)' harsh words attacked the host's colonial policies at a Nato meeting in 
Lisbon. Naturally, Portugal found this outrageous, but also Nato's SecretaI}' 
General, Manlio Brosio, Washington, Athens, Rome and London found this 
public criticism of an ally undesirable. [61 Three years later, following the 
peaceful overthrow of the government in Lisbon and the subsequent 
independence for Portugal's colonies, Nato's colonial problems were finally 
over. 
Conclusion 
The attempts by the colonial powers to engage Nato in various colonial 
conflicts, created a no-win situation for Nato. No matter what the 
organization did, Nato could not avoid getting into trouble in some way or 
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another. On the whole, Nato chose not to yield to pressure, and paid the 
price: internal problems with resentful member states. But the benefits of 
this policy were considerable. First, Nato avoided involvement in trouble 
spots all over the world, which would have represented an even more 
serious drain on sparse resources than Nato already experienced as a 
result of individual members' engagements out-of-area, perhaps diluted the 
democratic and moral value of the alliance, and possibly escalated local 
conflicts into global issues involving the Nato area. Second, though 
connected to the first, Nato sidestepped a potentially even more serious 
division within its ranks than that stemming from resentful colonial 
powers, namely a division over the fundamental purpose of the alliance, 
which could have undermined the effectiveness of defending the North 
Atlantic area from Soviet aggression. 
There were two exceptions to the policy of not yielding to pressure 
exerted by the colonial powers, both related to the imperative of defending 
the North Atlantic area from the Soviet Union. The first concession was 
given to individual Nato members to enhance their ability and will to 
cooperate in the defense of the North Atlantic area, and had been 
foreshadowed by the inclusion of Algeria in the Nato area. The same 
reasoning underpinned Nato's early moral support for France's struggle in 
Indochina, and the Nato agreement not to deliver arms to Indonesia during 
the conflict with the Netherlands, as well as the American retraction of its 
criticism of Portugal's colonial policies. Such departures from the non-
policy, most notably regarding Indochina, did, however, have 
consequences for Nato's handling of out-of-area issues. The most 
important one, in the context of this study, was that the smaller non-
colonial powers, especially the Scandinavian countries, experienced 
substantial domestic trouble in the wake of Nato's support for France's 
war in Indochina, which made them more determined to maintain Nato's 
non-policy on out-of-area issues in the future. 
The second kind of departure from the restrictive geographical scope 
of Nato, arose because some areas adjacent to Nato territory were 
considered to be so vital to the defense of the North Atlantic area that Nato 
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had to seriously consider its security relations with them. As Greece and 
Turkey were included in the alliance, the Mediterranean area was deeply 
integrated in Nato defenses - both directly and through the United 
Kingdom - and Nato was prepared to accept an indirect link to the Middle 
East through the MEC. 
As it was not possible for individual members to avoid out-of-area 
involvement, Nato's non-policy did not prevent Nato from being affected 
by out-of-area affairs. This was most prominent in the Middle East. Even 
the United States, which was generally opposed to Nato involvement in 
out-of-area issues, actually involved Nato in its ideas of linking regional 
alliances together, the invasion of Lebanon in 1958 (discussed in Chapter 
3), and its actions against Syria in 1957. However, British actions 
involving Nato were more typical. The Suez crisis is a prominent example. 
This British (and French) out-of-area affair hurt Nato badly. But Nato's 
refusal to have anything to do with the Suez debacle ensured that Nato as 
an organization escaped much of the negative fallout resulting from the 
incident: it avoided being held directly responsible for an <<imperialistic» 
war, and, more importantly, the crisis did not seriously damage 
cooperation in connection with the major task - the defense of the Nato 
area from Soviet aggression. Thus, the Suez crisis was in many ways an 
excellent demonstration of how involved Nato powers could become in 
out-of-area issues, and how this affected Nato, but still, how little Nato as 
an organization was involved. 
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Cha~ter 3: Challellilges t[J) Nato's IIilOIlil-
~oli(Gy Ollil OI.IIta[J)f-area issUles, 1962-1989: 
The UlIilited States 
In Chapter 2 we saw that until the early I 960s, the colonial powers 
wanted Nato to engage in out-of-area issues, and the United States 
opposed it. In the I 960s, the former colonial powers changed their attitude 
and began to advocate limiting Nato's geographical scope and restricting 
Nato involvement in out-of-area issues. Now, however, the United States 
was in favor of Nato engagement in out-of-area issues. The discussions in 
Nato about Cuba following Fidel Castro's take-over was the first major 
instance of this «reversal of roles». 162 
What can explain this change of attitude by the great powers? For the 
colonial powers, the answer seems quite straightforward: with the 
disintegration of the major part of their empires, their interest in 
committing themselves, let alone Nato, in these areas faded. The American 
change of attitude, however, was not so directly linked to material 
interests. The United States did, of course, have substantial national 
interests outside the Nato area, but prior to the early 1960s Washington 
believed that to involve Nato would only dilute and create trouble for 
Nato's main mission, which was the defense of the North Atlantic area. 
When the Americans began to argue to the contrary by the early 1960s, it 
was not American interests that had changed, but rather the perception of 
the Soviet and the communist threat. From initially being a threat to 
Europe, the Soviet Union was now, according to the Americans, a greater 
threat to the Third World. '6J 
In retrospect, it is easy to see that the American fear was exaggerated. 
Certainly the Soviet Union gradually sought to gain influence in the Third 
World following the death of Stalin. Anti-colonialism and the 
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decolonisation process created opportunities. The Middle East was the 
most important region for Moscow. The shipment of weapons to Nasser 
in 1955 was a turning point. In the Congo and Laos in 1960-61, the Soviet 
Union launched its first interventions in the Third World. Soviet 
engagement continued to increase throughout the 1960s, but it Was not 
until the late 1970s that Soviet involvement in the Third World was to any 
reasonable degree comparable with the Western level. In the 1960s, Soviet 
involvement in the Third World was still marginal. Moreover, it was not 
very successful. But as this influence in the Third World had started from 
scratch in the 1950s, any increased interest and activity caused concern. 
Moreover, the Soviet leaders, especially Nikita S. Khrushchev, played 
actively on this Western fear with great success. I'"' 
Despite the evidence - the American concern over the new Soviet and 
communist threat was palpable. As this situation arose after the colonial 
powers had lost most of their interests in the Third World, fierce struggles 
ensued in Nato. To make matters worse for the United States, the smaller 
non-colonial powers were even more reluctant than previously to engage 
Nato in out-of-area issues. Thus, despite strong pressure from the United 
States, Nato continued to hold on to its non-policy. Focus remained on 
what was unquestionably in the common interest of all the members: the 
North Atlantic area. It was not until the 1980s that Nato departed slightly 
from the non-policy on out-of-area matters, and then as a direct result of 
the first massive Soviet onslaught on a nation not belonging to the Soviet 
sphere of interest after World War 11, Afghanistan. 
Before outlining the American challenge to Nato's non-policy on out-
of-area issues from the early 1960s, we will look at some exceptions to 
the traditional American policy of not involving Nato in out-of-area affairs. 
We will then look in more detail at the case which was pivotal case to 
American thinking regarding Nato and out-of-area issues: Cuba after the 
revolution in 1958. The debacle regarding Cuba and the ensuing thaw in 
superpower relations after the missile crisis in autumn of 1962 led to a 
major reassessment of Nato's in out-of-area affairs. As in the mid-1950s, 
after a similar thaw, consultations were the favored device. In the late 
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1960s, American involvement in Vietnam and the question of Nato 
involvement were the main out-of-area issues, which were then replaced 
by the Middle East, Africa and South-West Asia, which in turn dominated 
Nato discussions in the 1970s and 1980s. Nato debates on out-of-area 
issues peaked in the early 1980s after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
and for a while it seemed that Nato would depart from its non-policy. 
However, several conflicts in the 1980s - the war in the Falklands, the 
American bombing of Libya, and the war between Iraq and Iran -
demonstrated the durability and strength of Nato's non-policy on out-of-
areas issues. At the same time, these episodes also underscored the 
traditional preferred alternative among Nato members to having an official 
Nato policy on out-of-area issues: an ad-hoc, informal, bilateral 
cooperation, often of a low-scale military nature, in line with the «coalition 
of the willing» formula. 
Exceptions to the traditional American support of Nato's 
non-pOlicy on out-of-area issues: the North Atlantic 
security dimension 
As shown in earlier chapters, even before the 1960s Washington did not 
rule out that Nato should look beyond its area. But this was always closely 
tied to the North Atlantic security dimension. The military aid to the 
French war effort in Asia and American support of Nato's Indochina 
Resolution in 1952, were granted in response to strong French pressure 
and to ensure that France was able to maintain its European commitments. 
Likewise, the American acceptance of some kind of link between Nato and 
Middle East defense efforts in the early 1950s was due to strong British 
pressure and a realization of the Middle East's importance for Europe. 
Furthermore, the Americans proposed improved consultations in Nato, 
including out-of-area issues, in the mid and late 1950s, as Washington 
believed that Soviet intrusion in the Third World could undermine security 
in Europe. The clearest demonstration that American support of Nato 
engagement in out-of-area issues was related to European security 
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matters, was the American wish to link Nato to - or even include -
adjacent countries important to the security of Europe, such as Greece 
and Turkey. 
Below, we will look at two other cases in which Washington departed 
from its usual policy of not involving Nato in out-of-area issues: 
Yugoslavia for a short period in the early 19505, and Spain for Over three 
decades. Both were closely linked to the security of the North Atlantic 
area. 
As Yugoslavia's leader, Josip Broz Tito, distanced himself more and 
more from the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, the United States saw a 
possibility of inserting a wedge in the communist bloc and drawing 
Yugoslavia closer to the West. The Americans decided to grant Tito 
military and economic assistance and urged its Nato allies to do the same. 
Furthermore, the establishment of an indirect link between Belgrade and 
Nato in 1953-54 by means of the Balkan Pact, of which Yugoslavia, 
Greece and Turkey were members, was welcomed by both the United 
States and Nato. An overland connection between Italy and Greece 
through a friendly Yugoslavia was a very positive prospect for military 
planners. There was talk about technical and legal links between the two 
alliances, and even talk about possible Nato membership for Yugoslavia. 
The latter never reached the formal Nato agenda, however, as Belgrade 
never asked for membership. Moreover, the Balkan Pact turned out to be 
short-lived and the relationship between Nato and Yugoslavia withered 
away.165 
Membership in Nato, however, was exactly what the United States 
wanted for Spain. Even before Nato's inception, Washington had called 
for Spanish membership in the future alliance. Military planners in 
Washington argued that facilities in Spain - primarily airports, harbors and 
overflight rights - would be of tremendous advantage in a strategy for 
Western Europe that relied heavily on reinforcement across the Atlantic. 
For the United States, the military imperatives outweighed the political 
problem that Spain's leader was a fascist dictator who had collaborated 
closely with Germany during World War n. Although the European Nato 
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members realized the military advantages of Spanish membership, they 
were not prepared to disregard ideology so easily. They were not willing to 
compromise the vision of a democratic Nato. Apart from the United States 
and Portugal, no one in Nato wanted Spain to join. '" 
Madrid realized that Spain did not have a high standing in Nato, but 
was also fully aware of Spain's strategic importance to Nato and 
consequently used this as leverage. In March 1949, Madrid insisted that 
«some arrangement should be made as soon as possible, outside the 
framework of the Treaty but in keeping with its spirit, to bring Spain into 
the general picture.» This was achieved in the shadow of the Korean War, 
when Spain in 1953 concluded a bilateral defense pact with the United 
States, which in effect included Spain in the collective Western defense 
against the Soviet Union. Many Nato members expressed misgivings, but 
in reality obtained the best of two worlds: the military advantages of a 
close Spanish-American defense cooperation, without the moral strain of 
having Spain as a Nato member. '67 
Over the next three decades, the question of Spanish membership was 
sporadically raised by Washington. At every juncture, an increasingly 
smaller number of allies blocked Madrid's entry. In 1955, when Spain was 
granted membership to the United Nations and the Federal Republic of 
Germany became a member of Nato, the United States and Portugal 
maintained that the time had come to include Spain in Nato. Only Greece, 
Turkey and Italy agreed. But the United Kingdom and France, which had 
fronted the broad opposition from 1949, modified their resistance, and in 
the years that followed, it was the smaller Northern countries of Nato, 
headed by Norway, which became the staunchest opponents of Spanish 
membership in Nato. 168 
In 1959, the majority of Nato members actually favored, or at least 
were not opposed to, Spanish membership in Nato. By this time, the 
Americans had also developed a political argument in addition to the 
military one: Nato membership for Spain would help to Europeanize Spain 
and would be a «stabilizing element in the Spanish political scene by 
developing a sense of community with the West.» But Norway and 
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Denmark could not be persuaded, not even after the major powers in Nato 
leaned on them to reconsider their position. The only thing that could 
facilitate Spanish membership in Nato, said the Norwegian Foreign 
Minister, Halvard Lange, was the «establishment of a democratic regime in 
Spaim).169 The reason why the United States and the other Nato members 
allowed Norway to exercise its veto in this question was probably that, all 
in all, Nato interests were best served this way. This question was so 
important for Norway that to force Spain's entry in Nato would have 
caused considerable trouble and perhaps even jeopardized Norway's 
continued membership in Nato. That would have been too heavy a price to 
pay. Besides, American bilateral arrangements with Spain were, if not 
perfect for the defense of the Nato area, at least quite satisfactory. 
As the road to Spanish membership was blocked for political reasons, 
American Nato military officials instead engaged in secret talks with 
Spanish officials. In 1959, for example, Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR), General Lauris Norstad, considered «the possibility of 
setting up some kind of relationship with Spain in the field of air defense» 
in which Spain's air defense «could be tied in with SHAPE [Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] planning either by contact directly 
through US forces in Spain or by liaison with Portugai.» During the 1960s 
and 1970s, however, the military contacts between Nato and Spain were 
informal and limited, and were not upgraded until the late 1970s. The 
exact nature of the military relationship between Spain and Nato, however, 
has not yet been revealed. 170 
As long as Spain's leader Francisco Franco lived, Norway and 
Denmark remained impossible to move on this question, even though they 
were under continuous American pressure, especially in the last years of 
Franco's rule. It was only two years after Franco's death in November 
1975 that the Norwegian government finally declared that it no longer 
opposed Spanish membership in Nato. Spain finally became a member in 
1982, ending four decades of American pressure to enhance the North 
Atlantic security through the inclusion of Spain in Nato.'" 
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The first major American calls on Nato: Cuba, improved 
consultations and Vietnam 
In the I 960s, the American hesitancy on out-of-area issues was replaced 
by an active policy, which tried to engage Nato in out-of-area issues. The 
general reason was an increasing awareness in Washington in the latter 
half of the 1950s that the communist threat was growing in the Third 
World. A more immediate factor was the foreign policy ofthe democratic 
administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. They came to 
share the beliefthat communist advances in the Third World posed a more 
immediate threat than the Soviet threat to the North Atlantic area. 
Moreover, if the West did not deal with this threat, the threat to the North 
Atlantic area would become increasingly serious. At the heart of the policy 
was the old domino theory combined with an increased emphasis on 
credibility: if it was to be seen as a credible and viable alternative to 
communism, the West had to stand up to the Soviet Union and fight the 
communist threat anywhere in the world. A concrete expression of these 
beliefs was the new American national security concept in the 1960s, 
based on extended commitments and flexible response. The basis of the 
new concept was a belief in the principle of the balance of power. In the 
I 960s, the democratic administrations firmly believed that even minor 
changes in the periphery - the Third World - could tilt the balance, set off 
a chain reaction and, in the end, affect American national security. To 
prevent this, the United States and its allies had to increase and restructure 
their defense in order to be able to meet the enemy at every level of 
aggression. In 
It was President Kennedy who paved the way for this kind of thinking. 
He had for a long time been interested in Third World matters, and devoted 
his time to such issues when in power. But perhaps developments in Cuba 
were even more pivotal to Kennedy's foreign policy. He regarded the new 
Castro regime in the American backyard as communist-directed, and 
asked for Nato support in fighting the regime even before the dramatic 
missile crisis in 1962 which nearly resulted in an armed conflict with the 
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Soviet Union. Following the missile crisis, the new American President, 
Lyndon B. Johnson, called for improved consultations in Nato, among 
other things in order to be better prepared to meet communist challenges 
in the Third World. This became even more important as the United States 
became increasingly involved in the conflict in Vietnam, a conflict which 
for many years overshadowed Washington's attention to Europe, which, 
in turn, concerned the European Nato allies deeply. 
Limited JNlato policies on Cuba 
After Fidel Castro's take-over in Cuba in 1958, Washington underlined the 
danger of allowing communism to gain a foothold On the American 
continent and began to lobby for Nato engagement in Latin-America. 
Thus, another region was added to Nato's out-of-area concerns. 
Washington's first step was to propose the establishment of a Latin 
American Expert Group in Nato in 1961. The other Nato members agreed 
to this, provided it was kept secret, in order to avoid allegations that Nato 
was meddling in Latin American affairs. m 
Next, the Americans called for Nato allies to impose sanctions on 
Cuba. In February and May of 1962, the United States asked its allies in 
Nato to refrain from shipping weapons and other strategic materials to 
Cuba, to include Cuba on the list of nations targeted by the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) system, to be 
cautious in giving credits, to limit their trade with, and not transship 
American goods to the island. The chairman of the Policy Planning 
Council, Wait Whitman Rostow, talked about a united Atlantic front against 
Cuba, including both the Organization of American States (OAS) and 
Nato, because Cuba was of concern to the whole of Western security. 
Most other Nato allies were reserved. They shared the American concern 
regarding Cuba and agreed to restrict arms deliveries, but not much 
beyond that; a collective Nato policy was out of the question. Cuba was 
not a threat to Nato, they maintained, not even to the United States. Thus, 
Cuba should not be the object of a collective Nato policy. Besides, such a 
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policy would probably generate negative responses. Including Cuba on the 
list of nations targeted by the COCOM system, for example, would 
probablY play Cuba into the hands ofthe Soviets and be costly in terms of 
Europe's relations with the rest of Latin America. When the Americans 
then went on to propose that Cuba should not be formally included on the 
list, but instead that there should be a gentlemen's agreement to not send 
materials covered by COCOM to Cuba, this was not well received. 
Instead, a compromise was worked out during summer of 1962, based on 
a Danish proposal. Nato members would review arms sales in six months, 
assess whether export to Cuba was a problem, and then come together to 
discuss the matter again. A similar solution was found regarding credits. 
Moreover, Nato discussions on Cuba were to be kept secret, and it was 
stressed that Nato nations should not act collectively, but individually. This 
could not, of course, hide the fact that the discussions and solutions on 
how to deal with Cuba in these matters were in fact dealt with within 
Nato,l74 
In August-September 1962, when it became known that Cuba received 
substantial aid from the Soviet Union, Washington found greater 
understanding among its allies. The principal argument against the 
American proposals was that Cuba did not pose a threat to Nato nor to the 
United States. This changed as it now became clear to everyone that the 
Soviet Union was directly involved in the matter. In addition, the debate 
became more concrete for Nato when it became known that Nato powers 
were in fact aiding the Soviets in their support of Castro: according to 
American sources, during the first seven months of 1962, 141 ships from 
ten Nato countries had made 209 calls at Cuban ports while under charter 
to countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Preventing Western ships from going 
to Cuba now became a top priority for Washington. President Kennedy 
stated publicly that he would urge Nato allies to support him in this. Many 
Nato countries did indeed do this, but the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Greece, Denmark, France and Norway - the most imp0l1ant 
shipping countries - did not, claiming to defend the principle of free trade. 
The traditional skepticism to engage in out-of-area issues was also a 
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factor, especially for Norway and Denmark.'" 
The United States could not accept this. The Congress went on to pass 
acts that would forbid economic assistance to countries whose ships 
carried goods that were economically beneficial to Castro and military 
assistance to countries whose ships carried arms or strategic materials to 
Cuba. The administration also threatened to implement further sanctions 
on countries whose ships made port calls on Cuba. In addition, and 
probably equally important to the shipping countries, was the implicit 
threat of being cut off from the American shipping market in the event of 
non-compliance with the American wishes. Apart from the United 
Kingdom and France, which did not back down in the face of this 
considerable pressure, even after the missile crisis in October 1962, the 
rest of Nato's shipping countries gave in. Thus, Washington had in its first 
serious attempt succeeded in using Nato as an arena from which to pursue 
out-of-area policy, and in reality forced Nato to adopt a policy on Cuba, 
even though Nato technically, as an organization, did not do anything 
regarding Cuba. l76 
When the missile crisis came to a head in October, it overshadowed all 
other issues. Nato, however, did not play an active role in the crisis. The 
United States did not even consult Nato. (The United Kingdom was really 
the only country to be kept generally informed during the crisis.) Nato 
accepted this, as the crisis clearly was an event where the time factor 
inhibited normal consultation, a situation the Three Wise Men's report had 
taken into account. After the crisis, all Nato members praised the United 
States for its handling of the crisis. Only later did de Gaulle express the 
sentiment that the United States had endangered Europe in an out-of-area 
issue. It may have been possible that the Soviet Union, in the event of an 
American attack on Cuba or the vessels carrying the missiles, could have 
retaliated against Nato's Jupiter bases in Turkey.l77 
This leads on to an aspect of the crisis that seriously worried Nato, and 
Turkey in particular: the speculation as to whether a part of the deal that 
made KItrushchev recall the vessels on their way to Cuba was an 
American promise to remove Nato Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The United 
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States denied that there had been any deal. We now know that there was 
indeed a deal involving the Jupiter missiles. This was a small concession, 
however, as the missiles were outdated and would most likely have been 
scrapped in the near future anyway. The Americans decided to keep this 
part of the bargain secret, as they feared it would undermine Nato 
cohesion if it were known. Only a chosen few, among them President 
Kennedy's close friend, the British ambassador to Washington, Sir 
Ormsby-Gore, received prior indication that the United States was 
considering the inclusion of the Turkish Jupiter missiles in a deal with the 
Soviet Union. m 
The events surrounding Cuba were the turning point regarding 
Washington's attitude to whether Nato should become involved in out-of-
area issues. Washington was now convinced that the Soviet and 
communist threat outside Europe was great enough to warrant attention 
from the major Western actors. Washington's pressure on Nato, however, 
was only partly successful. Even though Nato's traditional non-policy was 
in practice altered slightly, it was formally maintained. 
Yet another call for improved consultations 
The evidence of a thaw between the superpowers after the Cuban missile 
crisis led, as a similar thaw had done in the mid-1950s, to an internal 
debate in Nato about possible new tasks and new areas - beyond 
containment of the Soviet Union in Europe. Much of the new activity 
came in the form of various proposals for improving the consultative 
faculties, in much the same vein as in the mid- and late 1950s. Another 
similarity was that again it was the Americans who took the lead in calling 
for improved consultations. What was new in the mid-I 960s, however, 
was that the Americans now especially wanted to include out-of-area 
issues in the consultative process, something they had been reluctant to do 
previously. 
The debate in the mid-1950s had resulted in some concrete measures: 
the Wise Men's report, the Political Committee, the Regional Experts 
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Groups, and a few years later, the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG) 
for long-tenn studies and world problems. The geographical Scope of 
Nato, however, was not extended. But this appeared to be what the 
Americans had in mind, when they launched additional proposals for 
improved consultations after the Cuba crisis. Some of the proposals were 
more mainstream, such as the idea of creating an «executive group within 
NATO available for quick consultatiom>, or that the NAC should meet in 
Washington in emergencies, and that there should be four extra NAC 
meetings a year. A more controversial proposal was the so-call ed Rostowl 
Bowie thesis of 1965 (after the American officials, Wait W. Rostow and 
Robert T. Bowie), which argued in favor of a coordinated Western global 
policy through Nato. The response to all these proposals, however, was 
largely negative. 179 
The British, along with Nato's Secretary General Dirk U. Stikker, were 
at this point in time perhaps closest to the American view. They wanted 
«as much hannonization of policy as possible within and outside the 
NATO area», and, given the present thaw, wanted to revitalize and gear 
Nato to other tasks because «the most immediate military threat to the 
security of the Western Powers is at present outside Europe.» The British 
were among other things considering whether Nato should conduct 
political «contingency planning» in out-of-area issues based on the Berlin 
model: «By the careful selection of contingencies for study we might by 
this means extend the practical interests of the Alliance beyond the NATO 
area.» In addition, they believed extended consultations were 
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a means of widening the horizon of the smaller NATO countries. It 
helped to instill in them a sense of collective responsibility for Western 
interests outside the area of the Alliance. The Scandinavians, for 
instance, who used to be reluctant to take part in such discussions for 
fear of involvement, now seemed much readier to do so, recognising 
that their interests were indirectly involved in the fortunes of their allies 
in other parts of the world /80 
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The British did, however, have special issues which they wanted to keep 
for themselves, where they did not want Nato to become involved. Cyprus 
was a case in point. In a document that stressed «the need for 
harmonisation of Western policies outside the Atlantic arem), it was also 
underlined that: «It would be best to say nothing about Cyprus in the 
general debate. We are doing what We can to ensure that discussion on 
Cyprus is avoided or at least kept to a minimum, preferably in a separate 
restricted session».181 
It was, of course, still in the United Kingdom's interests that Nato 
became more concerned about out-of-area issues. The British still spent 
substantial amounts of money in the Far East and Middle East, and talked 
about the «burdens which we bore [ ... ] on behalf of NATO», which were 
a «contribution to achieving the common aims of the Alliance.» The British 
recognized that Nato's first concern was the North Atlantic area, but as 
Nato shared the same essential interests and aims, it should seek to 
harmonize policies out-of-area, where there was an indirect, but growing, 
threat to Nato. The Congo, Indonesia, and Vietnam were problems not 
only for Belgium, the United Kingdom and the United States, but for the 
whole of Nato. The British were particularly concerned about cost-
sharing: 
Why should UK. go on devoting 7% of GNP [gross national product} 
to defence while others devote only 4 % or 5 %? [ . .} UK. cannot 
continue to occept situation. Only US. and UK have world-wide 
defence commitments: should not be discriminated against because part 
of effort is outside Europe. Defence of free world indivisible: threats in 
Middle and Far East affect other members of alliance: military cost 
should not be borne by only two powers. Position made more acute by 
fact that overseas expenditure contributes 10 balance of payments 
problems. [ . .] Overseas commitments cannot simply be dropped Other 
shuulders must take larger share. U.K ready 10 discuss in alliance how 
this might be done. 
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This emphasis on non-European theaters manifested itself in the British 
Defence reviews in 1957 and again in 1962. These toned down the 
defenses of Europe and instead emphasized the British presence in Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East, as the security of these areas was more vital 
than ever for the security of Europe. '" 
Still, the British differed from the Americans on several important 
points. The most common argument against the American proposals was, 
as a British policy paper from 1965 stated, «that the machinery as it stands 
is adequate and efficient.» The British would rather see consultation 
«grow like Topsy rather than be formalised». One reason was the 
realization that diverging interests among Nato members were the real 
obstacle: 
Changes in machinelY are unlikely to produce more effective co-
ordination of policy. [. . .j The obstacle to co-operation of policy lies not 
in NATO machinery but in the divergent interests of members 
governments. This naturally applies particularly outside the NATO area 
Another reason was that the British did not want Third World countries to 
have the impression that «NATO countries are trying to run their affairs 
for them from Paris.» And finally, the British did not want a confrontation 
with France.183 
In contrast to the British, most other allies, and especially France and 
the Scandinavian countries, were negative to the American proposals. 
They were not opposed to consultations as such, but did not want any 
coordination and did not want to include out-of-area issues. France 
favored bilateral consultations between the countries in question. One 
reason was that they believed the United States dominated Nato and thus 
would have too much influence on the outcome of these policies. The 
smaller countries simply did not want Nato nor themselves to be involved 
in out-of-area issues. This was seen to be even more important now that 
the conflict in Vietnam was escalating.'"' 
Despite the negative attitude of many Nato members, something 
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concrete did emerge from the whole debate about possible new tasks and 
scope for Nato. One new feature was special Nato meetings on various 
topics. In 1965, for example, meetings were held on Africa/Congo, 
Vietnam and the Middle East. Another consultative device was an item on 
the North Atlantic Council's agenda called «political statements». A third 
device was institutionalized reports to the North Atlantic Council from the 
Chairman of the Political Committee on topics under discussion in the 
Committee. Finally, and perhaps the most important measure regarding 
out-of-area issues, was the increased number of expert groups that would 
deal with area-specific topics, which were to become institutionalized and 
permanent. 185 
In the eyes of some British officials, the meetings of the expert groups 
had two general objectives: I) to enable Nato members to discuss out-of-
area matters, 2) to produce reports on these matters. Another benefit of 
the meetings was that they offered the smaller powers, «the feeling of 
taking a full share in NATO consultations». Indeed, some British officials 
believed that «these meetings are something which we must put up with 
for the sake of the lesser brethren in the Alliance, even though they must 
at times be frustrating for our representatives at them.») Some (<lesser 
brethrem>, however, like Norway, felt that the meetings provided useful 
infonmation, and represented a possibility to influence the bigger nations, 
but they still did not want to use them for policy coordination purposes. IB6 
Despite these modest improvements in the consultative process, the 
Americans did not get the response they had hoped for when they had 
called for improved consultations, also on out-of-area issues. A British 
policy paper summed it up this way in 1965: 
on problems which, though of great concern to most NATO countries, 
do not directly involve the Soviet threat to the Treaty area, consultation 
has mainly been limited to simple exchanges of views. [. . .] NATO as a 
political forum amounts mainly to a clearing house for political 
information. It also affords a permanent, fairly sympathetic audience 
for the presentation of already decided national policies and an 
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opportunity for allies to express their views on these policies frankly 
and secretly. /87 
The problem with consultations on out-of-area issues was in reality the 
same that precluded a common policy on out-of-area issues in the first 
place: various interests, perception of threat and ideology. This made it 
virtually impossible to define which cases were suitable for consultation 
and, more importantly, what kind of consultations Nato should implement. 
Still, by giving the various Nato members a possibility to air concerns and 
to discuss out-of-area matters in Nato, unbinding consultations did in 
many cases function as a useful valve. Steam was let off and frustration 
was aired, without threatening to jeopardize Nato cohesion regarding the 
defense of the Nato area. 
lNlato and American involvement in Vietnam 
Already in 1962, Washington contacted its Nato allies about the possibility of 
forming a group for coordinating economic aid to Vietnam. 'SB As the United 
States became more and more involved in 1964-65, American attempts to 
obtain support from its allies for American policies in Vietnam became more 
urgent. At meetings in both spring and autumn of 1965, the Americans urged 
their allies to give moral support and direct assistance. This could be military, 
economic and/or humanitarian, or at least some form of compensation in 
Europe to offset American burdens in Vietnam. The United States was 
especially eager to get support from the United Kingdom - both direct support 
in Vietnam and compensating measures elsewhere in the Third World, 
particularly in the Middle East. However, moral support was most important. 
Even a British bagpipe platoon would be of help - it was the visibility of the 
British flag in Vietnam that mattered the most for the Americans. '89 
The United Kingdom was, along with several other allies, negative to begin 
with, but became more supportive from 1965 onward. Denmark, Canada, 
Norway and France, however, were simply negative. The other nations 
expressed understanding, but only the Federal Republic of Germany and 
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Turkey were clearly supportive of the United States' policy in Vietnam. The 
reluctant allies shared the American concern about what was happening in 
Vietnam, but did not agree with the American interpretation and handling of 
the conflict. Especially troublesome for many smaller nations was the 
American readiness to resort to military means. With large domestic groups 
opposing the American involvement in Vietnam, fear of guilt by association 
was considerable, and Nato involvement was out of the question.!OO 
In addition, many Nato members feared that American involvement in 
Vietnam would drain the American resources at Nato's expense. These fears 
were well founded. In 1965, the Secretary of the American Army admitted to 
the Congress that the American forces in Europe were temporarily weakened 
as a result of the war in Vietnam. In May 1967 Washington announced plans 
to withdraw 35000 soldiers, as well as several aircraft, from the Federal 
Republic of Germany. In November 1967 the Americans announced that they 
could no longer guarantee that they would send five divisions to Europe within 
sixty days if a conflict should break out in Europe. Between 1964 and 1972, 
the American forces in the Federal Republic of Germany were cut from 
263000 to 210000, and other places in Europe from 119000 to 62000, and in 
«Europe afloat» from 54000 to 26000, in total a reduction from 436000 10 
298000. In addition, large amounts of maleriel were withdrawn from Europe. 
«We robbed our NATO forces blind from 1965 to 1972», said RobertKomer, 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. One prominent scholar maintains that 
Washington's commitment in Vietnam «had grown to the point, by 1968, that 
the United States would have been hard-pressed to respond anywhere else in 
the world had a comparable crisis developed.»!'! 
American disillusionment with Nato's non-engagement 
in nearby areas, 1967-1979 
The substantial American defense commitments in Vietnam and the 
question of Nato's priorities were part of the background for the great 
«burden sharing» debate that started in the mid-1960s. Another significant 
factor was that the United States was in relative economic decline 
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compared with Europe. Bearing in mind these two facts, the Americans 
believed that the Europeans lacked understanding for what in American 
eyes were common problems - both inside and outside Nato. The 
American frustration resulted in mild legislative measures and threats of 
harder ones to cut the American commitment to Europe. The most drastic 
measures were not carried out, but the Americans did cut world-wide 
commitments dramatically from the late I 960s. The Nixon doctrine from 
1968 gave the most striking illustration ofthis: 
America cannot - and will not - conceive all the plans, design all the 
programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the 
free nations of the world We will help where it makes a real difference 
and is considered in ollr inleresl. 192 
To compensate for the loss of direct influence, the Americans began to 
rely more on their allies around the world. They began to "Vietnamise» the 
conflict in South-East Asia; they counted more and more on three vital 
aIlies in the Middle East - Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia - and demanded 
that their European allies assumed more responsibility for their own 
defense. But things did not work out as Washington had hoped, neither in 
the Third World nor in Europe. The result of the American withdrawal 
from the Third World was not replacement by American allies, but rather 
increased opportunities for the Soviet Union. Consequently, Washington 
tumed to Nato for help in countering Soviet infiltration in these areas. The 
Europeans, however, were not prepared to engage Nato in this task. In 
fact, they even dragged their feet regarding an increase in their defense 
commitments within the Nato area. This created resentment and 
disiIlusionment in Washington, and gave rise to serious disputes in Nato, 
especially regarding areas close to Nato: the Middle East, the 
Mediterranean and Africa. J9J 
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American involvement in the Middle lEast 
Following the Suez crisis, the United States had continued the process of 
taking Over the United Kingdom's responsibility in the Middle East. The 
most potent illustration of this was the Eisenhower doctrine from 1957, 
which stated that the United States would employ military force to defend 
friendly regimes in the Middle East against communist aggression. And 
that was exactly what Washington did. In the late 1950s, the United States 
was heavily involved in helping anti-Communist regimes to stay in power 
in Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. The most direct involvement was the 
invasion of the Lebanon in summer of 1958. All these interventions, 
however, were carried out unilaterally or in cooperation with London. 
Washington clearly pointed out that Nato was not directly involved,]94 in 
full accordance with Washington's long-standing policy of not involving 
Nato in out~of-area issues. 195 
After the Lebanon affair, the United States changed its strategy in the 
Middle East and sought closer relations with the Arab countries, especially 
Egypt. But this came to an end with the Six Day War in 1967 between 
Israel and many Arab nations, in which the United States unequivocally 
sided with Israel. Washington immediately urged for a coordinated Nato 
policy on the Middle East, listing many reasons why this was necessary: 
the Middle East was adjacent to the Nato area, Nato had strategic interests 
in the region - oil and the Suez canal in particular -, and Nato would 
benefit from overflight- and base rights in the region. The other Nato 
members acknowledged these reasons. Secretary General Manlio Brosio 
wanted Nato to participate in active coordinating consultations regarding 
the crisis. The West German Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt, maintained 
that the crisis raised the question of whether Nato had the ability to react 
quickly to crises outside Nato, and urged Nato to make contingency plans 
for similar situations in the future. Many Nato nations were not certain, 
however, that supporting Israel was the right way to secure Western 
interests in the Middle East. France, for example, branded Israel as the 
aggressor and instead preferred to be on good terms with the Arabs. Nor 
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was the majority of Nato nations ready to coordinate Nato policy on the 
Middle East, or indeed involve Nato at all in the region. 106 
Six years later, in October 1973, the Middle East again erupted in war -
disagreements about the «Yam Kippum war became the most serious out-
of-area clash in Nato since the Suez crisis. But the roles had changed: now 
it was the United States that wanted to support Israel and use force to 
stop Egypt (and the Soviet Union, which intervened heavily on the Arab 
side), whereas the United Kingdom and France - in addition to most of the 
other Nato nations - were reluctant to use force and help the Israelis. The 
Nato allies disagreed about almost everything, but the most serious 
disagreements were 1) whether to extend military support to Israel, 2) 
how to handle the Soviet Union, and 3) how to cope with the Organization 
or Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) oil embargo after the war.'97 
One of Washington's first priorities after the outbreak of the war was 
to supply Israel with arms and other goods. In order to do this swiftly, the 
Americans requested base rights from their Nato allies. At first, they used 
their bases in Germany, but Bonn stopped this as soon as it realized what 
the Americans were up to. Turkey, a crucial country for the United States 
in its handling of the war, denied American use of its bases, because they 
were «for the security and defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area and 
have been set up solely for defense cooperative purposes of Turkey.» The 
United Kingdom refused to permit the Americans to use their bases on 
Cyprus, and France even actively undermined the American war effort by 
sending oil tankers to Libya and Saudi Arabia during the crisis. Only 
Portugal gave explicit permission to the United States to use its bases, but 
only because the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, threatened 
to withdraw the American commitment to defend the country if the 
Portuguese did not yield. The Netherlands was the only Nato ally that 
actually supported Washington in this out-of-area issue. This Nato attitude, 
a furious Kissinger claimed, in fact made it easier for the Soviet Union to 
use Nato airspace than for the United States, as Soviet aircraft flew freely 
over Turkey and Greece to Egypt and Syria with supplies, without Ankara 
and Athens protesting.'" 
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The second major source of conflict between the United States and 
their Nato allies was how to handle the Soviet Union. During the crisis, 
Moscow threatened to increase its intervention. This provoked 
Washington to implement a military alert involving nuclear forces, thereby 
transforming the crisis into a serious East-West affair. It troubled Nato 
allies greatly that they were not informed of the American moves. The 
main purpose of consultation in Nato was precisely to consult on out-of-
area issues of this kind. The West German Chancellor, WilIy Brandt, 
demanded that Washington treated Europe as an equal partner and 
maintained that «partnership cannot mean subordinatiom>. The American 
explanation for jts lack of consultation - fear of leaks - did not molliJY the 
Europeans, on the contrary. The Americans for their part did not like what 
they considered to be a soft European response to Soviet behavior. 
Kissinger accused the allies of acting selfishly and only thinking of reaping 
the economic harvest of detente without contributing to Western 
security.199 
The third source of conflict was how to handle the oil embargo by 
OPEC after the war. Both the United States and its European allies 
recognized the importance of Middle Eastern oil to Western security and 
economic well-being. But there were differing opinions as to which means 
should be applied in order to protect these interests. While the United 
States and the Netherlands wanted to play hardball with the oil-producing 
countries and consequently faced a total oil embargo, the other European 
Community countries went to great lengths to be on good terms with the 
Arabs and therefore faced only limited restrictions in oil supplies. The 
United Kingdom and France virtually escaped the sanctions because they 
concluded their own agreements with the Arab countries. In fact, France 
even initiated a so-called «Euro-Arab dialogue», which infuriated the 
Americans. 2oo 
Behind this lack of consensus regarding an indisputably important out-
of-arca issue for Nato were differing perceptions of threat, conflicting 
preferences regarding means, and interests. Kissinger strongly argued that 
vital common security interests for Nato were at stake and that the 
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conflict should first and foremost be viewed in an East-West perspective. 
The Europeans, however, were more sensitive to the local factors behind 
the Middle East tensions and did not see the Soviet Union lurking in the 
background at every juncture. As regards means, Washington wanted 
Nato to support the Israelis unequivocally, while the Europeans wanted a 
more nuanced response. They were also eager to maintain good working 
relations with the Arab countries. Different interests were at play here. 
First, Europe was far more dependent on Arab oil and had developed a far 
tighter web of economic and cultural contacts with the Arabs than the 
United States. Second, the European allies did not want to take a 
confrontational stance towards the Soviet Union, because they did not 
want to abort the fragile process of detente, which was so important to 
Europe, both in terms of security and economy. Third, the Europeans 
strongly objected to the American habit of defining common security on 
behalf of Nato. They could not see that it was they, and not the United 
States, who undermined Western solidarity. Later, Kissinger dryly 
commented that the Yom Kippur war «was not [ ... ] one of the finer 
moments in allied relations.»:!01 
Intra-allied squabbles in the Mediterranean troubles 
Washington 
The United States was increasingly concerned about Soviet intrusion in the 
Mediterranean from the end of the I 960s. The Americans believed that 
Moscow would take advantage of the declining French and British 
influence in the area, the rising Arab nationalism and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Washington expressed particular concern about the rapidly 
growing Soviet maritime build-up, not only in the Mediterranean, but on 
other oceans, too. These concerns were shared by many officers involved 
in Nato military planning, who quite often were frustrated by the strict 
geographic boundaries of Nato. The Soviet Union did nut have a self-
imposed line on the Tropic of Cancer or indeed anywhere else. Nato had, 
however, albeit within strict limits, conducted military planning for 
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maritime operations out-of-area for a long time. From the early 1950s, for 
example, Nato discussed various plans for the protection of Western civil 
shipping in the event of war. In connection with the Soviet maritime 
expansion in the Mediterranean from the late 1960s, Nato created a mobile 
fleet in the Mediterranean in 1967, and the following year a Maritime Air 
Force Mediterranean was established in Naples to coordinate surveillance 
of the area. In addition, the Sixth Fleet was given a higher priority in 
American strategy. Although the Scandinavian members did not entirely 
agree with the pessimistic American threat analysis, all members agreed on 
the measures. The United States was satisfied by this recognition of the 
Mediterranean's importance to Nato security.'" 
But the situation in the Mediterranean was, in Washington's view, still 
far from satisfactory. Intra-allied problems threatened to undermine Nato's 
position and even endanger Nato itself. Especially troublesome was the 
Cyprus issue, an issue the Soviets sought to exploit. Following the 
apparently peaceful solution of the Zurich arrangement in 1959, violence 
again erupted between the Turkish and Greek populations on the island in 
1964. The Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonii, threatened to invade 
Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots from what he saw as Greek Cypriot 
aggression. President Lyndon B. 10hnson reacted by sending a stem letter 
to the Turkish leader: Turkey could not count on Nato assistance in the 
event ofa Soviet attack, in the light of the country's behavior regarding 
Cyprus. The American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, said in Nato that 
the United States simply would not accept an invasion of Cyprus by either 
of the allies. Fighting between Greece and Turkey was, Rusk emphasized, 
«literally unthinkable». Turkey, bordering the Middle East, the 
Mediterranean, and the Soviet Union, hosting important bases for Nato and 
the United States, and being a moderate Muslim country, played a key role 
in the region. Washington had no qualms about interfering in an intra-allied 
problem which was technically an out-of-area issue for Nato. Both the 
United States and the United Kingdom wanted to avoid discussion of the 
Cyprus issue in Nato, so that an out-of-area affair would not distract, or 
possibly destroy, Nato. Therefore, both governments tried to mediate in 
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the conflict. For example, a peace-keeping force in which Nato played a 
major role was proposed, and indeed even a Nato peace-keeping force 
was suggested, but with little success. As in the late 1950s, prominent 
Nato officials also made efforts to reconcile the two allies, but with no 
more luck than the Americans or the British. As none of these efforts was 
successful, and as Washington was determined not to allow an intra-allied 
conflict over an out-of-area issue endanger Nato, the United States had to 
raise the issue in Nato. The logic of avoiding out-of-area issues in Nato in 
order to stay out of trouble, did not apply here, as this particular issue 
involved two allies and was not a conflict between allies and outsiders.") 
The Cyprus conflict entailed a break from Turkey's traditional close 
relations with the United States. Ankara initiated its own variant of an 
OSlpolilikk towards the Soviet Union, and from the late 1960s restricted 
American overflight rights and the use of bases on Turkish soil. This was 
serious, not the least in the light of the Soviet naval build-up in the 
Mediterranean. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 did not exactly improve 
American-Turkish relations. The following year, the Cyprus crisis erupted 
again. In response to a coup in Nicosia staged by the Greek Junta, Turkey 
invaded the island, allegedly to protect the Turkish minority, despite 
warnings from the United States. Nato's Secretary General tried to 
mediate, but failed again, just as Nato had done in the 1960s. The United 
States declared a weapons embargo on Turkey, which retaliated by 
nationalizing all 25 American-Turkish bases. Nato bases, however, were 
kept open. The following year, the embargo was partially lifted, and in 
1978 it was removed. Ankara responded by lifting some restrictions on the 
American use of Turkish bases, but demanded economic support. 
American-Greek relations did not fare much better over the Cyprus issue. 
Greece blamed the United States for not preventing the Turkish invasion 
and left Nato's military structure for six years in protest, threatening to 
leave Nato altogether. '01 
All in all, the skirmishes in the Mediterranean provided additional 
evidence for Washington that out-of-area conflicts between Nato allies, if 
such conflicts jeopardized Nato and its ability to protect the Nato area, had 
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to be addressed. This course of action was preferred to non-involvement 
as all means possible had to be explored in order to avoid providing 
opportunities for the Soviet Union to gain influence in the Mediterranean. 
American concerns over Africa 
The last American calls for allied action in out-of-area issues which fell on 
deaf ears were in connection with communist advances in Africa. The 
first case to appear was in Angola. After the collapse of Portuguese rule in 
Angola in 1974, different factions were struggling for power. The United 
States supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) 
and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNlTA), while 
the Soviet Union and Cuba supported the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In December 1975, influenced by the 
Watergate affair, the troubles in Vietnam, scandals in the CIA and anti-
apartheid winds, Congress decided to stop aiding its factions, which left 
no obstacles in the way of an MPLA victory, backed by Soviet-aided 
Cuban forces. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger deplored the decision, 
but stood alone in his desire to continue fighting the communists in 
Angola. The Communists celebrated a major symbolic victory which 
enhanced the Soviet Union's reputation in the Third World.'" Kissinger did 
not give up, however, and continued his crusade in Nato, saying that the 
credibility of the West was at stake. Some agreed, but the majority viewed 
these events in the light of the African aspirations for independence and 
freedom, rather than in an East-West context. Portugal, now under 
socialist rule, even permitted Cuban planes to use airfields on the Azores 
on their way to Angola. The majority agreed, however, that Nato should 
not play any role in the conflict. 206 
The new American president from 1977, Jimmy Carter, had a different 
outlook on African affairs from Kissinger. Carter was more cautious in 
interpreting developments in Africa in an East-West context, and more 
inclined to view them from a local perspective. This probably explains his 
attitude to the so-called Shaba I and II incidents in 1977 and 1978. In both 
DEFENCE STUDIES 4/1999 111 
cases, forces operating from Angola attacked the Shaba province in Zaire 
and initially gained control. In both instances, however, France and 
Belgium intervened on the Zairian side and threw the attackers out. The 
United States was concerned, but did not interfere in the conflicts, other 
than providing some logistical support to repel the second invasion, and 
together with the United Kingdom, praised France for its efforts in Africa. 
France, on the other hand, was heavily involved, not only in these two 
incidents, but also in several others on the African continent: in Mauritania 
in 1977, and in Morocco, Chad, and the Central African Republic in 1978. 
Although the French sometimes operated with the support of some Nato 
allies (primarily Belgium, but also Portugal and sometimes the United 
States), France absolutely did not want the operations to be Nato affairs. 
In fact, alongside the Scandinavian countries, France was the leading 
proponent of maintaining the established non,policy on out,of,area issues 
in the 1970s. Again, the cooperation between some Nato powers on out, 
of,area issues shows that the preferred alternative to concerted Nato 
action or policy was an ad,hoc, informal, bilateral cooperation, often of a 
low,scale military nature, based on the «coalition of the willing» 
fonnula. 201 
President Carter was more inclined to adopt an East, West perspective 
on the situation in the Horn of Africa than elsewhere in Africa, as he 
believed that the Soviet Union, again in collaboration with the Cubans, was 
gaining considerable influence in an important part of the continent, at the 
approaches to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf with all its oil 
resources, by supporting Ethiopia in its conflict with Somalia over the 
Ogaden province in the years 1977,78. But like Kissinger, Carter did not 
have the domestic or allied support to do anything about it, apart from 
giving half,hearted support to Somalia in the early stages of the conflict. 
Some Nato countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
had a tradition of being a verbal advocate of strong Western responses to 
what Bonn regarded as Soviet attempts to establish spheres of influence in 
Africa, aired their concern, but were not ready to take action. The United 
Kingdom and France also supplied Somalia with defensive arms, but there 
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was a solid majority in Nato that did not want to engage the organization in 
the various struggles in the Horn of Africa. The Danish and Norwegian 
traditional view of not engaging Nato in out-of-area issues prevailed, now 
supplemented by the argument that the events in Africa should primarily be 
judged in an African perspective, and not only in an East-West context.'o, 
Hesitant and limited Nato out-of-area engagement, 1979-
1989 
The process of Soviet infiltration in the Third World started in the 1950s, 
progressed slowly in the 1960s, and accelerated in the 1970s. This convinced 
Washington that the West was losing ground to the Soviet Union in the Third 
World. Washington had repeatedly given warnings ofthis in Nato, but had not 
succeeded in provoking Nato to do anything collectively out-of-area. It was 
not until the early 1980s that Washington finally got a positive, albeit reluctant, 
response. The reason for this was the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan 
in late December 1979. 
Following the invasion, the Americans launched a major campaign in Nato 
in an attempt to get the Europeans to share their perception ofthreat regarding 
the situation in South West Asia and to apply the necessary means to contain 
the Soviet Union. Even the staunchest opponents of a collective Nato out-of-
area policy, the Scandinavian countries, admitted that the situation had 
changed after the Soviet Union's first invasion of a country outside its sphere 
of influence since World War 11. But this did not mean that they, or the other 
Nato allies, were ready to engage Nato out-of-area or expand Nato's 
geographical scope. What they were prepared to do, after prolonged 
discussions, was to improve consultations on such matters, to air Nato's 
concerns in the communiques, and to compensate within the Nato area for 
actions taken on national basis by individual Nato members - primarily the 
United States - to address the new situation. So, even though the link between 
out-of-area issues and a specific Nato policy became more clear-cut than ever 
before in Nato's history, it was still far from what the Americans had hoped 
for when they started the campaign.20' 
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One reason for the hesitant European response was that they still did 
not share the American perception of the Soviet threat after the invasion of 
Afghanistan. Another reason was that the Europeans were more careful to 
avoid harming the process of detente than the United States. They were 
close neighbors with the Soviet Union, and potentially big trading partners 
with the Eastern European countries, and thus had a lot more to lose if 
detente collapsed. There was probably also an element of free-riding in the 
European response: it was more beneficial to let the Americans bear the 
brunt of the defense efforts and hide behind the American deterrent, than 
to spend money oneself, with the additional risk of losing even more if 
detente collapsed. 
The modified approach to out-of-area issues was tested and developed 
in several incidents later in the decade, particularly in the Falklands War, 
the Libya incidents and the war between Iraq and Iran. The Nato 
members' response to these events demonstrated that the traditional 
fonnal non-policy on out-of-area issues remained largely intact, but was 
supplemented with some compensating measures and a greater realization 
that Nato was more directly affected by out-of-area issues than previously 
assumed. What was more striking, however, was that these events proved 
that the traditional ad-hoc, infonnal, bilateral cooperation of a low-scale 
military nature between Nato members with interests in a particular out-
of-area issues was indeed a viable alternative for Nato. 
Afghanistan and changes in Nato's non-policy 
The revolution in Iran in 1978, the ensuing hostage crisis, and the Soviet 
Union's invasion of Afghanistan, in particular, represented a watershed in 
American foreign policy. These events dramatically changed the context 
and content of American efforts to get allies to do more in containing the 
Soviet Union outside Nato. In National Security Advisor, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski's eyes, the Soviets were «emboldened by our lack of response 
over Ethiopia)) and other places in the Third World during the I 970s. 
Thus, to regain credibility and to stop the Soviet momentum, the United 
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States and the West had to stand up and respond harshly and effectively. 
President Carter agreed. Immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan, 
Washington launched a series of economic and other sanctions against 
Moscow. The United States also increased its presence in the Indian 
Ocean and Persian Gulf, increased the supply of arms to friendly countries 
in the region (Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia), and sought to gain 
access to naval and air bases in Oman, Kenya, Somalia and other places. It 
also increased its defense budgets and activated the plans for a Rapid 
Deployment Force (RDF). The idea of such a force was born in a 
response to the crisis in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78. The RDF was to 
be deployed in Third World contingencies and was intended to make the 
United States less dependent on volatile local allies. It was therefore a 
major departure from Nixon's policy which relied heavily on local allies 
around the world. In 1981, RDF totaled some 200,000 troops with 
support functions. It was drawn from existing forces, especially those 
earmarked for Nato. This meant that Nato was invariably drawn into the 
events in the greater Middle East and the Persian Gulf at the end of the 
1970s, something Washington zealously underlined in talks with its 
European allies. 21O 
In early January 1980, President Carter maintained that the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan was «the greatest threat to peace since the Second 
World War.» Later that month, he declared, in what subsequently became 
to be known as the «Carter doctrine», that «[aln attempt by any outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an 
assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an 
assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military 
force.»:!11 
The invasion also upset Nato, which entered into a long and, as it 
turned out, difficult, process to establish an appropriate response. It was 
obvious to everyone that the new situation had to be addressed in Nato's 
communiques; in other words, the device of «explicit statements» had to 
be activated. But how this should be done was not obvious. One parallel 
was the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Nato had then 
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issued a warning to Moscow in its communique: «Clearly any Soviet 
intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the 
Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave 
consequences.» The communique in 1968 had received much attention, 
especially as it was so vague and thus stimulated speculations as to which 
countries it referred to. The Israelis, for instance, thought or hoped they 
was included, and were therefore satisfied. The Yugoslav government 
mouthpiece Barb regarded the communique as a sort of a de facto 
guarantee for Yugoslavia's sovereignty and independence. American media 
speculated whether Nato had extended the geographical scope of its 
commitments. This was categorically denied by Nato officials. And 
indeed, no such thing was intended. Nato members had Yugoslavia, 
Romania, Austria and Albania in mind when they formulated the 
communique. But Nato was very satisfied that the Soviet Union was 
unsure as to which countries Nato had implied. Employed correctly, 
«explicit statements» could be an effective device. m 
In 1980 Nato was prepared to go further and adopt a clear and official 
stance in an out-of-area issue. The first Nato communique after the 
invasion referred to South West Asia as being of «crucial importance» to 
Nato and that the invasion required increased solidarity among members. 
Those countries (dn a position to do so», especially the United States, 
should do what they could to ensure peace and stability in the region. 
Other countries agreed «to do their utmost to meet additional burdens for 
NATO security which could result from the increased United States 
responsibilities in South West Asia.» It was particular important to 
strengthen Nato's South-East Flank. Thus, it appears that a division of 
labor was established: the United States would have the major 
responsibility for protecting Nato's interests in South West Asia, while the 
other members should compensate the reduced American capabilities in 
the Nato area.m The explicit recognition that events out-of-area did have a 
direct bearing on Nato, and that Nato members should employ various 
measures to protect Nato, was a major step forwards from previous 
communiques and was repeated in the next couple of years. Perhaps the 
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strongest modification of the traditional non-policy was presented in the 
Oefense Planning Committee's (OPC's) May 1981 communique, which 
stated that «common objectives [ ... ] may require members of the Alliance 
to facilitate out-of-area deployments in support of the vital interests of 
all.»214 
One major reason why the United States pushed so hard for stem 
language in the Nato communiques was that the Carter administration, and 
from 1981 the Reagan administration, needed to placate the Congress and 
secure Congressional support for the ROF. The NAC communiques, 
however, did not go as far as the OPC communiques, as defense ministers 
were not so afraid to challenge the non-policy as the foreign ministers. 
Another reason was that France did not participate in the NAC. France, 
which had joined and in many ways taken the lead from the Scandinavian 
countries in opposing the American stance in out-of-area issues, noted the 
difference and protested against the OPC communiques. Other members, 
especially Norway, also tried very hard to prevent the texts from the ope 
from going too far. While Norway recognized that out-of-area events had 
«implications» for Nato, and that Nato should therefore engage in 
consultations, and individual members should compensate within Nato or 
even facilitate support to active Nato nations on an individual basis, they 
emphasized that policies regarding areas outside Nato were «a matter for 
national decisiom).'" 
But communiques were not sufficient. The invasion of Afghanistan 
was perceived as a blatant display of aggression. In addition, the Soviet 
Union was now moving dangerously close to the vital Persian Gulf with all 
its oil resources. It was agreed that Nato had to prepare for new 
contingencies - also out-of-area - and build up arms in general.'''Thus, in 
March 1980, Nato decided to accelerate the agreed defense expenditure 
increases, and thus send a signal to the Soviet Union that actions out-of-
area were important to Nato and would not go unnoticed. A couple of 
months later, Nato's defense ministers rejected an American suggestion to 
create a Nato strike force to deal with out-of-area crises, but agreed to 
implement a series of measures- «Afghanistan, phase I» - aimed at 
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strengthening Nato within the Nato area. In December 1980, after strong 
American pressure, Nato went even further and agreed to «Afghanistan, 
phase 2», in which Nato collectively would compensate for possible 
American, Nato earmarked, forces that may be used in a conflict in the 
South West Asia.m 
The exact nature of the measures was fiercely debated over the next 
few years. In sum, the American proposals were: 1) Nato presence in the 
Middle East/South West Asia in peacetime (naval and air deployments, 
exercises with partners in the region, councilors and training programs), 
2) Nato economic and military aid to local partners, 3) overflight- and base 
rights from Nato partners, 4) strategic capacity for mobility in case the 
United States had to operate in two places at the same time, in addition to 
fulfilling its obligations for the defense of Europe, 5) Nato military 
participation (on a bilateral basis outside Nato), 6) compensation from 
non-engaged Nato powers in the form of increased defense efforts within 
the alliance. The others members found this to be excessive. They were 
prepared to give some support, but only nationally, not through Nato or by 
Nato. It was very important to many members, that the United States was 
not given some sort of carte blanche support in out-of-area issues. At the 
same time, however, those countries which were most reluctant to engage 
themselves or Nato out-of-area, were glad that the United States in reality 
took on as much responsibility out-of-area on behalf of Nato as they did. 
But a formal Nato policy on out-of-area issues was out of the question.'" 
In 1982, Nato decided to undertake a study of the exact compensating 
measure required from each ally, called South West Asia Implementation 
Study (SWAIS). The SWAIS was engulfed by disagreements between the 
United States and most of the European countries in 1983, but in the 
following year, based on SWAIS, Nato decided to set 2-year force goals 
for each ally in order to compensate for the potential use of American 
forces in South West Asia. The goals were not binding but, the allies were 
still forced to consider in detail what consequences American operations 
out-of-area would have for Nato and for each individual country. 
Underlying this compromise was the fear that possible American 
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engagement out-of-area would seriously harm the defense of the Nato area 
if it was not balanced by compensating measures. Moreover, the 
Europeans had to show at least some understanding for the United States' 
priorities, in order not to undermine Washington's will to commit military 
forces to Europe. In addition, a wide range of individual compensatory 
arrangements were established. For example, nine Nato members agreed 
to increase their contribution of long-range civilian cargo and passenger 
airplanes in the event that the United States was engaged in an crisis 
outside Nato; several Nato members, including the Federal Republic of 
Germany, agreed to increase their defense in the Nato area and give the 
United States overflight and base rights in connection with possible 
operations in South West Asia; the French and British strengthened their 
own rapid reaction forces for deployment outside Nato and maintained 
their forces in the Indian Ocean; many Nato members, including countries 
that had not engaged in out-of-area issues after World War 11 (Italy), 
participated in multilateral peace-keeping missions in Lebanon (Multilateral 
Force· MNF and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon - UNIFIL) and 
in Sinai (Multilateral Force and Observers - MFO); some nations, like the 
Federal RepUblic of Germany, agrecd to extend economic support to 
Greece, Turkey, Portugal and even Pakistan, in order to strengthen the 
defense at Nato's South-East border. All these measures illustrated a new 
readiness to take the out-of-area challenge seriously and to take concrete 
steps to meet the challenge, short of a collective Nato policy.m 
Still, this did not satisfY the Americans, and a new round of the 
burden-sharing debate began. Members of Congress said that the 
American contribution to the defense of Europe could be reduced if the 
Europeans were not prepared to assume greater responsibility in the 
defense of Western interests in South West Asia or to compensate 
sufficiently for this within the Nato area. Europe could not «have it both 
ways».220 
The disagreement stemmed from fundamental differences, especially 
regarding perceptions of threat and the application of means. In general, 
the European allies (with the exception of the United Kingdom, which was 
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closer to the American view than the other European allies) were not 
happy that the United States constantly tried to get Nato engaged in out-
of-area operations. In addition, they felt that the United States was far too 
concerned with military solutions at the cost of diplomatic ones. They also 
felt that the Americans too readily and mistakenlY saw local and regional 
conflicts in an East-West perspective and placed excessive emphasis on 
the domino effect and credibility, and thus contributed towards polarizing 
such conflicts. They were much more concerned than the Americans that 
the arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union and detente in general 
should not be jeopardized. Their economic interests in pursuing the 
process of detente were greater than Washington's and they were 
reluctant to join Washington in their sanctions against Moscow. In fact, 
some West European countries increased their trade with the Soviet Union 
and in effect «picked up the slack in American trade». West German 
Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, said in 1980 that «We will not permit ten 
years of detente and defence policy to be destroyed.» The overriding fear, 
however, was that the United States would drag Europe into a conflict it 
had nothing to do with, and possibly trigger a war in Europe.221 
The reluctance among politicians to involve Nato in out-of-area issues 
was sometimes frustrating for Nato's military planners. Especially the 
increased Soviet maritime build-up during the 1970s caused concern. 
Some measures had indeed been implemented. In 1972, for example, the 
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) was given authorization 
to plan how to protect commercial shipping in the South Atlantic and the 
Indian Ocean. Still, many officers continued to worry. In May 1979, the 
Norwegian Chairman ofthe Nato Military Committee from 1977-1980, 
General Herman F. Zeiner Gundersen, noted that, since open lines of 
communication were vital, the fact that Nato countries did not control the 
situation south of the Tropic of Cancer was a weakness. His concern was 
probably not diminished by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One of 
Nato's top ranking military officials, Admiral Gilnther Luther, wondered 
whether Nato should consider using naval forces also outside the 
geographic Nato area. He assumed that this would be welcomed by 
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cooperating countries. I! is not yet possible to tell the extent to which 
military officials gained support for these views from political leaders, as 
the material is not available.'" 
The alternative to an out-of-area policy in the 19805 
Even though the results of the American attempts to get Nato more 
involved in out-of-area issues in the early 1980s did not match American 
ambitions, developments later in the decade showed that there had been 
some change in Nato's non-policy on out-of-area issues. More striking, 
however, is the continuation of the traditional alternative to Nato's non-
policy on out-of-area issues: the ad-hoc, informal, bilateral cooperation, 
often of a Iow-scale military nature, between individual Nato powers. This 
type of cooperation was quite visible and seemed to work well in the 
1980s. One example of this was the Falklands War between the United 
Kingdom and Argentina in 1982; another case was allied cooperation in the 
Persian Gulf during the Iraqi-Iranian war. But this kind of cooperation 
required some common understanding of the potential threat of the out-of-
area issue in question. In cases where perceptions of threat, interests or 
ideology clashed, however, cooperation was not easy. Libya is a case in 
point. 
The Reagan administration was in general positive towards Argentina. 
I! regarded the country as a good ally against the Soviet Union and 
especially suited to containing the Soviets in the South Atlantic. The 
amicable relationship between the United States and Argentina was 
probably one reason why Argentine generals did not think that Washington 
would interfere if they invaded the Falklands, which they did in April 1982. 
Immediately, and without conSUlting their Nato allies, the British 
dispatched a task force to protect their compatriots. At first, the United 
States did not interfere, and declared itself neutral. This angered London, 
which expected that Washington would support an ally which was 
confronted with outright aggression from another country. The British 
were appeased, however, by the substantial unofficial American support. 
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In reality, the British got almost everything they wanted, such as 
sidewinder rockets, airplane fuel, airport mats, mortar shells, and 
intelligence information. The Americans even filled in the holes in Nato 
defense of the North Atlantic area as a result of the British action in the 
South Atlantic. What the British did not receive, however, was official 
support and combat troops. The main reason for this was worries in 
Pentagon that the United Kingdom would actually lose the war. Ifthe 
British were to lose the war, it would be a terrible blow also to those who 
supported them, included Nato. Another fear was that British war efforts 
would drain too much from Nato's defense in Europe. Approximately 70 
per cent of the British Navy was active in the war against Argentina. There 
was also a danger that the Soviet Union would use the opportunity to gain 
influence in the South Atlantic. The Americans remained formally neutral 
until the Argentine generals turned down a peace proposal from the 
American Secretary of State in late April 1982. Washington then started to 
support London officially. Washington's fears that the United Kingdom 
would not win the war were soon proved to be unwarranted. When the 
British task force finally reached the Falklands at the end of May, the war 
was quickly over: Argentina surrendered in the middle of June.m 
Most of the other Nato allies supported the United Kingdom with 
reference to a United Nations Resolution that demanded that Argentina 
withdraw from the Falklands. Belgium and France even helped the British 
by providing fighter-training for British airmen. Only Spain, the newcomer 
to Nato, with its traditional links to Latin America, did not support London. 
The British several times expressed their gratitude in Nato for the 
individual support given by Nato allies.:!24 
Washington had for a long time been concerned about Soviet intentions 
and capabilities in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. From the late 
1960s and through the 1970s and 1980s, there had been a massive Soviet 
naval build-up in the Indian Ocean, and Moscow acquired access to naval 
facilities in Aden, Somalia, and Mauritius. The United States tried to 
counter this with a substantial increase in its military presence in the 
Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region. Moreover, President Carter issued his 
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famous doctrine revealing the seriousness with which the United States 
viewed Soviet intrusion and instability in this vital region.'" 
Consequently. the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s caused deep concern in 
Washington. It also became clear that Western interests were directly 
affected by the conflict. After several shooting episodes against Kuwaiti 
oil-tankers. and against Western commercial and military vessels in 1986-
87, the United States decided to take action by escorting Western ships 
and to reflag Kuwaiti ships with American flags. Washington made a futile 
attempt to get Nato involved in this; several allies were willing to make a 
contribution, but only as long as it was on a national basis. The 
Netherlands, however, managed to achieve some coordination under the 
Western European Union (WEU) umbrella. Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and even Italy agreed to cooperate in a 
protection scheme in the Persian Gulf. The Federal Republic of Germany 
also participated indirectly by assuming greater responsibility for the 
Western part of the Mediterranean (Nato area). Norway, which was not a 
WEU member, also volunteered to compensate for allied contributions in 
the Persian Gulf by increasing its presence in the English Channel. By the 
autumn of 1987, individual Nato members had together assembled the 
largest concentration of Nato naval units (approximately 80 ships) since 
the Korean War. Nato, though not formally involved, was thus in reality 
conducting an out-of-area operation. In a way, this was confirmed early in 
1988, when six Nato countries with forces in the region established an 
informal joint command for minesweeping. Moreover, at a meeting in 
spring of 1988, five Nato countries decided to improve the cooperation in 
the Persian Gulf in order to avoid overlapping. Albeit informally, even 
France participated. As long as Nato was not formally involved, France 
was quite willing to cooperate on military matters. It was stated that each 
country should only protect its own forces in the Persian Gulf, but the 
United States on one occasion protected a Danish supertanker (Denmark 
did not have military forces in the region) and it was unlikely that other 
naval units in the war zone would have just sat idle if an allied ship had 
been attacked. This kind of ad-hoc, bilateral and mostly informal military 
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cooperation was regarded as a quite plausible way to operate, given the 
political reluctance to cooperate formally under the auspices of Nato.'" 
In the Persian Gulf, allied interests and perception of threat seemed to 
converge. Consequently, an informal cooperation was possible. In other 
instances, diverging interests and perception of threat made cooperation 
impossible. Several American clashes with Libya confirm this. In 1981, 
Libya made claims on the Gulf of Sidra, outside the shores of Libya. The 
United States could not accept this and took action against Colonel 
Muhammar al-Qaddafi. Libya retaliated by firing missiles against the Italian 
island ofLampedusa (ironically since Italy had denied United States 
overflight rights and access to Italian bases for its attacks against Libya). 
The missiles did not hit the island, but since this was a near attack on Nato 
territory as a consequence of unilateral American military action against 
the recommendation of other Nato members, it created havoc in Nato. 
Washington and Rome also clashed over the so-called Achille Lauro affair 
in 1983, in which terrorists hijacked an Italian cruise-liner. This time the 
Italians protested against the American use of Italian bases for action in a 
non-Nato issue. And finally, in 1986, the United States again attacked 
Libya, this time after a series of terrorist attacks Washington believed were 
staged by Libya's leader, Qaddafi. American airplanes based in the United 
Kingdom and on vessels in the Mediterranean bombed Libyan cities, killing 
several Libyans. Again Nato allies, most notably France, disapproved of 
the attack. 22' 
Conclusion 
In the early 1960s the United States changed its mind and decided that it 
was necessary to engage Nato in out-of-area issues, primarily due to a 
changing perception of threat. The United States had been aware of the 
Soviet and communist threat in the Third World earlier, but was convinced 
that it was becoming more serious and, if unchecked, could eventual1y 
threaten the Nato area. Prior to the 1960s, the United States had only 
departed from its non-policy on out-of-area issues when Washington felt it 
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was necessary for the defense of the Nato area. The initial support for 
France in Indochina, the sympathy with British attempts to position the 
West in the Middle East, the advocation of Spain's inclusion in Nato, 
and the eagerness to link Yugoslavia with Nato, are all examples of this. 
The new communist threat from the early 1960s, highlighted by 
Soviet involvement in Cuba, communist advances in Asia, Africa and 
not the least in the Middle East, was thought to be of a different nature 
than previously, and in certain ways more serious than the threat to 
Europe. In reality, it could then be argued that the Americans did not 
«reverse» their policy, but only adapted it to what they saw as a new 
threat. 
But why, then, call on the Nato allies in this situation? Why not let 
the Europeans take care of their own defense and take on the new 
threat alone? After all, the Americans had assumed considerable 
responsibilities of behalf of the West before. Now, however, 
Washington believed that this was no longer possible. The hard 
economic facts were that the United States became less economically 
powerful, in relative terms, vis-a.-vis its European partners in the 
1960s. Thus, many policy-makers in Washington began to advocate 
that the United States should encourage its Nato partners to assume 
more responsibilities outside the Nato area. The lack of success can be 
explained by many factors. An important one was that the new Nato 
strategy, flexible response, demanded increased defense efforts from 
all Nato allies within Europe, and left little room for additional 
expenditure. The result of these American demands, therefore, was not 
a common Nato policy, but rather endless «burden-sharing» debates 
from the end of the 1960s, through the 1970s and into the 1980s. 
However, economy was not the principal reason why the allies 
responded negatively to the American calls for engagement out-of-area. 
The differences in interests and perceptions of threat were more 
decisive. And as none of the parties were willing to press the issue for 
the sake of maintaining cohesion regarding Nato's main mission, Nato 
did not change its non-policy. The two important exceptions to this -
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Cuba in the early 1960s and Afghanistan in the early 1980s - are largely 
explained by the direct Soviet involvement in these conflicts. As long 
as events in Cuba were seen as Western hemisphere business, 
Washington's allies were not willing to compromise Nato's non-policy. 
It was only after it became evident that the Soviets were directly 
involved that Washington's allies were willing to implement certain 
measures which in reality compromised Nato's non-policy. Again, with 
regard to Afghanistan, when it was evident that the Soviets were 
responsible for this out-of-area crisis, the Nato allies felt that Nato had 
to take a stance. Thus, it seems that the only out-of-area issues to be 
recognized by all allies as a Nato concern, were those with a clear-cut 
connection to Nato's primary task, to defend the Nato area from Soviet 
aggression. And even in such instances, Nato was cautious in its 
involvement. 
This restrictive attitude as to what constituted a threat to Nato did 
create considerable resentment in Washington and bitter struggles in 
Nato. However, by largely maintaining its non-policy, Nato avoided 
getting involved in controversies in the Third World, dispersing even 
more resources than Nato already did as a result of American 
engagements out-of-area, and undermining cohesion regarding the 
main area of concern - the North Atlantic area. 
Besides, the alternative to a common Nato policy, the ad-hoc, 
bilateral, and mostly informal military cooperation between those with 
interests in a specific issue outside of Nato, seemed to work quite well. 
The Falklands War and the war between Iran and Iraq were examples 
that preempted the «coalition of the willing» formula that became so 
fashionable after the Cold War. The rationale behind the idea was 
almost as old as Nato itself. American Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, laid out the fundamental principles of this idea already in the 
early 1950s, when he reassured the smaller Nato allies that the 
inclusion of Greece and Turkey would not mean additional 
responsibilities for them; only those with major interests in the newly 
extended area and other areas outside Nato should contribute to its 
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defense. What the other members could do, however, was to 
contribute to the common cause by taking on increased responsibility 
within the Nato area, which is exactly what they did as a result of the 
big out-of-area debates in the 1980s.'" 
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Co ne ilJl si«ms 
A prominent Nato expert has stated that «NATO has meticulously avoided 
adopting a formal out-of-area strategy.»'" This study confirms that 
statement. We have seen that, by and large, during the Cold War Nato 
decided to have a restrictive geographical scope, by limiting the number of 
members, by focusing on immediate threats to the Nato area, and by 
having a non-policy regarding out-of-area issues. But this attitude was not 
evident from the beginning, and there were to be some exceptions later on. 
In Nato's first years, exceptions to the generally restrictive view of 
Nato's geographical scope were the admission of Italy and Algeria, the 
inclusion of Greece and Turkey, Nato's involvement in the Indochina issue 
and its support of various British initiatives in the Middle East. All these 
cases, however, were closely related to the European security dimension, 
either because France's willingness and ability to contribute to Western 
defense was conditional on support for these issues, or because they were 
related to the defense of Nato's South-East border, in an out-of-area 
region of particular importance to Nato, as it was adjacent to Nato, very 
volatile, and contained vital oil resources. B ut these exceptions, especially 
the Indochina issue, had substantial repercussions for Nato. By meddling 
in clearly out-of-area issues, Nato opened up a can of worms of diverging 
interests, perceptions of threat and ideology. Many Nato countries became 
increasingly critical of France's actions, and some experienced serious 
trouble in domestic arenas. The result was that Nato became more 
protective of its non-policy on out-of-area issues in the years that 
followed. The Suez crisis is a case in point. By not supporting the United 
Kingdom and France when they got into trouble in an out-of-area issue, 
Nato got itself into trouble, but probablY gained more by avoiding 
involvement in this controversial affair and thereby not alienating anti-
colonial members of the alliance. Involvement could have created more 
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trouble for Nato than that experienced by the organization, as it could have 
undennined cohesion regarding the defense of the North Atlantic area. 
Exceptions to the non-policy that occurred in the later years varied but 
shared one common trait with the earlier exceptions: they were all closely 
related to the North Atlantic security dimension. One type of exception 
was when two allies fought over an out-of-area issue. In the case of 
Cyprus, Nato hoped that the two countries would find a peaceful solution 
themselves, but when this proved not to be the case, Nato felt obliged to 
try to solve the matter, for the sake of Nato cohesion regarding its main 
mission. A second type of exception, for example the Cuban and 
Afghanistan affairs, is also explained by concern for the Nato area. In both 
cases Nato departed from its non-policy because of clear acts of 
aggression by the Soviet Union. A third kind of exception was when a 
Nato member successfully used its assets to defend the North Atlantic 
area in order to obtain benefits in an out-of-area issue. This happened, for 
example, when the United States backed down in its criticism of 
Portugal's colonial policy, because Portugal threatened to deny the 
Americans the use of their bases on the Azores. 
As this study has tried to demonstrate, the above-mentioned cases 
were all exceptions. The main policy was that of not having one. The 
fundamental reason for this was that beyond the consensus on trying to 
protect the Nato area from Soviet aggression, the various members' 
interests, perception of threat, and ideology differed too much to facilitate 
a common policy on other issues. What, then, were the interests, 
perceptions of threat, and ideology that prohibited a Nato policy on out-of-
area issues throughout the Cold War? 
The United States, as one of two superpowers, had global interests and 
perceived the threats accordingly. In principle, throughout the entire Cold 
War period, Washington wanted to contain the Soviet Union all over the 
world. Until the early 1960s, however, they were averse to using Nato in 
this global struggle, and instead insisted that the organization should focus 
on Europe. There were three main reasons for this. First, they regarded 
the Soviet threat towards Europe as far more serious than the Soviet threat 
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elsewhere. Accordingly, Western efforts and resources should be 
concentrated on Europe. Second, Nato resources - collectively and 
individually - were regarded to be so meager that it would be unwise to 
commit them outside Europe. Third, the Americans were declared anti-
colonialists and sought to minimize «guilt by associatiom) by refusing to 
take part in colonial struggles. They were, as they saw it, already too 
closely associated simply by being allied to the colonial powers. The 
balancing act between being brothers in anns in some aspects of foreign 
policy and enemies in others was not easy and led to bitter disputes 
between the United States and the colonial powers. 
In the early 1960s, these three factors changed. Washington now 
believed that the Soviet threat had changed its focus from Europe to the 
Third World, that its European allies had recovered sufficiently after World 
War 11 to use more resources in the global fight against the Soviet Union, 
and that the colonial stain on the major European powers' foreign policy 
had faded with time. Consequently, they wanted Nato tn be more involved 
in out-of-area issues. 
Prior to the early I 960s, the colonial powers had primarily regional 
interests, though the United Kingdom did also have a global outlook. 
Beyond their homelands, they focused mainly on regions were they had 
colonies. Whether it was the case or not, they often portrayed their 
opponents in their colonial struggles as communists aided by the Soviets. 
Thus, they maintained that these regional threats were in effect global and 
closely connected to Nato's main mission. Consequently, Nato allies 
should support them in their out-of-area struggles. However, when their 
colonial interests diminished from the I 960s on, they primarily focused on 
their homelands, and consequently were negative when the Americans 
then advocated Nato involvement in out-of-area issues (with the exception 
of the United Kingdom, which generally was more inclined than the other 
fonner colonial powers to side with the United States). 
Nato allies that were neither superpowers nor colonial powers primarily 
had local interests throughout the Cold War and consequently were most 
worried about the Soviet threat to them: the Scandinavian powers and 
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Canada were concerned about the Soviet threat to the Northern Flank and 
Northern sea lanes; the Federal RepUblic of Germany, Italy, Greece and 
Turkey were concerned about the Central and Southern Flanks. In 
addition, most ofthese countries were also ideologically averse to 
colonialism. Moreover, when the United States wanted to step up the war 
on communism and alleged Soviet adventurism all over the world from the 
early 1960s, many of these countries - which were now even joined by 
some of the former colonial powers - found this not only unwise, but also 
morally difficult to support. The Scandinavian powers in particular had 
problems, not least due to domestic opinion and their respective 
parliaments. They constantly faced a dilemma between defense 
imperatives on the one hand, and ideology on the other. In terms of 
security, they were dependent on the major powers taking on global 
responsibilities in defense of the West, but in terms of ideology, they did 
not like the power politics that this implied. 
The differences in interests, perceptions of threat, and ideology are, 
however, insufficient in explaining Nato's non-policy on out-of-area 
issues. As all Nato's major powers at some point wanted a common Nato 
policy in different out-of-area issues, it would be reasonable to expect that 
they would have pushed harder to have their views accepted in Nato. But, 
with a few exceptions, they did not. Why? Primarily because this could 
have created trouble in relation to achieving Nato's main mission, 
defending the Nato area from Soviet aggression. Instead, the Western 
countries chose to deal with out-of-area issues outside Nato on an ad-hoc, 
informal, bilateral, and quite often low-scale military basis, according to a 
«coalition of the willing» formula. 
All this was to be very different after the Cold War, when the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact dissolved and Nato's declared enemies 
thereby disappeared. Now, Nato had to think about its raison d'etre, and 
out-of-area issues were suddenly at the eenter of Nato attention. 
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